Cash

• Criminals physically deposit banknotes and coins, splitting or staggering amounts below reporting thresholds to avoid detection.
• The anonymity, portability, and immediate liquidity of physical currency make it an ideal instrument for introducing illicit proceeds into the banking system through repeated small placements.

• Bribes are often handed over in cash, evading electronic monitoring systems.
• Physical currency lacks an inherent transactional record, reducing suspicious activity flags compared to digital transfers.
• Criminals may also structure repeated smaller cash payments to avoid threshold-based reporting.

• Illicit proceeds can be introduced into large construction projects through bulk cash payments to undocumented workers or shell subcontractors, resulting in minimal transactional records.
• Cash-intensive operations facilitate the circumvention of AML reporting thresholds and obscure the money trail, as physical currency is harder to trace and can be repeatedly deposited or withdrawn under various pretexts (e.g., construction wages, material purchases).

• Property-based businesses often handle significant amounts of physical currency from tenants or customers.
• Criminals introduce illicit cash into these daily receipts, making unusually large amounts appear standard for a cash-intensive operation.
• This approach facilitates the placement and layering of illegal proceeds, obscuring the true source of funds.

• Criminals provide physical currency to tenants or deposit it themselves as alleged rent, directly introducing illicit funds into the property's income flow.
• The inherent anonymity of cash transactions conceals the true source of funds, facilitating the seamless integration of criminal proceeds.

• Criminals introduce physical currency directly into real estate closings, sidestepping typical banking records and transaction monitoring.
• They often structure payments in smaller amounts below reporting thresholds, avoiding detection and standard AML scrutiny.
• This immediate use of cash enables a rapid conversion of illicit proceeds into property assets without many traditional financial red flags.

• Mules receive illicit proceeds in physical form and perform structured cash deposits below reporting thresholds to evade detection.
• Withdrawals in cash similarly mask the original fund source, adding layers of anonymity for the real launderers.

• Criminals hand over illicit physical banknotes to money mules, who deposit them into crypto ATMs that require minimal or no identification.
• Physical cash is difficult to trace, allowing perpetrators to swiftly place and layer illicit proceeds into the crypto ecosystem without creating a clear audit trail.

• Mules bring in illicit funds as physical cash, often distributing deposits among multiple individuals to stay below threshold limits.
• Casinos accept these cash transactions with relatively limited on-the-spot scrutiny, allowing criminals to introduce illicit currency into the financial system.
• The anonymity and portability of physical banknotes make it difficult for authorities to trace the origin of the funds once exchanged for chips.

• Customers provide or receive physical currency directly through IVTS operators, circumventing formal banking channels.
• Minimal documentation and reliance on trust-based relationships obscure the origin and destination of illicit funds.
• Cash transactions allow operators to bundle legitimate remittances with criminal proceeds, making it harder for authorities to detect anomalous transfers.

Unlicensed MSBs accept physical currency from multiple criminal clients without conducting the required due diligence or issuing receipts. They combine these funds and dispense equivalent payouts in another jurisdiction or currency, bypassing formal banking channels. This informal parallel settlement conceals the true origin of the cash and avoids reporting thresholds.

Criminals settle hot transfer balances hand-to-hand using physical bills, bypassing formal banking channels. By dividing large sums into smaller amounts and relying on personal trust networks, they evade conventional detection measures and obscure the true counterparties involved in each exchange.

• NEP actors move physical currency through trusted couriers or brokers across multiple jurisdictions, bypassing traditional banking oversight.
• Large amounts of cash can be exchanged for cryptocurrency with minimal or no KYC, hiding the true origin of the funds.
• The off-the-record nature of these cash transactions complicates detection, as there is little documentation or audit trail.

• Hawala relies heavily on cash deposits and withdrawals, allowing criminals to hand over physical currency to the hawaladar with minimal paperwork.
• The anonymity of cash transactions, combined with informal recordkeeping, makes it difficult for authorities to track the flow of funds.
• Large sums can be moved quickly and discreetly, exploiting hawala’s trust-based nature to hide illicit proceeds from scrutiny.

• Criminal organizations hand over bulk US dollars in physical form to the peso broker, circumventing official currency exchange channels.
• The broker then uses these cash proceeds to settle foreign trade invoices (e.g., paying US exporters), blending illicit funds with legitimate import payments.
• Because transactions occur largely off the regulated banking grid, it becomes difficult for authorities to trace the origin of the dollars back to criminal activities.

