Money mule activity involving cryptoasset ATMs (also called CVC kiosks ) enables criminals to place and layer illicit cash by converting it into cryptocurrency with minimal or nonexistent identification. Mules receive bulk fiat currency derived from illegal sources and deposit it into multiple crypto ATMs—often below daily or per-transaction limits—to avoid suspicious reporting thresholds. In some cases, drug-trafficking organizations or other illicit operators instruct these mules to purchase bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies at such terminals, then immediately transfer the funds to wallets abroad, effectively obfuscating the trail and distancing proceeds from their criminal origin. Criminals also exploit the relative anonymity of unregistered or non-compliant ATM operators, repeatedly conducting deposits and withdrawals across regions to further scatter transaction patterns. In addition, bad actors may coerce or deceive victims into physically depositing cash for them at crypto ATMs, instructing the victim to scan a prepaid wallet address or QR code so that the purchased crypto is diverted to addresses under criminal control. By pushing the nominal ownership and KYC burden onto victims or mules, launderers mask their true identities and swiftly cross jurisdictional boundaries, complicating detection and enforcement by financial institutions and investigative agencies. This approach allows for high-volume movement of criminal proceeds into the crypto ecosystem, where criminals can continue layering funds through multiple wallets or subsequent exchange points. Once placed in crypto form, illicit proceeds can be withdrawn in other currencies, converted back to fiat through regulated or unregulated services, or further transferred among self-hosted wallets that lack comprehensive KYC obligations, creating additional obstacles for investigators and regulators.
Crypto ATM Mule
Cryptoasset ATM Money Mule
Tactics
Criminals exploit the minimal or nonexistent AML/KYC checks of certain crypto ATM operators as a convenient entry point into the crypto ecosystem, circumventing standard due diligence and gaining rapid access to less-regulated channels.
By employing a mule to feed illicit cash into cryptocurrency via ATMs, criminals achieve the placement stage by converting physical currency into digital assets that are harder to trace.
By repeatedly converting illicit cash into cryptocurrency at multiple ATMs—often across regions—criminals create additional transactional layers to obscure both the origin and destination of illicit funds, distancing proceeds from their criminal source.
Risks
Criminals exploit the anonymity and minimal KYC features inherent in crypto ATM services. By requiring little to no identification, these machines allow rapid placement and layering of illicit cash into cryptocurrency, bypassing standard AML scrutiny. This is the primary risk because the technique relies on the product’s limited oversight and anonymity-enhancing features to obscure transactional origins and beneficiaries.
Mules and illicit operators frequently perform transactions at crypto ATMs across multiple regions, effectively leveraging cross-border complexities and potentially weaker AML controls in certain locales to further conceal the source of funds. This cross-jurisdictional layering obscures money trails and undermines coordinated oversight.
Indicators
Minimal or inconsistent customer identification data at crypto ATMs, deviating from standard KYC requirements.
Discrepancies between a customer’s declared occupation or income and the high frequency or volume of crypto ATM-related cash movements, indicating use as a money mule.
Large-volume deposits into or withdrawals from crypto ATMs that deviate from typical usage patterns or exceed expected transaction sizes for the customer’s profile.
A rapid sequence where funds are withdrawn as cash from bank accounts and then quickly deposited into crypto ATMs, often within a very short timeframe.
Frequent execution of cash transactions with a cyclical deposit-to-withdrawal pattern, quickly channeling funds from compromised or third-party bank accounts into crypto ATMs.
Multiple bank accounts exhibit similar patterns of immediate cash withdrawals followed by deposits into crypto ATMs, indicative of a coordinated network of mules.
Geographic inconsistencies where the location of crypto ATM usage is significantly different from the customer's primary residence or business location, indicating cross-jurisdictional layering.
Accounts with historically low or routine activity suddenly showing a spike in transactions, particularly cash withdrawals and subsequent deposits into crypto ATMs.
Repetitive transactions involving round-number amounts that are quickly moved from bank accounts to crypto ATMs, structured to avoid detection thresholds.
Short time intervals between bank account cash deposits and withdrawals directed to crypto ATM use, reflecting an expedited layering process.
Multiple mules exhibiting similar transaction timings and amounts, indicating central orchestration in the use of crypto ATMs to move illicit funds into crypto wallets.
Repeated usage of the same crypto wallet address by multiple unrelated individuals at different crypto ATM terminals, indicating a funneling arrangement for aggregated illicit funds.
Data Sources
- Consolidates risk profiles for countries and regions, including information on regulatory regimes and cross-border AML requirements.
- Identifies discrepancies when crypto ATM activity occurs in high-risk or unexpected jurisdictions, highlighting potential layering.
- Captures comprehensive deposit and withdrawal records, including timestamps, amounts, account ownership, and cross-channel activity.
- Enables detection of structured, repetitive, or round-amount cash deposits into crypto ATMs, revealing potential mule-based layering schemes.
- Consists of internal VASP records, including user profiles, wallet addresses, and transaction logs tied to crypto ATM usage.
- Provides additional context (e.g., linked accounts, velocity checks) not visible on public blockchains.
- Enables detection of multiple mules transacting through the same VASP-managed entity or wallet address, confirming organized layering activity.
- Contains verified identity data, personal details, and documentation of customers.
- Detects minimal or inconsistent identification used at crypto ATMs, indicating potential mule activity or attempts to bypass KYC controls.
- Provides detailed records of crypto ATM usage, including locations, timestamps, and transaction details.
- Helps identify abnormal or cross-jurisdictional usage patterns, revealing potential layering or mule activity involving rapid deposits of illicit cash.
- Tracks on-chain transactions, wallet addresses, and the flow of digital assets.
- Correlates repeated funding of the same wallet address by multiple individuals or suspicious layering patterns once illicit cash is converted to crypto.
