Currency Exchange Conversions

Criminals exploit both licensed and unlicensed currency exchange offices to execute multiple cross-currency swaps, continually shifting denominations to obscure the origin of illicit proceeds. By exploiting lax AML controls or inadequate customer due diligence, launderers can convert large sums into different fiat currencies, fragment the funds across multiple accounts or intermediaries, and then reconsolidate them under newly formed chains,. They often collaborate with complicit operators who overlook suspicious transaction patterns or ignore aggregated activity thresholds, allowing structured exchanges to remain undetected. In practice, once the funds have been converted among multiple denominations, tracing their origin becomes progressively more challenging, especially when smaller transfers are distributed through multiple providers. Cross-border wire transfers and other cross-currency services are particularly vulnerable to repeated layering, since oversight varies widely between jurisdictions, enabling criminals to operate below detection thresholds. A key interrelation involves physically transporting large amounts of cash across borders to exploit discrepancies between official and unofficial exchange rates. Criminals partner with clandestine groups or facilitators who smuggle foreign currency into a target jurisdiction, where underground brokers offer premium rates for quick conversions without formal oversight. In some regions with inconsistent or underdeveloped AML controls, such as parts of West Africa, weak supervision and limited cross-border reporting requirements allow offenders to multiply illicit proceeds through repeated roundabout flows and cross-currency swaps, further obscuring the money’s origin. By merging cross-border smuggling with intentional currency fragmentation and repeated exchanges, offenders create complex transaction trails that significantly hinder investigators’ efforts to identify and recover criminal assets.

[
Code
T0115
]
[
Name
Currency Exchange Conversions
]
[
Version
1.0
]
[
Parent Technique
]
[
Risk
Product Risk, Jurisdictional Risk, Internal Risk
]
[
Created
2025-03-12
]
[
Modified
2025-04-02
]

Tactics

Criminals exploit lax KYC procedures and complicit currency exchange operators to circumvent AML measures, thereby securing entry into or continued use of financial channels despite suspicious transaction patterns or threshold violations.

ML.TA0007
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Repeated cross-currency exchanges serve as the primary strategy to obscure the origin of illicit proceeds by rapidly shifting them between denominations, accounts, and jurisdictions, making the funds more difficult to trace.

Risks

RS0002
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Product Risk
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Currency exchange services are the core product vulnerability exploited here. Criminals repeatedly swap currencies to layer illicit proceeds, taking advantage of minimal KYC at some exchange offices and the speed and opacity of multi-currency transactions. This enables rapid layering and obscures the funds’ origin, making product risk the primary threat vector.

RS0004
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Jurisdictional Risk
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Offenders deliberately choose or operate in jurisdictions with weak AML standards or non-existent exchange controls, exploiting inconsistent regulatory frameworks across borders. This facilitates repeated conversions without proper oversight, exacerbating the layering process.

RS0005
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Internal Risk
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Collusion with complicit or untrained exchange staff—who fail to enforce AML measures, overlook aggregated transaction sizes, or ignore suspicious activity—represents an internal vulnerability within both licensed and unlicensed exchange services.

Indicators

IND00630
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Frequent high-value currency conversions between multiple denominations within short intervals, lacking a clear economic justification.

IND02177
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Successive use of currency exchange offices located in jurisdictions with limited AML oversight, conducted with minimal or no documentation provided.

IND02178
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After converting funds into a new currency, the account holder immediately wires the proceeds to multiple third-party accounts in different countries.

IND02179
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Customer’s account activity abruptly shifts from routine local transactions to recurrent foreign currency swaps not aligned with stated business operations.

IND02180
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Customer maintains relationships with numerous currency exchange providers, without a discernible legitimate business or economic reason for engaging so many.

IND02181
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Currency exchange office processes large-scale transactions for a single client repeatedly, yet does not request standard KYC updates or file threshold reports.

IND02182
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Multiple currency exchange transactions structured just below reporting thresholds over a short period, collectively amounting to a substantial total volume.