• Daigou coordinators directly pay surrogate shoppers with physical cash to avoid formal financial channels.
• This reliance on cash transactions obscures the fund trail, reduces AML oversight, and facilitates the bulk purchasing of goods with illicit proceeds.

Illicit currency is physically introduced into the cash register or safe of the front enterprise and deposited as “sales”, exploiting the anonymity and high turnover of cash-intensive sectors such as restaurants or convenience stores.

• Operators of fraudulent call centers may receive bulk cash from scam victims, disguised as payments for telemarketing services.
• They deposit or transport these physical funds as routine income, reducing paper trails and obscuring the actual sources.
• The anonymity of cash and its ease of deposit under presumed service fees further complicate detection by authorities.

• Criminals channel illicit currency into an entertainment front (e.g., concert promotions) by claiming it as ticket or merchandise sales revenue.
• The cash-intensive nature of live events allows them to inflate reported attendance or sales, making it difficult for authorities to verify legitimate earnings.
• This anonymity and difficulty in reconciling actual versus claimed cash flow help obscure the illegal source of the funds.

• Criminals conduct business or personal transactions in cash, omitting or underreporting these amounts in official income filings.
• Revenue from cash-intensive operations can be manipulated to show lower receipts, masking the real income.
• Illicit cash can be recorded as legitimate yet untraceable revenue streams, reducing apparent taxable earnings.

• Criminals divide large amounts of illicit cash into multiple small deposits at financial institutions (e.g., below USD/EUR 10,000) to avoid triggering currency transaction reports or other mandatory disclosures.
• By varying the locations and timing of deposits, each transaction remains below official thresholds, making it difficult to detect the aggregation of these sums.

• Illicit cash is broken down into numerous small bills, allowing criminals to make frequent small deposits, each staying under official CTR or STR triggers.
• This tactic leverages the anonymity of physical currency, which complicates tracing its true origin before deposit.
• By using multiple tellers or branches, they can further disperse transactions, reducing the chances of any single institution noticing unusual patterns.

• Criminal proceeds in physical cash form are placed into the remittance channel and deposited into the unsuspecting beneficiary's account instead of legitimate funds.
• By substituting or mixing the illicit cash with legitimate incoming transfers, criminals circumvent more rigorous AML scrutiny on large or unexpected cash deposits.

At both the placement and layering stages, criminals deposit physical currency in small increments at remittance outlets to avoid the scrutiny associated with larger cash deposits. On the receiving side, funds are promptly withdrawn in physical cash, further concealing the transaction trail. This ready convertibility into cash allows offenders to evade traditional banking oversight and frustrates subsequent tracing efforts.

• Criminals deposit sub-threshold amounts of illicit physical currency through deposit-taking ATMs, avoiding direct scrutiny from bank staff.
• By splitting total illicit funds into multiple small cash deposits below reporting thresholds, they evade automated transaction monitoring alerts.
• Rapid, repeated deposits across various ATMs and times leverage the anonymity and convenience of self-service machines, making detection more difficult.

• Criminals deposit multiple small sums of physical currency across different accounts or ATMs, staying under reporting thresholds to avoid scrutiny.
• The direct, face-to-face nature of cash transactions reduces traceability, helping smurfs introduce illicit funds without triggering alerts for large deposits.

• At charitable events or donation drives, criminals can contribute physical currency anonymously, bypassing formal donor documentation.
• Large cash sums can be broken into smaller increments below reporting thresholds to avoid raising suspicion, effectively placing illicit funds into the non-profit’s revenue streams.
• The physical nature of cash reduces traceability, offering criminals an initial layer of anonymity before blending with legitimate charitable receipts.

Insiders with access to teller or vault operations can deliberately bypass requirements for large cash transaction reporting by suppressing or neglecting mandatory currency transaction reports. They may overlook repeated structured deposits or expedite unusual cash withdrawals without triggering standard AML checks, allowing illicit funds to move in or out unchallenged.

• Once payments reach the fake vendor’s account, part of the funds can be withdrawn and handed out in physical currency.
• The use of cash for partial refunds, bribes, or kickbacks obscures the financial trail by eliminating electronic records of fund flows.
• This anonymity and difficulty in tracing cash transactions enhance the effectiveness of the fake vendor laundering process.