Mitigations
For high-risk or high-volume users of crypto ATMs, conduct thorough verification of personal information, source of funds, and transaction rationales. Corroborate supporting documents, such as employment records and bank statements, and scrutinize cross-jurisdiction ATM visits to uncover layering patterns typical of money mules.
During onboarding and periodically thereafter, verify the identities of individuals using crypto ATMs, requiring validation of legitimate sources of funds for significant or frequent usage. Cross-check transaction volumes, deposit patterns, and geographic usage against declared customer profiles to identify potential irregularities indicative of money mule behavior.
Implement targeted analytics to detect repeated or structured cash deposits and withdrawals at crypto ATMs that significantly deviate from a customer’s expected profile. Focus on rapid sequences of large, round-number transactions, cross-regional ATM usage, or patterns suggesting layering (e.g., multiple small deposits quickly followed by larger crypto transfers). Investigate anomalies promptly to disrupt illicit layering via mule activity.
File threshold-based reports on large cash deposits or withdrawals at crypto ATMs to create an official record for regulatory authorities. By systematically documenting significant transactions, uncover patterns of bulk cash movement indicative of coordinated money mule operations.
Leverage blockchain analytics to track on-chain flows from crypto ATM addresses. Identify repeated use of the same wallet by multiple individuals at different terminals, detect potentially linked addresses across jurisdictions, and escalate evidence of pattern-based layering or funneling consistent with money mule networks.
Impose daily or monthly limits on crypto ATM cash transactions, requiring enhanced identity verification or managerial approval for amounts above set thresholds. These controls can substantially curtail the typical high-volume layering used by ATM mules, forcing greater scrutiny on suspicious activity.
Instruments
- Illicit funds are quickly withdrawn as cash from bank accounts and then deposited into crypto ATMs, creating an additional layer between the illicit source and the converted cryptocurrency.
- The rapid withdraw-and-deposit cycle makes it harder for financial institutions to track the movement of funds, facilitating layering.
- Mules transfer newly acquired cryptocurrency from ATMs into external wallets, often self-hosted, which typically lack rigorous KYC checks.
- This arrangement further distances the illicit funds from their origin, making it difficult for authorities to trace subsequent transfers or identify ultimate beneficiaries.
- Once deposited as cash into the ATM, funds are converted into publicly traded cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin.
- Criminals exploit the pseudonymous nature of these blockchains, where addresses are visible but the real owners remain obscured, enabling cross-jurisdictional layering.
- Criminals hand over illicit physical banknotes to money mules, who deposit them into crypto ATMs that require minimal or no identification.
- Physical cash is difficult to trace, allowing perpetrators to swiftly place and layer illicit proceeds into the crypto ecosystem without creating a clear audit trail.
Service & Products
- Mules can deposit or withdraw illicit cash with minimal identification, exploiting weak or non-existent AML controls.
- Large or repeated deposits and withdrawals facilitate layering, obscuring the true origin and flow of funds.
- Criminals direct mules to use multiple terminals across different regions, complicating tracing.
- By converting bulk cash into crypto at these machines, illicit proceeds are more easily moved abroad and detached from their criminal source.
Actors
Drug traffickers hire or direct money mules to launder bulk cash through crypto ATMs.
- They provide proceeds from narcotics sales to mules, who deposit the cash into ATMs and convert it to cryptocurrency.
- This rapid placement and layering of funds across jurisdictions make it difficult for financial institutions to trace the original source of the money.
Illicit operators, beyond specific drug traffickers, acquire illegal proceeds and direct mules to use crypto ATMs for layering.
- They exploit weak KYC at ATMs to convert or move cash discreetly.
- Repeated transactions at different locations fragment the audit trail, challenging financial institutions' monitoring and investigative efforts.
Money mules deposit or withdraw illicit cash via crypto ATMs with minimal identification.
- They receive physical currency from criminal sources and convert it to cryptocurrency, adding layers between the original illicit proceeds and later transactions.
- By making frequent or structured deposits across multiple machines, they obscure transaction patterns, hindering financial institutions' ability to detect suspicious flows.
Operators offering crypto ATMs with lax or nonexistent AML/CFT controls enable large-scale illicit deposits and withdrawals.
- Minimal KYC requirements allow criminals and mules to bypass scrutiny, creating additional opacity in fund movements.
- This lack of controls impedes financial institutions' ability to identify or link transactions to their true origin or beneficiary.
References
EBA (European Banking Authority). (2024). Final Report: Guidelines amending Guidelines EBA/2021/02 on customer due diligence and the factors credit and financial institutions should consider when assessing the money laundering and terrorist financing risk associated with individual business relationships and occasional transactions ('The ML/TF Risk Factors Guidelines') under Articles 17 and 18(4) of Directive (EU) 2015/849. EBA. https://www.eba.europa.eu/
Costa, A. (2023). Preventing financial crime in cryptoassets: Investigating illicit funds flows in a cross-chain world. Elliptic.https://www.elliptic.co/hubfs/Elliptic_LEA_Typologies_2023_Report.pdf
Elliptic. (2020). Financial crime typologies in cryptoassets: The Concise Guide for Compliance Leaders. Elliptic. http://www.elliptic.co . https://www.elliptic.co/hubfs/Financial%20Crime%20Typologies%20in%20Cryptoassets%20Guides%20(All%20Assets)/Typologies_Concise%20Guide_12-20.pdf
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). (2019, May 9). Advisory on illicit activity involving convertible virtual currency (FIN-2019-A003). FinCEN. https://www.fincen.gov/resources
Interdepartmental coordinating group on combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism (CGMF). (2018). National Risk Assessment (NRA): Risk of money laundering and terrorist financing posed by crypto assets and crowdfunding. Switzerland.