Smurfing

Smurfing is a subtechnique of Structuring that employs multiple individuals or accounts (often called ‘smurfs’) to make numerous below-threshold deposits, transfers, or withdrawals. By distributing what would otherwise be a large suspicious sum across smaller transactions in various locations or financial institutions, criminals hide the true scale of illicit activity. This approach effectively thwarts standard monitoring, making it difficult for financial institutions to detect the underlying laundering scheme. Many smurfing operations rely on consecutive cash deposits at ATMs or branch tellers, ensuring each deposit remains below mandated thresholds. In some instances, depositors may share contact information or device fingerprints, complicating detection. Criminals also exploit poorly tuned threshold-based monitoring systems, reducing the risk of alerts triggered by suspicious activity. In cross-border contexts, variations such as ‘cuckoo smurfing’ hijack legitimate inbound transfers to mask the origin of illicit funds.

[
Code
T0016.005
]
[
Name
Smurfing
]
[
Version
1.0
]
[
Parent Technique
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[
Tactics
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[
Risk
Customer Risk, Product Risk
]
[
Created
2025-01-23
]
[
Modified
2025-04-02
]

Placement Structuring

Conducting Multiple Same-Day Cash Deposits

Cryptocurrency Smurfing

NFT Smurfing

Forex Smurfing

Smurfing Via Cryptocurrency

Tactics

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Smurfing involves breaking down large sums of illicit funds into multiple small transactions that are explicitly below reporting thresholds. This tactic facilitates the initial entry of criminal proceeds into the legitimate financial system with a reduced risk of detection.

Risks

RS0001
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Customer Risk
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Smurfing also involves using multiple depositors or 'money mules,' which obscures beneficial ownership and complicates customer due diligence. Each smurf's transactions appear individually innocuous, adding a distinct layer of anonymity and hindering effective KYC processes.

RS0002
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Product Risk
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Smurfing primarily exploits vulnerabilities in threshold-based deposit or payment products. By splitting large sums into multiple below-threshold transactions, criminals circumvent standard product-driven reporting and monitoring triggers, making this the central operational vulnerability.

Indicators

IND00291
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Multiple transactions consistently just below regulatory reporting thresholds distributed across several accounts within a short period.

IND00292
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Simultaneous or near-simultaneous deposits across different channels (branches, ATMs, or online) by apparently connected entities without a clear business purpose.

IND00480
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Accounts that appear unrelated yet share contact details, personal information, or login patterns.

IND01250
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Newly opened, dormant, or low-activity accounts that suddenly begin receiving frequent low-value deposits.

IND01251
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Account profiles showing a mismatch between the customer's expected financial activity and the volume of recurring low-value deposits.

IND01252
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Highly frequent small cash deposits made by different individuals or entities, which collectively amount to a large sum.

IND01253
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Multiple clients using the same physical address, contact details, IP address, or device for transactions without an apparent legitimate reason.

IND01254
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Multiple persons depositing or transferring small amounts into the same or related accounts with no discernible economic link.

IND01255
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Frequent inbound cross-border wire transfers in small increments from multiple overseas senders that do not align with the account holder’s typical remittance patterns or stated business activity.

Data Sources

Provides detailed records of financial transactions, including timestamps, amounts, depositors, recipients, and channel information. This directly supports smurfing detection by:

  • Identifying numerous low-value deposits deliberately kept below reporting thresholds.
  • Aggregating transaction data to reveal hidden connections among accounts or depositors.
  • Highlighting patterns of frequent small deposits or withdrawals consistent with smurfing behavior.

Captures IP addresses, device identifiers, and login timestamps. This data aids smurfing investigations by:

  • Identifying multiple accounts accessed from the same device or IP, signaling potential collusion or single-user control of several smurf accounts.
  • Pinpointing suspicious login patterns that correlate with bursts of small deposits in different accounts.

Stores verified customer identities, addresses, ownership information, and risk profiles. This data helps detect smurfing by:

  • Revealing accounts with shared personal or contact details that appear unrelated on the surface.
  • Comparing declared financial profiles or expected account activity to actual deposit patterns, potentially exposing structuring through smurfing.

Captures location, date, time, and amount details for ATM transactions. This supports smurfing detection by:

  • Showing multiple small cash deposits performed across different ATMs or geographic locations in quick succession.
  • Identifying unusual patterns in the distribution of low-value deposits suggestive of smurfing activity.

Provides details on inbound and outbound wire transfers, including sender/receiver information, amounts, currencies, and jurisdictions. This data supports smurfing detection by:

  • Detecting frequent small-value cross-border transfers that may be structured.
  • Identifying elements of cuckoo smurfing where legitimate inbound remittances are co-opted to disguise illicit funds.

Mitigations

Conduct deeper checks when multiple depositors or accounts appear linked by shared contact details or addresses without a legitimate relationship. For smurfing, verify whether phone numbers or addresses trace to mail drops, virtual offices, or high-risk jurisdictions to help reveal the coordination behind sub-threshold transactions. Escalate to advanced verification or account restrictions when these red flags emerge.

Implement targeted scenario rules that flag repeated small deposits or transfers when they share identical contact details, device fingerprints, or IP addresses. By focusing on patterns of below-threshold transactions across multiple accounts, financial institutions can detect smurfing operations disguised as unrelated customer activity.

Leverage monitoring systems that aggregate activity over time, across accounts, and across channels to identify repetitive patterns of small-value deposits or transfers. Configure alerts for cumulative amounts nearing reporting thresholds, and use device fingerprinting or IP clustering to flag potential smurfing networks coordinating multiple sub-threshold transactions.