Although placement is usually manual, scripts may quickly pull ATM cash deposits back into digital form via instant transfers, completing the cash→digital→layer loop before CTR systems react.

• Criminals deposit or withdraw physical currency while declaring it to be from legitimate sources, such as donations, personal savings, or business revenue.
• By supplying falsified documentation or vague explanations for the cash's origin or intended use, they bypass standard suspicion triggers.

• Criminals place large sums of illicit physical currency directly into safe deposit boxes, sidestepping traditional bank deposit channels.
• By paying the rental fees in cash and avoiding formal account deposits or withdrawals, they can bypass reporting thresholds and reduce transaction scrutiny.
• The anonymity of safe deposit boxes allows staggered or phased withdrawals of illicit cash without triggering AML alerts linked to structured cash deposits.

• The technique involves accepting physical cash for high-value art purchases, enabling launderers to bypass standard financial channels.
• Large or repeated cash transactions obscure the fund trail, reduce transparency in art deals, and hinder AML checks.

• Criminals use physical cash to purchase illegally sourced diamonds from private mines or unregulated sellers, preventing a traceable transaction record.
• By relying on bulk cash, they evade formal financial scrutiny, making it difficult to link the initial funds to a criminal origin.
• The anonymity and lack of documentation associated with physical cash transactions enable criminals to obscure their identities and the ultimate source of the money used to acquire the diamonds.

• Physical currency transactions dominate street-level and wholesale contraband cigarette sales, leaving minimal electronic footprints.
• Substantial cash holdings allow smugglers to discreetly compensate accomplices and structure cash deposits below regulatory thresholds.
• The anonymity and liquidity of banknotes facilitate placement and reduce detection risk when moving illicit funds derived from cigarette smuggling.

• Criminals directly collect physical currency from extortion victims, typically in unrecorded handovers. This allows them to bypass transparent financial channels at the outset.
• They then deposit or integrate these cash proceeds into legitimate revenue streams, such as hospitality businesses or retail operations, to obscure their coercive origin.
• The anonymity and liquidity of cash make it challenging for financial institutions to identify the illicit nature of these transactions.

• Criminals physically collect protection payments, allowing immediate, off-record receipt of illicit funds.
• The anonymity of cash enables offenders to deposit smaller sums below reporting thresholds, avoiding detection.
• By mixing extorted currency with legitimate daily takings in cash-intensive businesses, perpetrators obscure the illegal origin and make it challenging for financial institutions to differentiate lawful from unlawful proceeds.

• Criminals record fictitious cash sales or alter petty cash ledgers to mask the true sources and volumes of physical currency, effectively commingling dirty money with apparently legitimate revenues.
• By adjusting accrual accounting entries linked to these counterfeit cash transactions, they reconcile false data in official records, making it appear as normal business income.
• This creates a misleading paper trail that complicates efforts by financial institutions and regulators to identify irregular inflows or outflows of actual cash.

• Bribes or kickbacks are often paid and collected in physical currency, leaving no direct electronic record.
• Incremental deposits under regulatory reporting thresholds help layer cash into the financial system, making the source appear legitimate and hindering detection.

• Officials or colluding contractors withdraw stolen funds in cash, exploiting anonymity and the difficulty in tracing large physical currency movements.
• Once converted to cash, the money is readily transported or fragmented into smaller deposits elsewhere, complicating investigations and circumventing reporting triggers.
• Cash-based transactions are often off the official record, undermining transparency and internal audit trails.

• Criminals directly pay wages in tangible currency, inserting illicit proceeds into seemingly legitimate payroll expenses without triggering payroll records or automated AML checks.
• By settling wages off the books, they avoid documentation requirements such as pay stubs or electronic transfers, making it harder for authorities or financial institutions to trace the funds’ origin.
• These cash payments seamlessly blend with everyday cash-intensive operations (e.g., restaurants, retail) where large volumes of currency transactions are common, further obscuring the source of the illicit money.

• Criminals withdraw illicit funds and directly pay undocumented workers in physical currency, leaving no formal payroll records.
• The absence of documentation or electronic traces conceals both the source of funds and the identities of recipients.
• This off-the-books method obscures labor expenses, helping to commingle illegal proceeds with purportedly legitimate wage outflows.

