Hawala

Hawala (also called hundi or fei-qian) is an informal value-transfer network that substitutes personal trust and bilateral ledgers for regulated correspondent banking. Each transaction is captured only in the hawaladars’ private books; settlement occurs when counterpart agents net their mutual positions by: (i) exchanging cash physically, (ii) booking third-party wire transfers that are decoupled from the original customers, or (iii) manipulating trade documents—such as under- or over-invoicing shipments—to move equivalent value across borders [4].

Criminal exploitation occurs at three distinct points:

  • Cash/Account Intake – Illicit proceeds are handed to a local hawaladar in bulk currency or deposited into pooled bank accounts that may be opened with falsified identities. Investigators have documented single retail accounts, registered under fictitious names, processing local-currency turnover beyond any plausible legitimate profile [1].

  • Off-book Clearing – Successive offset instructions are passed through the network, leaving no formal remittance record. Because no funds traverse the regulated payment rails at this stage, conventional KYC/CTR triggers are bypassed.

  • Rebalancing & Integration – Agents periodically square their ledgers through cross-border cash couriers, sham trade flows (e.g., forged diamond import papers used to justify foreign-exchange remittances) or later-dated bank transfers initiated by seemingly unrelated counterparties [1][4]. The end recipient receives money that appears as ordinary family support or business revenue.

Structural vulnerabilities include: (a) minimal documentation requirements; (b) reliance on community enforcement rather than regulatory supervision; (c) low-cost, high-speed service that attracts migrants priced out of formal channels, especially where banking fees or currency controls are onerous [2]; and (d) the ability to commingle licit diaspora remittances with illicit funds. Field studies show that in several major corridors informal mechanisms transmit multiples of the officially recorded remittance volume, routinely eclipsing formal bank flows [3].

Red-flag indicators for financial institutions include personal or small-business accounts with disproportionately high cyclic turnover, rapid cash deposits followed by overseas wire payouts lacking economic rationale, and repeated use of aliases or third-party nominees linked to known hawala corridors. Authorities also highlight “offsetting” relationships—an industry term for hawala/hundi settlements—as a high-risk conduit that requires enhanced monitoring and consistent reporting, even when no single international wire appears suspicious on its own [4].

[
Code
T0013.004
]
[
Name
Hawala
]
[
Version
1.0
]
[
Risk
Channel Risk, Jurisdictional Risk
]
[
Created
2025-02-06
]
[
Modified
2025-05-12
]

Hawala Networks

Tactics

Hawala bypasses formal banking channels and standard KYC requirements by leveraging personal trust networks and off-record transactions. This provides criminals with a direct entry point for illicit funds into less-regulated financial flows.

Risks

RS0003
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Channel Risk
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Hawala fundamentally exploits informal, trust-based channels that bypass standard banking controls and recordkeeping requirements. Criminals deposit illicit proceeds with hawaladars and rely on personal or familial networks rather than KYC or formal documentation, allowing them to move funds domestically or cross-border without triggering typical AML alerts. This unregulated channel is the primary vulnerability enabling the laundering scheme.

RS0004
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Jurisdictional Risk
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Cross-border hawala networks often operate in or target locations with weak AML regulations or less stringent enforcement, further obscuring fund flows. Criminals deliberately route transactions through these regions to minimize scrutiny and hinder investigations, exacerbating the difficulty in tracing illicit proceeds internationally.

Indicators

IND00263
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Transactions conducted entirely in cash through informal channels with little to no supporting documentation.

IND00264
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Frequent cross-border transfers executed via non-licensed intermediaries, such as couriers or front men, rather than traditional banking systems.

IND00265
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Use of alternative communication methods, including coded language or encrypted messages, to instruct or confirm fund movements.

IND00266
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Rapid movement of funds across multiple informal nodes with minimal or no audit trail, complicating efforts to follow the transaction path.

IND01390
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Funds originate from or are routed to high-risk jurisdictions known for hawala usage, which do not align with the customer's verified profile or declared business activities.

IND01391
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Clients engaging intermediaries or agents with unverifiable identities or inconsistent documentation, making it difficult to trace the true source of funds.

IND01392
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Discrepancies between a client's declared business activities and the volume or frequency of cash-based transactions processed through informal networks.

IND01393
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Consistent reliance on diaspora or familial networks to facilitate off-the-record fund transfers, bypassing formal banking channels.