Apply blockchain analytics to identify coordinated smurfing across multiple wallets moving small amounts of cryptocurrency in repetitive patterns. Investigate clusters of transactions that originate from or converge on the same addresses, ensuring sub-threshold transfers aimed at concealing illicit proceeds are flagged for further review.

Train frontline and compliance staff to recognize smurfing red flags, such as frequent small transactions by multiple individuals linked by common addresses, phone numbers, or online credentials. Provide concrete examples of structuring methods so employees can quickly escalate potential smurfing scenarios for enhanced scrutiny.

Warn customers about the risks of unknowingly participating in smurfing or cuckoo smurfing. Advise them to never accept or transfer funds on behalf of others without a legitimate reason, and encourage immediate reporting if approached for repeated small deposit schemes that disguise larger illicit transactions.

Use open-source intelligence to verify any repeatedly used addresses, phone numbers, or email domains associated with sub-threshold deposits. This process uncovers smurfing rings that delinquently reuse contact information or utilize mailbox services, helping determine if apparent customers are actually coordinated depositors.

Limit or temporarily block repetitive small-value deposits when there is no valid business justification. By enforcing tighter frequency and volume controls, financial institutions can directly disrupt the continuous sub-threshold transactions typical of smurfing. Mandate in-person identification or enhanced verification for suspicious deposit patterns to deter misuse.

Instruments

  • Smurfs maintain multiple bank accounts, often under different names or at various institutions, to deposit or transfer funds in amounts below mandated thresholds.
  • Distributing what would otherwise be a large sum across numerous accounts obscures the true volume of illicit proceeds, preventing immediate detection by financial institutions.
  • Criminals execute numerous low-value NFT trades instead of a single high-value purchase, dispersing illicit funds below suspicious transaction thresholds.
  • NFT marketplaces often lack robust AML monitoring for repeated small transactions, enabling smurf-like structuring in the digital realm.
  • 'Cryptocurrency smurfing' involves splitting large digital currency amounts into multiple small transfers across different wallets or exchanges.
  • Each low-value transaction remains below typical exchange alert triggers, concealing the overall volume of illicit assets being moved.
IN0040
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  • Criminals purchase multiple small-denomination money orders with illicit cash to bypass ID requirements, then deposit or redeem them separately.
  • By keeping each money order amount low, smurfs evade reporting triggers that would typically apply to larger lump-sum transactions.
IN0051
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  • Criminals deposit multiple small sums of physical currency across different accounts or ATMs, staying under reporting thresholds to avoid scrutiny.
  • The direct, face-to-face nature of cash transactions reduces traceability, helping smurfs introduce illicit funds without triggering alerts for large deposits.
  • Criminals repeatedly load small amounts onto prepaid cards or similar stored-value services, evading transaction monitoring tied to larger sums.
  • The ability to manage multiple prepaid instruments or e-wallets simultaneously allows smurfs to further divide and conceal the total illicit value being laundered.

Service & Products

PS0024
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  • Criminals make repeated small cash deposits or withdrawals across multiple ATMs to remain below reporting thresholds.
  • This fragmentation of transactions conceals the overall volume of illicit funds and avoids suspicion.
  • Criminals execute numerous small transfers via remittance channels, each below monitoring thresholds.
  • They often involve multiple senders or recipients to disguise the cumulative value and origin of illicit proceeds.
  • ‘Smurfs’ open or use multiple checking accounts, depositing low-value amounts that collectively form large sums.
  • This dispersal of transactions hinders effective tracking and conceals the source of funds.
  • Facilitates ‘cuckoo smurfing’ where illicit funds are intermingled with legitimate inbound wire transfers in amounts below reporting limits.
  • Repetitive small-volume wires obscure the true origin or beneficiary, hindering detection.

Actors

Illicit operators orchestrate smurfing by:

  • Recruiting or directing multiple depositors to split large sums into numerous below-threshold transactions.
  • Exploiting threshold-based monitoring gaps across various financial channels.

Their actions conceal the true volume and source of illicit proceeds, hindering financial institutions' ability to detect suspicious patterns or beneficial ownership.

AT0076
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Money mules, commonly referred to as ‘smurfs,’ are individuals who knowingly or unknowingly deposit or transfer small amounts for illicit operators:

  • Opening or using accounts to process repeated low-value transactions under reporting thresholds.
  • Fragmenting larger sums to evade alarms, obscuring the overall volume of illicit funds involved.

References

  1. APG (Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering). (2019, August). APG Yearly Typologies Report 2019. Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. https://apgml.org/documents/default.aspx

  2. FATF (Financial Action Task Force). (1998). 1997-1998 report on money laundering typologies. FATF . https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/annual-reports/1997%201998%20ENG.pdf

  3. AUSTRAC (Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre). (2021, June). Detect and report: Cuckoo smurfing. Commonwealth of Australia. https://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-06/AUSTRAC_FCG_CuckooSmurfing_web.pdf

  4. FINTRAC (Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada). (2024). Special Bulletin on laundering the proceeds of crime through online gambling sites (FINTRAC-2024-SB001). FINTRAC.https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/intel/bulletins/gambling-jeu-eng.pdf

  5. AUSTRAC (Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre). (2021). Australia's major banks: Money laundering and terrorism financing risk assessment. Commonwealth of Australia. https://www.austrac.gov.au/business/how-comply-guidance-and-resources/guidance-resources/major-banks-australia-risk-assessment-2021

  6. Chau, D., Nemcsik, M. v. D. (2021). Anti-Money Laundering Transaction Monitoring Systems Implementation: Finding Anomalies. John Wiley & Sons, Inc