• Criminals use physical currency to make multiple small deposits across geographically dispersed bank branches or institutions.
• Because individual cash deposits are kept below reporting thresholds, it becomes harder for financial institutions to detect a larger aggregate of illicit proceeds.
• The anonymity and fungibility of physical cash allow smurfs or couriers to deposit funds without leaving a clear audit trail linking all deposits to a single source.

• Criminals insert illicit banknotes directly into electronic gaming machines, immediately converting them into TITO credits or vouchers.
• The anonymity of physical bills obscures the money’s illicit origin, especially when deposits are split below thresholds or across multiple sessions.
• This tactic effectively places dirty cash into the financial system by giving it the appearance of legitimate gambling proceeds at the earliest stage.

• Criminals use bulk illicit cash to purchase gold directly, avoiding the banking system and standard AML checks.
• Cash-for-gold channels or dealers with weak KYC controls allow anonymity, enabling the placement of illicit funds into gold.
• Once converted, the gold can be transported or resold across jurisdictions, further obscuring the origin of the illicit proceeds.

• Political donations in cash can be structured below reporting thresholds, avoiding donor identity requirements.
• Criminals may use intermediaries ('straw donors') to submit multiple smaller cash donations, concealing the ultimate source of funds.
• Lack of a clear transactional trail hinders oversight, allowing laundered money to enter the political system with minimal paper documentation.

• Physical currency from environmental crimes (e.g., illegal timber sales) can be introduced into the financial system through structured deposits.
• These deposits are commingled with lawful business turnover, making it harder to isolate proceeds tied to illicit environmental activities.
• The anonymity of physical cash enables initial placement without clear transactional traces back to the origin of the funds.

• Traffickers often receive cash directly from forced labor sites or sexual services, granting them immediate control over illicit funds.
• By depositing smaller amounts into multiple bank branches or mingling it with lawful proceeds from front businesses, they avoid raising red flags.
• The anonymity and portability of cash enable quick placement and layering, reducing transparency and direct associations with trafficking victims.

• Traffickers controlling forced or coerced prostitution often receive direct cash payments from customers. They deposit funds in small increments or across multiple accounts to avoid reporting thresholds.
• The physical and anonymous nature of cash reduces traceability, making it easier to commingle illicit proceeds with seemingly legitimate transactions.
• This high-liquidity asset enables traffickers to rapidly place and layer illicit income without leaving a clear transactional record.

• Offenders orchestrating child exploitation often receive direct cash payments from clients or intermediaries, minimizing transaction records.
• Physical currency can then be smuggled or deposited in smaller increments (structuring), enabling perpetrators to evade detection and obscure the true source of funds.

• Smugglers typically collect illicit fees in physical banknotes from migrants seeking unauthorized entry.
• By receiving proceeds in cash, they avoid immediate scrutiny from financial institutions, maintaining anonymity.
• They deposit or exchange these amounts in smaller increments to evade reporting thresholds, effectively structuring and layering smuggling proceeds.

• Criminals hand over significant amounts of cash to lawyers, accountants, or other intermediaries under the guise of legitimate service fees.
• The professional then deposits or disperses these funds through their own or client accounts, adding a layer of separation from the illicit source.
• Attorney-client privilege or professional confidentiality can deter further inquiry, allowing large cash movements under the appearance of standard professional services.

• Criminals directly insert tangible currency into crypto ATMs, bypassing the scrutiny typically encountered in bank branches or other traditional channels.
• By breaking up deposits into smaller amounts—each below mandatory reporting thresholds—they minimize triggering AML alerts.
• This quick conversion of physical cash into digital assets effectively places illicit funds into the financial system and obscures the paper trail.

• Criminals conceal large sums of currency in vehicles, luggage, or split them among multiple couriers (smurfing) to evade declaration thresholds.
• High-denomination notes reduce bulk and detection risk at border checkpoints.
• Once in jurisdictions with weaker AML controls, funds can be deposited or exchanged without prompting significant scrutiny.
• The anonymity of physical cash hampers authorities’ ability to trace the origin of the funds or identify the ultimate beneficiary.

