Hawala (also called hundi or fei-qian) is an informal value-transfer network that substitutes personal trust and bilateral ledgers for regulated correspondent banking. Each transaction is captured only in the hawaladars’ private books; settlement occurs when counterpart agents net their mutual positions by: (i) exchanging cash physically, (ii) booking third-party wire transfers that are decoupled from the original customers, or (iii) manipulating trade documents—such as under- or over-invoicing shipments—to move equivalent value across borders [4].
Criminal exploitation occurs at three distinct points:
Cash/Account Intake – Illicit proceeds are handed to a local hawaladar in bulk currency or deposited into pooled bank accounts that may be opened with falsified identities. Investigators have documented single retail accounts, registered under fictitious names, processing local-currency turnover beyond any plausible legitimate profile [1].
Off-book Clearing – Successive offset instructions are passed through the network, leaving no formal remittance record. Because no funds traverse the regulated payment rails at this stage, conventional KYC/CTR triggers are bypassed.
Rebalancing & Integration – Agents periodically square their ledgers through cross-border cash couriers, sham trade flows (e.g., forged diamond import papers used to justify foreign-exchange remittances) or later-dated bank transfers initiated by seemingly unrelated counterparties [1][4]. The end recipient receives money that appears as ordinary family support or business revenue.
Structural vulnerabilities include: (a) minimal documentation requirements; (b) reliance on community enforcement rather than regulatory supervision; (c) low-cost, high-speed service that attracts migrants priced out of formal channels, especially where banking fees or currency controls are onerous [2]; and (d) the ability to commingle licit diaspora remittances with illicit funds. Field studies show that in several major corridors informal mechanisms transmit multiples of the officially recorded remittance volume, routinely eclipsing formal bank flows [3].
Red-flag indicators for financial institutions include personal or small-business accounts with disproportionately high cyclic turnover, rapid cash deposits followed by overseas wire payouts lacking economic rationale, and repeated use of aliases or third-party nominees linked to known hawala corridors. Authorities also highlight “offsetting” relationships—an industry term for hawala/hundi settlements—as a high-risk conduit that requires enhanced monitoring and consistent reporting, even when no single international wire appears suspicious on its own [4].