Informal Value Transfer Systems (IVTS) are networks used to transfer money or value outside formal banking channels, relying on personal trust or offset arrangements rather than regulated processes. Common examples include hawala or Chinese underground banks, where operators settle accounts via reciprocal transactions, off-the-books ledgers, or trade-based offsets in place of standard wire transfers. This setup allows criminals to bypass conventional AML/KYC controls, moving significant amounts of illicit proceeds discreetly across borders. In some jurisdictions, these parallel settlement schemes function as a separate, shadow-like infrastructure that evades regulated financial channels. Because documentation is minimal and operations can span multiple regions, IVTS transactions are difficult to trace, making these systems highly susceptible to money-laundering abuse. Many IVTS operators serve diaspora communities or regions with limited official banking services, blending legitimate remittances with illicit funds. Heavy reliance on personal trust underpins these arrangements, reducing overhead but obscuring the origin and destination of the proceeds. Violations of this trust can lead to reputational or communal repercussions for operators and participants, which in turn helps enforce compliance within these networks despite the absence of formal contracts. Some professionals engaging in IVTS also employ specialized software to move funds through multiple offset accounts, further complicating investigations. With lax or varied regulation across jurisdictions, IVTS continue to provide a hidden corridor for cross-border value transfers and remain a favored laundering channel for criminals seeking to structure, layer, or disguise proceeds from numerous predicate offenses.
Informal Value Transfer Systems
Black Market Peso Exchange (Latin America)
Hundi (हुण्डी / ہنڈی) (South Asia)
Fei-Ch’ien (飛錢 / 飛钱) (China)
Hawala (حوالة)
Underground Banking (地下錢莊 / 地下钱庄)
Munshi System (मुंशी प्रणाली) (India)
Angadia (अंगड़िया) (India)
Padala (పడాల / पडाल) (India, Philippines)
Hawala-Hundi (هَوالَہ-هُنڈی) (Afghanistan, Pakistan)
Mercado Negro De Divisas (Latin America)
Mercado Negro De Cambio De Pesos (Latin America)
Cambiadores Clandestinos (Latin America)
IVTS
Underground Remittance Networks
Tactics
The technique relies on an informal, trust-based network that operates outside regulated financial channels and leaves little or no paper trail, thus minimizing the risk of detection. This method directly supports the goal of avoiding regulatory scrutiny and investigation, as it circumvents formal documentation and monitoring procedures.
IVTS explicitly bypasses formal bank oversight and circumvents KYC requirements by relying on personal trust-based or off-record paths, providing criminals with unregulated entry points to move illicit funds across borders. The primary objective behind using IVTS is to avoid standard AML controls in official financial channels.
Illicit cash can be introduced into the hawala network at the initial stage.
Repeated offsetting transactions and cross-border value transfers via IVTS create complex trails that obscure the criminal source of funds, adding multiple layers of distance between the proceeds and their illicit origin.
Criminals use informal value transfer systems to quickly convert between different types of assets to maintain flexible and readily movable funds, allowing them to pivot rapidly if detection risks change.
Risks
IVTS fundamentally exploit informal, trust-based channels that operate outside regulated banking systems. Criminals bypass standard due diligence and transaction monitoring by relying on personal networks and off-record offset arrangements, significantly reducing transparency and regulatory oversight. This is the primary vulnerability enabling illicit funds to move undetected.
Operators exploit cross-border discrepancies in AML enforcement by establishing or routing transactions through regions with lax regulations or limited legal frameworks. This facilitates international transfers that evade consistent scrutiny and take advantage of differing regulatory standards.
Indicators
Business entities repeatedly refuse or fail to provide legitimate supporting documentation for large or unusual transfers, or submit documentation with clear signs of falsification.
Customers who cannot provide standard identification or corporate documents, or who give inconsistent explanations about the purpose of transactions.
Accounts receiving or sending funds on behalf of multiple, seemingly unrelated parties, without a clear explanation or documentation.