• Criminals conceal large sums of currency in personal luggage, vehicles, or cargo shipments to bypass formal banking channels.
• Physical cash is highly liquid and does not inherently link to an identity, allowing mules to cross borders while evading AML reporting requirements.
• Once across the border, illicit funds can be intermingled with legitimate assets or exchanged through underground networks, increasing anonymity.

• Criminals purposely seek out large-denomination bills (e.g., €500 or CHF 1000) to significantly reduce the volume and weight of their illicit funds, making concealment and cross-border transport much easier.
• By obtaining these high-value notes—often through complicit or lax money service businesses—they bypass the more rigorous controls commonly imposed by traditional banks.
• This physical form of currency is difficult to trace once it crosses borders, allowing criminals to move proceeds largely undetected and circumvent formal reporting or monitoring requirements.

Criminals deposit illicit cash in structured amounts into multiple bank accounts, sometimes combining these deposits with wire transfers to further obscure the provenance of funds. By placing physical currency below reporting thresholds, they reduce immediate scrutiny. Once deposited, the money is quickly wired through additional accounts, intensifying the layering and complicating efforts to connect the funds back to their criminal source.

• Criminals hand over physical currency to cooperating or unwitting third parties, who then deposit it under their own names.
• Since receipts and deposit records reflect only the third party, investigators struggle to link the cash back to the criminal.
• Repetitive, below-threshold deposits orchestrated by multiple individuals reduce scrutiny and hide the cumulative scale of illicit funds.

• Once an account is compromised, criminals make large ATM or in-branch cash withdrawals under the rightful owner’s identity.
• Because the activity appears to be conducted by the legitimate customer, high-volume cash extractions may evade immediate suspicion, bypassing certain AML thresholds.
• Converting digital balances into physical currency helps further obscure the fund trail.

• Under criminal control, MSBs accept large volumes of physical currency, often splitting deposits to avoid regulatory scrutiny.
• Staff intentionally ignores AML thresholds or reporting obligations, allowing criminals to integrate illicit cash directly into the MSB’s legitimate operations.

• Criminals structure their deposits of physical currency below reporting thresholds into funnel accounts, obscuring the funds' illicit origin.
• Because physical cash is difficult to trace, once deposited into different locations, it can be quickly withdrawn or transferred, fragmenting the audit trail and hindering investigators.

• Diplomatic personnel can transport substantial amounts of cash in diplomatic pouches, which are shielded from routine inspection.
• Physical currency is easily used for off-the-books transactions, hindering traceability and complicating AML efforts.
• Diplomatic immunity prevents authorities from conducting thorough investigations, allowing criminals to deposit or move cash without triggering standard reporting protocols.

• Criminals manufacture fake banknotes or coins and blend them with legitimate currency in routine transactions or deposits.
• They exploit the anonymity and universal acceptance of physical cash, making it difficult for authorities and businesses to detect forged bills at the point of entry.
• Inadequate banknote authentication at cash-intensive venues and financial institutions enables the widespread circulation of counterfeit currency.

• Criminals commonly use physical currency to make contributions to and receive payouts from informal micro-finance groups.
• The anonymity and off-record nature of cash transactions reduce traceability, allowing illicit money to be mixed with legitimate funds.
• By keeping operations outside formal banking channels, criminals avoid standard reporting thresholds or KYC measures that might reveal suspicious deposits.

• Criminals can withdraw darknet-derived cryptocurrency at poorly regulated cryptocurrency ATMs, receiving physical currency with minimal identity checks.
• Once converted to physical cash, the digital transaction chain is effectively severed, granting near-total anonymity.
• This tactic finalizes laundering by placing funds outside traceable financial systems, thwarting typical AML measures.

• Upon converting digital or otherwise traceable funds into physical banknotes, criminals exploit the inherent anonymity of cash.
• Cash withdrawals are often structured below regulatory thresholds, reducing the likelihood of additional scrutiny.
• Once in cash form, subsequent transactions become more difficult for authorities to track, facilitating further layering or integration.

• Criminals bring illicit cash into gambling venues, exchanging it directly for betting tokens or credits.
• By placing minimal bets and redeeming the remainder as 'winnings,' they can obtain legitimate-looking payout records.
• This rapid conversion of raw cash into documented gambling proceeds obscures the original illicit source.