IND01394
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Usage of falsified, inflated, or duplicate trade and shipping documentation to offset or conceal hawala-based fund movements.

IND01395
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A personal or business account exhibiting disproportionately high turnover relative to declared activities, suggesting use as a clearing account for hawala settlements.

Data Sources

Provides insight into high-risk or hawala-prevalent jurisdictions, enabling proactive risk scoring for cross-border flows that do not match customer profiles or declared business activities.

Discloses officially filed financial statements, tax returns, and related documents. Used to identify mismatches between reported revenues and large amounts funneled through hawala channels, indicating potential illicit activity.

Shows details about invoices and contracts, including parties, amounts, and goods or services. Detects potential over-invoicing or fictitious transactions used to settle hawala obligations covertly.

Provides a comprehensive record of deposits, withdrawals, and cross-border transfers, enabling the detection of unusual cash movements, high-frequency or structured transactions, and potentially unlicensed intermediary activity consistent with hawala operations.

Authenticates identification documents to detect forged or tampered IDs used by hawala brokers or their customers. Ensures legitimate identity data is on file, helping to uncover individuals operating under false credentials.

Official or government-maintained lists of licensed money service businesses are essential. Checking these registries helps identify unlicensed hawaladars operating outside regulatory purview, enabling AML teams to spot unauthorized remittance activity indicative of hawala networks.

Covers shipping logs, customs declarations, and bills of lading. When paired with hawala, fraudulent or inflated trade records may be used to mask illicit cross-border fund movements, making these documents critical for verification.

Houses comprehensive identity and business information, including beneficial ownership details, risk assessments, and historical activity. Enables the detection of fictitious or inconsistent customer profiles, which are often exploited by hawala operators for untraceable fund flows.

Contains logs of phone calls, emails, or messaging app exchanges where hawala participants might use coded or encrypted instructions to arrange or confirm fund movements, aiding investigations into concealed or suspicious activities.

Captures cross-border transaction details and intermediary relationships, revealing potentially unlicensed or informal channels used in hawala arrangements, where funds are transferred across jurisdictions outside formal banking routes.

Mitigations

Rate jurisdictions for high hawala prevalence, limited banking infrastructure, or weak AML enforcement. Assign higher risk profiles to customers or flows originating from or entering these areas, triggering additional reviews and controls. This recognizes hawala’s often regional concentration and lack of robust oversight in certain corridors.

Apply deeper background checks on customers exhibiting hawala-like cash flows or cross-border settlements without formal processes. Verify whether they hold or claim any money transmitter licensing, scrutinize personal or familial references, and require detailed evidence of legitimate business operations. This directly targets hawala’s reliance on informal networks and scant documentation.

When onboarding potential money transfer clients, verify the licensing status and the legitimacy of any claims about operating a remittance or family-based transfer service. Cross-check business registrations, investigate the source of funds, and validate stated transaction corridors. This ensures hawaladars cannot masquerade as regular customers.

Enable rules-based monitoring to flag repeated cross-border payments funneled through personal or family-run accounts, unusual layering via multiple small deposits in different branches, or a lack of clear economic rationale for rapid payouts. By focusing on hawala-specific patterns, institutions can close off the untracked movement of illicit funds.

Mandate thorough disclosure for large or repetitive cash deposits potentially tied to hawala corridors, such as high-risk jurisdictions or regions with significant diaspora populations. Ensure all threshold-based cash movements are captured, logged, and evaluated for hidden informal transfer activity. This exposes hawala's typical reliance on sizable off-record cash placements.

Provide focused instruction to frontline and compliance teams on hawala red flags, including inconsistent paperwork, family or tribal connections used as a justification for large cash movements, and suspicious cross-border remittances without formal licensing. Equip personnel with clear escalation protocols for suspected hawala usage.

Cross-check customers' public records, local directories, social media, and any reported affiliations with known hawaladar networks. Verify claims of family-based remittance services through external commercial registries or reputable sources. This helps uncover unlicensed hawala operators who rely on false or non-existent documentation.

Restrict or deny high-risk remittance or wire services to unlicensed or suspicious hawala operators. Suspend account features if transactional patterns suggest the account is acting as a de facto hawaladar hub. This counters hawala's informal settlement logic by cutting off institutional service channels where no formal license or oversight exists.