Sudden increases in international transfer volume or value to or from regions with no apparent personal or business connection to the account holder.
Intentional splitting of transactions to avoid triggering reporting requirements (e.g., consistent deposits of just under the threshold).
Rapid In/Out Movements: funds are deposited and then transferred out shortly thereafter, with little to no business rationale.
Multiple small deposits (often below reporting thresholds) made into one account by different individuals, followed by large international transfers.
Businesses conducting large volumes of international wire transfers through a personal bank account rather than a company account.
Use of offset or alternative settlement methods, including trade-based exchanges, net-settlements, or cash pooling, instead of direct wire transfers.
Prolonged or irregular account-balancing cycles among multiple intermediaries that do not align with standard settlement practices.
Frequent or large transactions to or from jurisdictions associated with hawala networks, without legitimate business or personal ties.
Customers who remain intentionally vague about the source of funds or their business activities, or refuse to provide further details upon request.
Cash delivered by individuals claiming to act on behalf of an unlicensed or undocumented 'remittance agent'.
Payments or references to unlicensed or undocumented money transfer service providers lacking official registration or legal status.
Customer openly references trust-based or familial networks to facilitate large cross-border transfers without formal contracts or documentation.
Multiple affiliated accounts across different jurisdictions used in offset arrangements to settle cross-border obligations without standard wires.
Data Sources
- Detailed records of account actions and changes, including transaction timestamps and user-initiated modifications.
- Identifies rapid in-and-out fund movements or short holding durations indicative of layering strategies linked to IVTS.
- Strengthens internal investigations by providing granular insight into unusual activity patterns within accounts.
- Contains contracts, invoices, and payment terms for domestic or international transactions.
- Highlights inconsistencies between claimed trade deals and actual settlement methods, pinpointing disguised offset or net-settlement IVTS arrangements.
- Supports verification of legitimate business activity versus fabricated or inflated invoices used to conceal illicit funds.
- Captures details of each financial transaction, including timestamps, amounts, counterparties, and channels.
- Enables identification of sub-threshold structuring, multiple small deposits, or offset-based transfers—hallmarks of informal value transfer systems.
- Supports detection of rapid movement or layering across accounts consistent with IVTS patterns.
- Provides ownership details, account types, balances, and transaction histories across multiple jurisdictions.
- Helps detect affiliated accounts used in offset arrangements for informal settlements, bypassing regulated wires.
- Reveals common ownership links or overlapping signatories indicative of structured IVTS networks.
- Contains official licensing and registration information for money service businesses.
- Verifies whether hawala or underground remittance providers have legal authorization, helping identify unregistered IVTS operations.
- Supports AML investigators in confirming the legitimacy of purported MSB activities.
Trade Documentation encompasses official shipping logs, customs declarations, bills of lading, and invoices that confirm whether genuine goods or services changed hands. This data helps detect phony or inflated trade-based offset transactions commonly used in IVTS to mask cross-border settlements.
- Provides verified identification documents, beneficial ownership details, and risk profiles for customers.
- Enables detection of individuals or entities who lack proper licensing or offer inconsistent information about cross-border transfers, exposing potential unregulated IVTS usage.
- Validates whether stated remittance activities align with known customer profiles, helping pinpoint suspicious or opaque trust-based arrangements.
- Includes detailed records of cross-border transactions, participating financial institutions, currencies, and settlement processes.
- Facilitates identification of repetitive or high-volume international flows to jurisdictions associated with hawala or other IVTS.
- Assists in flagging unusual settlement patterns bypassing standard wire transfers or regulated channels.
- Tracks transaction origin and destination geolocation metadata.
- Flags the channeling of funds through jurisdictions lacking robust banking oversight or commonly associated with hawala networks.
- Helps correlate cross-border flows with customer profiles to identify unusual or unauthorized IVTS-related routes.