• Criminals rely on physical currency to purchase large volumes of lottery tickets without triggering scrutiny from standard banking or electronic payment systems.
• Bulk cash transactions help avoid immediate red flags, such as unusual account activity, allowing proceeds from illicit sources to be funneled into seemingly legitimate lottery purchases.
• By dealing in physical bills, criminals reduce traceability and effectively convert illegal funds into official lottery payouts.

• Criminals bring in physical currency in small increments to betting counters, staying below thresholds that trigger reporting.
• High cash turnover at licensed betting shops allows illicit funds to be blended with genuine wagers.
• Once winnings are redeemed, the criminal proceeds appear as legitimate gambling payouts, masking their illegal origin.

• Criminals purchase casino chips using bulk cash and coordinate deliberate chip losses to a co-conspirator.
• The physical nature of cash, combined with multiple small purchases or rapid buy-ins, obscures the original source of the illicit money.
• Once cashed out, the funds appear as standard gambling winnings with reduced traceability due to the anonymity of banknotes.

• Junket networks frequently move large amounts of physical currency across borders with limited reporting or oversight.
• Criminals then introduce these bulk cash holdings into VIP junket rooms, mingling illicit proceeds with legitimate gambling funds and complicating source-of-funds verification.

• Criminals use illicit physical currency to place bets on rigged sporting events, bypassing transparent financial channels.
• Once the fixed match concludes, resulting payouts appear as legitimate gambling proceeds rather than criminal funds.
• Cash-based transactions allow bettors to remain largely anonymous and circumvent strict identity checks, making it difficult for authorities to trace the true origin of funds.

• Criminals bring illicit physical banknotes into the casino, purchasing chips or loading slot machines under the guise of normal gambling activity.
• By breaking purchases into smaller denominations or transactions, they can avoid triggering certain AML thresholds or ID checks.
• This enables the initial placement of illicit proceeds, obscuring their origin within standard casino operations.

• Criminals introduce large amounts of illicit banknotes as buy-ins at underground gambling venues, which often have no identification requirements.
• They commingle these funds with legitimate bettors’ money, creating difficulty in isolating the original criminal proceeds.
• Ultimately, the criminals retrieve purported ‘winnings’ in cash, leaving little to no paper trail or formal documentation due to the unregulated nature of these venues.

• Criminals deposit suspicious physical currency with auction houses as bid deposits or partial payments.
• If they later abandon the purchase, the auction house refunds the deposited amount, creating seemingly legitimate transaction records.
• This tactic effectively reintroduces illicit proceeds under the guise of auction refunds, layering the source of the funds.

• Large or full payments made in physical currency facilitate anonymous purchases, bypassing regulated banking channels.
• Auction houses may lack rigorous KYC, allowing criminals to inject illicit funds into property transactions without triggering formal traceability.
• This anonymity enables straightforward placement of criminal proceeds, which are then laundered via subsequent property flips or resales.

• Sub-agents accept physical currency and deposit it in smaller increments under reporting thresholds, masking the origin of illicit cash.
• Aggregators consolidate these deposits, hindering the identification of each sub-agent’s transactions.
• By channeling funds through a licensed payment provider, criminals exploit the perceived legitimacy of the principal institution while concealing their true identities.

• Sub-agents accept physical currency from criminals without adequate KYC, then remit or deposit it through the aggregator’s payment network.
• The aggregator’s name on formal records conceals the direct handling of cash by sub-agents, reducing traceability.
• This anonymity allows criminals to inject large sums of illicit cash into the financial system under the guise of normal operations.

• Criminals physically deliver large volumes of cash to OTC brokers who provide minimal or no KYC, allowing direct placement of illicit funds.
• By bypassing traditional banking channels and their accompanying documentation, these large cash transactions occur with reduced scrutiny, concealing the original source of the funds.

• Criminals bring in physical bills for conversion into other denominations, often breaking transactions into smaller sums below reporting thresholds.
• Paper-based or under-the-table dealings in unlicensed or complicit exchanges produce limited audits, providing opportunities for structuring and layering illicit proceeds.

• Criminals repeatedly deposit or exchange physical cash in small denominations at various currency exchange counters or MSBs, minimizing scrutiny by staying below reporting thresholds.
• By timing transactions during busy hours and distributing them across different locations, they obscure the paper trail and make each individual exchange appear routine.
• Converting the cash into multiple fiat currencies at physical counters adds extra layers, complicating law enforcement's ability to trace the original illicit source.