Data Sources

  • Official data on the movement of individuals and cash across international borders.
  • Reveals instances where large sums of cash are physically transported to exploit off-book or unofficial exchange rates.
  • Assists investigators in correlating unreported cross-border movements with subsequent suspicious currency conversions.
  • Consolidated information on AML/CFT enforcement levels and regulations across different countries.
  • Highlights regions with lax oversight or inadequate exchange controls, aligning with known laundering hotspots.
  • Assists in risk-scoring transactions involving high-risk or undersupervised jurisdictions for currency exchange.
  • Provides detailed records of all fiat currency exchanges, including timestamps, exchange rates, volumes, and counterparties.
  • Enables detection of repeated high-value conversions and structured sub-threshold exchanges, which are indicators of layering in illicit currency swaps.
  • Allows tracing of suspicious cross-currency movements that obscure the origin of funds.
  • Comprehensive records of financial transactions across accounts, including timestamps, amounts, currencies, and counterparties.
  • Enables correlation of currency exchange activity with subsequent layering transactions to different accounts or jurisdictions.
  • Assists in tracing the flow of converted funds through multiple financial channels.
  • Lists licensed or registered currency exchange and money service providers, including their authorization status.
  • Identifies unlicensed or rogue exchange offices that may facilitate illicit conversions.
  • Helps monitor compliance requirements for regulated MSBs, detecting those with potential AML lapses.
  • Contains verified customer identities, beneficial ownership data, and stated business activities.
  • Allows comparison of declared customer profiles against frequent or high-volume foreign exchange transactions.
  • Supports detection of misaligned account activity, where currency swaps and cross-border fund transfers contradict stated business objectives.
  • Captures cross-border wire transfers involving different countries and currencies.
  • Facilitates the identification of multi-jurisdictional layering by linking currency conversion activities to subsequent international transfers.
  • Enables the detection of high-risk patterns where criminals quickly move converted funds to foreign accounts.

Mitigations

Require advanced scrutiny for customers or entities engaged in large or repetitive cross-currency swaps. Verify the legitimacy of underlying transactions, the source of funds, and the licensing status of the exchange service providers. By uncovering suspicious patterns in currency flows, enhanced due diligence (EDD) ensures that high-risk customers receive deeper investigation.

Collect detailed documentation on clients’ reasons for frequent currency conversions, verify the legitimacy of cross-currency transactions, and identify beneficial owners for legal entities involved. Investigate any unusual or unexplained changes in exchange volume or denominations.

Implement specialized transaction monitoring rules focusing on repeated cross-currency conversions with minimal intervals, including frequent currency swaps at or just below threshold amounts, to identify layering patterns. Investigate cases that involve the rapid movement of funds across multiple jurisdictions or denominations not aligned with the customer's stated business activities.

Regularly audit currency exchange partners and money service businesses for AML compliance shortcomings, especially regarding high-volume cross-currency OTC transactions. Impose corrective measures or terminate relationships where lax controls enable layering schemes.

Consolidate and file CTRs for aggregated currency exchange transactions that exceed reporting thresholds. Generate real-time alerts when customers conduct repeated conversions just below these thresholds to prevent structured layering attempts aimed at evading detection.

Train front-line and compliance staff to recognize layering red flags in currency exchange transactions, such as repeated conversion requests below reporting thresholds, suspicious use of multiple denominations, and frequent transmissions to third-party accounts in diverse jurisdictions. Provide clear workflows for escalating such findings.

Categorize customers based on their typical currency usage patterns, volume, and geographic exposure. Assign higher risk ratings to customers exhibiting frequent multi-currency exchanges or using numerous exchange providers in multiple jurisdictions. This should prompt enhanced monitoring for layering indicators.

Coordinate with financial institutions and money service businesses to exchange intelligence on customers or operators with known layering histories. Identify repeat offenders who exploit multiple currency exchange points by distributing typologies and suspicious patterns across the network.

Restrict or deny services to unlicensed or high-risk currency exchange operators. Require verifiable evidence of regulatory compliance and AML controls before approving large-scale cross-currency transactions. This measure prevents criminals from exploiting weak or complicit exchange facilities.

Continuously review customer profiles, tracking emerging patterns of multi-currency exchanges or significant changes in transaction behavior. Escalate anomalies, such as abrupt spikes in foreign currency transactions, to ensure timely detection of layering tactics.

Instruments

  • Criminals deposit illicit proceeds into accounts and request currency conversions, often transferring funds among multiple accounts or banks to layer transactions.
  • After each conversion, proceeds can be swiftly wired to new jurisdictions, increasing complexity in tracing the financial trail.
  • Criminals repeatedly convert one fiat currency into another at exchange offices, fragmenting transaction records and making the original source of funds harder to identify.
  • By rotating through diverse currencies across multiple jurisdictions, launderers exploit weak controls or collusion in certain exchange offices to create numerous low-visibility transactions.
IN0051
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  • Criminals bring in physical bills for conversion into other denominations, often breaking transactions into smaller sums below reporting thresholds.
  • Paper-based or under-the-table dealings in unlicensed or complicit exchanges produce limited audits, providing opportunities for structuring and layering illicit proceeds.
  • Offenders can load illicit funds onto prepaid cards or digital wallets in one currency and then exchange these balances for other currencies at selected exchange offices.
  • The reduced KYC requirements of some providers allow repeated cross-currency transfers, fragmenting the audit trail across multiple jurisdictions and platforms.