Mitigations
Require documented proof of proper licensing or registration for money transfer services and conduct deeper background checks on entities operating in high-risk corridors known for IVTS. Scrutinize large or repetitive cross-border payments for offset transactions, unusual remittance patterns, or reliance on non-formal trust-based arrangements. Verify the source of funds, ultimate beneficiaries, and transaction justifications to better identify or stop unlicensed operators exploiting IVTS networks.
Implement automated rules and analytics to identify repeated small deposits or split transactions that lead to large, rapid outbound transfers, as commonly seen in IVTS layering. Flag net-settlement or offset-related flows moving through multiple accounts in quick succession without a clear business rationale. Focus on high-risk geographic corridors, personal accounts used for business-scale remittances, and structured transfers staying below reporting thresholds to target typical IVTS patterns.
Restrict or discontinue services when customers appear to operate as unlicensed IVTS providers. Require verifiable licensing or documentation for money transfer activities, and limit account features if trust-based or cross-border offset transactions are identified without legitimate business justification, thus preventing further IVTS misuse.
Examine trade transactions for net-settlement arrangements and invoice discrepancies that may indicate IVTS usage. Compare declared goods and pricing with market data to identify misinvoicing or suspicious offsets. Investigate unusual trade routes and counterparties to detect cross-border manipulations that obscure the origin or destination of funds.
Instruments
- IVTS operators maintain accounts in different jurisdictions to settle cross-border obligations off the formal radar.
- Funds are deposited into or withdrawn from these offset accounts without rigorous customer due diligence.
- Repetitive credits and debits across multiple jurisdictions mask the true flow of illicit proceeds, complicating bank and regulatory oversight.
- IVTS networks use trade-based offsets (e.g., invoices, bills of lading) to settle accounts under the guise of legitimate commercial transactions.
- Criminals misrepresent quantities, prices, or goods involved so that actual fund movements remain hidden from formal banking scrutiny.
- These instruments create a paper trail of fictional trade activity, enabling IVTS operators to net out or balance cross-border transfers without triggering standard wire processes.
- Customers provide or receive physical currency directly through IVTS operators, circumventing formal banking channels.
- Minimal documentation and reliance on trust-based relationships obscure the origin and destination of illicit funds.
- Cash transactions allow operators to bundle legitimate remittances with criminal proceeds, making it harder for authorities to detect anomalous transfers.
Service & Products
- Enable direct user-to-user fund transfers with limited third-party oversight, allowing operators to replicate trust-based settlements via digital platforms.
- Multiple small transfers among accounts can mimic or substitute traditional IVTS offsets, making it harder for authorities to trace the ultimate source or beneficiary of funds.
- Unlicensed or loosely regulated remittance operators can mirror hawala-like operations, using personal trust instead of formal KYC to accept and move significant sums.
- Commingling legitimate remittances with illicit funds and minimal recordkeeping obscures transactional traces, allowing criminals to bypass formal banking oversight.
Actors
Illicit operators exploit IVTS arrangements to:
- Transfer proceeds from predicate offenses under the guise of informal remittances.
- Evade formal banking oversight, minimizing recordkeeping and KYC checks.
By doing so, they obscure ownership and transaction trails, complicating financial institutions’ efforts to identify illicit fund flows.
References
Financial Action Task Force (FATF). (2018). Professional money laundering. FATF. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Professional-Money-Laundering.pdf
OECD. (2018). Illicit Financial Flows: The Economy of Illicit Trade in West Africa. OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264268418-en
AUSTRAC (Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre). Joint-agency effort disrupts international crime syndicate. AUSTRAC. https://www.austrac.gov.au/business/how-comply-guidance-and-resources/guidance-resources/joint-agency-effort-disrupts-international-crime-syndicate
Passas, N. (1999). Informal value transfer systems and criminal organizations; A study into so-called underground banking networks. Research and Documentation Centre of the Ministry of Justice. https://repository.wodc.nl/handle/20.500.12832/1300