• Criminals can use physical currency to execute repeated currency swaps at money service businesses or exchange offices.
• By structuring deposits or exchanges below reporting thresholds, they exploit lax AML controls and avoid triggering alerts.
• Physical cash exchanges make it difficult for financial institutions to link successive transactions, further obscuring the illicit origin of funds.

• Criminals exploit the portability and anonymity of physical banknotes by moving large sums domestically in high-denomination currency, reducing overall bulk and easing concealment.
• Once relocated, they deposit or exchange the illicit funds in increments specifically structured below reporting thresholds, minimizing scrutiny from financial institutions.
• The absence of cross-border declarations further decreases detection risk, allowing criminals to circulate illicit cash within the national financial system largely unnoticed.

• Offenders physically transport currency across borders to circumvent formal payment channels subject to data reporting (e.g., LEIs in wire instructions).
• In regions with limited border checks or inconsistent customs declarations, they smuggle cash to avoid triggering electronic monitoring or AML controls.
• This direct, unrecorded movement of funds adds an extra layer of anonymity, further complicating cross-border investigative efforts.

• Local transportation professionals or couriers physically carry banknotes across loosely monitored borders, avoiding formal banking channels.
• By dividing bulk amounts into smaller packets, fixers reduce detection risk and bypass declaration thresholds, further hindering consolidated oversight.
• The anonymity of physical currency movements makes it difficult for authorities to trace the ultimate beneficiary or source of funds.

• Criminals physically transport large sums across borders, filing official declarations to appear compliant.
• They exploit weak or inconsistent verification by over-declaring amounts, thereby ‘legitimizing’ additional illicit funds that never actually crossed the border.
• Subdividing declared cash into multiple smaller declarations or various currencies helps them evade threshold checks.
• They reuse or falsify the same declaration records for subsequent deposits or transfers, making it more difficult for authorities to detect discrepancies between physical cash carried and the higher amounts ultimately introduced into the financial system.

• Insiders, such as vault custodians, can siphon physical currency from bank vaults while manipulating internal ledgers to avoid detection.
• Weak reconciliation or oversight allows large cash discrepancies to go unflagged, undermining typical AML controls.
• Once removed, cash remains largely untraceable, making it easy to conceal illicit origins and evade official scrutiny.

• Unlicensed real estate brokers often accept substantial cash payments without verifying the origin of the funds.
• By sidestepping AML reporting thresholds or scrutiny, launderers effectively convert illegal proceeds into real property.
• The lack of documented transactions further conceals the money trail and beneficial ownership.

• In hawala-style P2P networks, cash exchanges occur without formal AML checks or identity verification.
• Criminals deposit physical currency with informal intermediaries who route funds across decentralized channels.
• These face-to-face or offline transactions circumvent regulated channels, creating additional layering steps and obscuring paper trails.

• Undeclared earnings often originate as physical currency from informal transactions, remaining off official records.
• Criminals can store these funds in cash and either deposit them gradually below reporting thresholds or mix them with legitimate cash takings.
• The anonymity and difficulty of tracing physical cash enable criminals to bypass formal oversight and avoid disclosing true earnings, reducing the likelihood of triggering suspicion.

• Drug traffickers accumulate significant physical currency from street-level distribution of narcotics.
• They then deposit or exchange cash in amounts structured to evade reporting thresholds or use third-party intermediaries (e.g., multiple depositors) to avoid drawing suspicion.
• Because bills and coins are anonymous and tangible, this instrument remains the starting point for many drug-related laundering steps, making the origin of funds harder to trace once placed into financial channels.

• Proceeds from narcotics sales often originate in physical currency, allowing direct, unrecorded placement into front company accounts.
• Criminals structure deposits below threshold limits or use intermediaries to bypass reporting requirements, later directing the funds toward precursor chemical suppliers.
• The anonymity of cash transactions makes it more difficult for authorities to track the funds’ ultimate use in financing synthetic drug production.

• Traffickers smuggle physical currency obtained from illicit commodity sales across borders, bypassing formal financial channels and KYC checks.
• Once inside a jurisdiction with laxer controls, they break up (structure) deposits into smaller amounts below reporting thresholds, obscuring the overall volume of illicit proceeds.
• This direct use of banknotes frustrates audits and complicates financial tracking, especially when entering different financial institutions or jurisdictions.