Service & Products

  • Facilitate systematic cross-currency swapping, often in rapid succession, making it harder to pinpoint the original source of funds.
  • Criminals exploit these transactions’ complexity and volume, leveraging multi-currency swap chains to break audit trails and further layer illicit assets.
  • Provide multiple cross-currency swaps with limited oversight, allowing criminals to continually shift denominations and obscure the transaction trail.
  • Susceptible to collusion with complicit exchange operators who fail to enforce AML requirements, enabling structured transactions designed to avoid detection thresholds.
  • Enable layering steps following currency conversions, as illicit funds can be swiftly relocated to multiple accounts or jurisdictions.
  • In many scenarios, criminals exploit foreign wire transfers to further fragment the audit trail after each currency swap.

Actors

AT0008
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Banks become part of the layering chain when launderers:

  • Wire or transfer newly converted funds to multiple accounts or jurisdictions.
  • Disguise transactions as routine foreign exchange settlements or legitimate business payments.

This reliance on standard banking channels for rapid fund movement further obscures the audit trail and complicates detection efforts.

Money services businesses, including both licensed and informal (unlicensed) currency exchange operators, are exploited by:

  • Facilitating multiple currency swaps with minimal scrutiny or recordkeeping.
  • Allowing complicit staff or ownership to overlook suspicious transactions or fail to file threshold reports.

By enabling frequent denomination changes and fragmented transaction records, these businesses significantly hinder effective tracing of illicit proceeds.

Professional money launderers coordinate successive currency exchanges by:

  • Seeking out licensed or unlicensed exchange services that have weak AML controls or complicit operators.
  • Structuring funds into smaller amounts, converting them repeatedly to different currencies, and transferring the proceeds across multiple accounts.

This repeated layering hinders financial institutions' ability to detect suspicious transaction patterns and trace the original source of illicit funds.

AT0064
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Cash couriers physically transport large amounts of currency across borders, enabling criminals to exploit unofficial exchange rates and lax oversight. By bypassing standard reporting channels, they facilitate repeated cross-currency conversions away from regulated scrutiny, complicating financial institutions' ability to track or intercept illicit funds.

Informal value transfer system operators, such as unlicensed hawala brokers, enable:

  • Cross-border currency movement and conversions outside regulated banking channels.
  • Exploitation of unofficial or premium exchange rates without formal oversight, bypassing financial institutions' KYC and transaction monitoring.

References

  1. GAFILAT (Financial Action Task Force of Latin America). (2021). Strategic analysis product on patterns, trends and alerts related to the physical transportation of cash and bearer negotiable instruments in the region. GAFILAT.https://biblioteca.gafilat.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Strategic-Analysis-of-the-Physical-Transportation-of-Cash-and-Bearer-Negotiable-Instruments-BNI-in-the-region.pdf

  2. OECD. (2018). Illicit Financial Flows: The Economy of Illicit Trade in West Africa. OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264268418-en

  3. GIABA (Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa). (2020). Money laundering and terrorist financing through the informal and illegal currency exchange service providers in West Africa. GIABA. http://www.giaba.org

  4. Financial Action Task Force (FATF). (2010, June). Money laundering through money remittance and currency exchange providers. MONEYVAL and FATF/OECD. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/Moneylaunderingthroughmoneyremittanceandcurrencyexchangeproviders.html

  5. Teichmann, F. M., Falker, M.C. (2021). Money laundering via underground currency exchange networks. Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance,Vol. 29 No. 1, pp. 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1108/JFRC-01-2020-0003

  6. Goldbarsht, D. (2021). Virtual currencies as a quasi-payment tool: the case of frequent-flier programs and money laundering. Emerald Publishing Limited. https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/jmlc-11-2020-0127/full/html

  7. MAS (Monetary Authority of Singapore). (2024). Money laundering risk assessment report Singapore 2024. MAS. https://www.mas.gov.sg/publications/monographs-or-information-paper/2024/money-laundering-national-risk-assessment