Scrutinize shipping documents, invoices, and value declarations to detect misinvoicing or fraudulent trade activity used as an offset or balancing mechanism for hawala settlements. Pay special attention to trade routes known for concentrated informal value transfer, and verify goods and transaction values against independent sources.

Instruments

  • Hawaladars routinely maintain pooled or personal bank accounts to collect illicit proceeds from clients using fictitious or third-party names.
  • Because hawala transactions are trust-based and lack formal documentation, criminals exploit these accounts to obscure beneficial ownership, bypassing traditional KYC and AML checks.
  • The absence of detailed records hinders investigators in tracing the origin of the deposited funds or linking them to criminal activity.
  • Criminals manipulate bills of lading or other trade financial documents in conjunction with hawala to conduct cross-border transfers under the guise of legitimate commerce.
  • These falsified trade instruments help mask the illicit nature of the proceeds, bypassing formal AML alerts in banks or customs agencies.
  • By intertwining hawala with sham trade documentation, criminals conceal both the origin and final destination of the laundered funds.
  • Criminals fabricate or inflate invoices to legitimize otherwise untraceable hawala payouts and settlements.
  • These fake receivables provide a false commercial cover story for funds moving through informal hawala channels.
  • By pairing fraudulent invoicing with hawala, criminals disguise illicit proceeds as legitimate payments for goods or services, hampering regulators’ ability to detect the true source of funds.
IN0051
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  • Hawala relies heavily on cash deposits and withdrawals, allowing criminals to hand over physical currency to the hawaladar with minimal paperwork.
  • The anonymity of cash transactions, combined with informal recordkeeping, makes it difficult for authorities to track the flow of funds.
  • Large sums can be moved quickly and discreetly, exploiting hawala’s trust-based nature to hide illicit proceeds from scrutiny.

Service & Products

  • Fraudulent trade invoices and shipping documents are used alongside hawala transactions to conceal the true origin of funds.
  • By manipulating or fabricating documentation, criminals justify cross-border payments with minimal scrutiny, bypassing formal banking alerts.
  • These falsified records help obscure the transactional chain, making it challenging for regulators or investigators to trace illicit proceeds.
  • Criminals exploit informal hawala networks that operate outside formal licensing and KYC requirements.
  • Deposits of illicit proceeds can be made to a hawaladar’s pooled account, leaving no official record or paper trail.
  • Cross-border or domestic payouts are arranged through trust-based relationships, effectively bypassing regulatory monitoring and AML detection.

Actors

AT0008
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Banks are unwittingly exploited when hawaladars or criminals open accounts under fictitious or third-party names, depositing illicit proceeds that avoid conventional scrutiny. Limited or falsified documentation obscures beneficial ownership, bypassing standard KYC and AML controls, and making suspicious activity more difficult for banks to detect.

Criminal actors deposit illicit proceeds into hawala systems, often pairing transactions with fraudulent or manipulated trade documents to obscure the true source of funds. Their use of informal channels bypasses official banking records and AML alerts, hindering financial institutions' ability to identify suspicious activities.

They act as hawaladars, receiving funds from criminals and arranging equivalent payouts elsewhere without formal contracts. By relying on personal trust networks instead of standard documentation, they circumvent traditional KYC and AML measures, making it difficult for financial institutions to detect or trace illicit proceeds.

References

  1. The Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG). (2008, July 11). APG Typologies Report 2008. http://www.apgml.org

  2. OECD. (2018). Illicit Financial Flows: The Economy of Illicit Trade in West Africa. OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264268418-en

  3. Blackwell, M., Seddon, D. (2004). Informal remittances from the UK: Values, flows and mechanisms, A report to DFID by Overseas Development Group. DFID.

  4. AUSTRAC (Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre). (2022). Money laundering and terrorism financing risk assessment: Remittance network providers and affiliates. AUSTRAC. https://www.austrac.gov.au/business/how-comply-guidance-and-resources/guidance-resources/remittance-network-providers-and-their-affiliates-australia-risk-assessment-2022

  5. Swedish Police Authority, National Operations Department, Financial Intelligence Unit. (2024, September). Crypto exchange providers - Professional money launderers (Ref. No. A554.682/2024 – 423). Swedish Police Authority. https://polisen.se/siteassets/dokument/finanspolisen/rapporter/crypto-exchange-providers-open.pdf [Accessed 2025-02-03]