• Street-level or retail sales of counterfeit items frequently generate substantial physical currency.
• Criminals exploit the anonymity of cash by splitting deposits into smaller amounts or funneling them through multiple channels to avoid detection.
• Converting counterfeit sales into cash and then re-depositing it reduces traceability, complicating financial investigations and AML controls.

• Arms traffickers often accept physical currency in conflict zones, bypassing electronic monitoring entirely.
• Cash payments facilitate covert weapons deals and can be quickly transported across borders, minimizing traceable transaction records.

• After receiving illicit relief payments into bank or prepaid accounts, criminals withdraw the funds in physical currency.
• Cash withdrawals interrupt the electronic audit trail, allowing them to redeposit or spend the proceeds elsewhere without a clear record of origin.
• Physical currency can then be used to purchase assets or cross borders unnoticed, hindering financial institutions' ability to trace the initial fraud.

• Some organizations reimburse small expenses from petty cash. Offenders forge receipts or inflate costs to receive higher cash payouts.
• Since petty cash transactions frequently face minimal documentation, the misappropriated funds appear as normal operating expenses in corporate records.

• After depositing counterfeit or washed checks, offenders exploit provisional credit by withdrawing the funds as physical currency.
• Converting the temporarily credited amounts into cash makes the proceeds less traceable and facilitates rapid layering or integration into the illicit actors’ financial activities.

After victims remit purported fees, scammers or money mules often collect the proceeds in cash at various payout locations. This reduces electronic records tying the funds to the fraudulent lottery operation. The anonymity of physical currency, especially across multiple jurisdictions with lax ID measures, makes structuring and rapid movement of illicit proceeds significantly easier.

• Wildlife traffickers rely on physical currency to pay poachers or suppliers in remote areas, entirely bypassing formal banking channels that might flag suspicious transactions.
• Cash also facilitates bribes to border or customs officials without leaving a paper trail, enabling traffickers to evade AML checks and regulatory scrutiny.

• Illegally mined gold is often quickly exchanged through cash-for-gold services, receiving physical currency with minimal paperwork.
• The anonymity and ease of handling physical cash make it difficult for authorities to trace its origin, aiding criminals in placing funds into legitimate circulation.
• This straightforward liquidity option allows the untracked proceeds to be integrated without extensive oversight or record-keeping.

• Criminals involved in petty theft, robbery, or extortion typically receive physical currency directly from victims or illicit activities.
• They then deposit small increments of this cash into the financial system (e.g., daily store deposits at a cash-intensive business), mitigating detection risks by remaining under reporting thresholds.
• Because cash lacks intrinsic identifiers, tracing the original criminal source is particularly challenging when it is commingled with legitimate revenue.

Cash transactions bypass the electronic trail typically monitored by tax authorities. Offenders underreport income by conducting business activities entirely or partially in cash, keeping these earnings off formal records. This makes it harder for auditors to establish accurate revenue totals, enabling systematic tax evasion through unreported earnings and deductible expenses paid with cash.

• Criminals pay workers in physical currency, leaving minimal trace in official payroll records.
• This tactic enables them to conceal actual headcount or salary levels, reducing reported payroll taxes or insurance premiums.
• The unrecorded revenue from unpaid withholdings can be integrated back into financial channels under the guise of legitimate business proceeds.

• Pirates frequently demand ransoms in cash to avoid electronic traces or formal documentation.
• Once obtained, physical currency is easily separated into smaller amounts or moved through unregulated channels, helping pirates evade reporting thresholds and obscure the original source of funds.

• Criminals assign certain individuals or teams solely to handle physical cash deposits, preventing them from seeing how those funds are later transferred or integrated into corporate entities.
• This isolates each depositor’s knowledge to the immediate cash transaction, ensuring no single participant can piece together the complete laundering chain.
• Such compartmentalized handling of cash exploits institutional data silos and reduces the likelihood of coordinated detection by financial institutions.

Illicit cryptojacking proceeds can be converted into physical cash via cryptocurrency ATMs, informal peer-to-peer sales, or OTC deals, often with minimal or falsified identification. Cash-out further fragments the audit trail and makes it difficult for authorities to link cryptocurrency flows back to cryptojacking activity.