Money Mule Exploitation

Money mules are unwitting or complicit individuals recruited to funnel illicit proceeds through personal or business accounts, thereby adding layers of separation between the launderers and law enforcement. Criminals often direct these mules to receive and transfer funds, exploiting third-party or “mule” accounts to obscure the true beneficiaries. In some cases, entire funnel account networks span multiple jurisdictions—recruiting foreign nationals or other associates to open new accounts and rapidly move fraudulent deposits overseas. One investigation uncovered a duo that enlisted seven additional individuals to launder scam proceeds between 2013 and 2017, illustrating how criminals can scale money mule operations across multiple accounts. By leveraging money mules, criminals further distance themselves from detection, heightening risks for financial institutions and investigators tasked with monitoring suspicious transactions. Even family members or close acquaintances may be co-opted—knowingly or not—to serve in this role. This distribution of criminal proceeds across disparate accounts can complicate AML detection systems, as each mule offers an additional layer masking the trail of funds.

[
Code
T0011
]
[
Name
Money Mule Exploitation
]
[
Version
1.0
]
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Parent Technique
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[
Risk
Customer Risk, Jurisdictional Risk
]
[
Created
2025-01-23
]
[
Modified
2025-04-11
]

Money Mule Schemes

Stooge account

Tactics

Criminals use money mule accounts to bypass standard KYC/AML checks, establishing entry points into the financial system without revealing the ultimate controllers of illicit funds. This serves as a secondary objective when enlisting third-party account holders.

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Mules often deposit or transfer illicit proceeds into legitimate channels, effectively integrating the funds into the financial system.

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Money mules channel illicit proceeds through multiple accounts and jurisdictions, creating layers of separation from the original criminal source and obscuring the true beneficiaries of the laundered funds.

Risks

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Customer Risk
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Criminals recruit unwitting or complicit individuals (mules) who open or use personal and business accounts to move illicit proceeds. By leveraging these ostensibly legitimate customers, launderers obscure their own identities and complicate financial institutions' ability to detect suspicious activity. This is the primary vulnerability, as it exploits the bank's reliance on customer credentials and KYC processes that do not immediately reveal the true controlling parties.

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Jurisdictional Risk
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Money mule operations often extend across multiple jurisdictions, recruiting foreign nationals or directing funds overseas to exploit regulatory or investigative gaps. By dispersing transactions internationally, criminals further conceal the illicit origins, making it difficult for authorities to trace the flow of funds across disparate legal frameworks.

Indicators

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Frequent small-value deposits deliberately structured below mandatory reporting thresholds to circumvent detection, consistent with smurfing techniques by money mules.

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Multiple new accounts opened within a short timeframe by individuals with matching or highly similar addresses or nationalities, consistent with coordinated money mule recruitment.

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New customers providing identical or nearly identical identification documents (e.g., passports, driver’s licenses, selfies), indicative of standardized KYC data usage in money mule schemes.

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Rapid outbound transfers from recently opened personal accounts to external institutions or cryptoasset exchanges, reflecting early-stage money mule placement and integration.

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Multiple sequential transactions rapidly moving funds in and out of accounts, fragmenting the funds’ flow and obscuring their origin, consistent with layering tactics in money mule operations.

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Anomalous account behavior where a client with routine identity verification suddenly conducts high-volume transactions contrary to their declared profile, consistent with money mule exploitation.

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Circular transaction patterns, where funds repeatedly cycle through a network of related accounts without legitimate business purpose, consistent with coordinated money mule activity.

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Discrepancies between the declared source of wealth and observed transaction volumes or frequencies in newly opened accounts, indicating personal accounts used for illicit funds processing.

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Recently opened accounts belonging to individuals recruited via suspicious job postings or social media offers to receive and transfer funds for a commission, consistent with money mule operations.

Data Sources

  • Includes publicly accessible data from social media, forums, and websites advertising quick-money schemes or job offers targeting potential money mules.
  • Provides insights into mule recruitment networks and communications, enabling analysts to cross-reference online postings with individuals opening new accounts.
  • Reveals social media patterns or user interactions that indicate potential involvement in organized mule activities.
  • Capture timestamps, amounts, sending and receiving account identifiers, currencies, and transaction types to enable the detection of suspicious or repetitive deposits, structured amounts below reporting thresholds, and rapid in-and-out fund transfers.
  • Allow comparison of actual transaction behaviors against expected customer profiles, highlighting anomalies such as quick outbound transfers from newly opened accounts.
  • Facilitate tracing of layering or circular flows through multiple linked accounts, a hallmark of money mule exploitation.
  • Consists of postings, applications, and records from recruitment platforms, allowing for the identification of suspicious or fraudulent job ads that promise easy income for receiving and transferring funds.
  • Helps link newly opened accounts to potentially compromised or complicit individuals recruited as mules through dubious advertisements.
  • Supports investigations by pinpointing clusters of applicants who might have been directed to open accounts for illicit fund movements.
  • Contain verified identity documents, personal and address details, and beneficial ownership information.
  • Reveal patterns of multiple new accounts opened by individuals with matching addresses, nationalities, or identical ID documents, consistent with money mule recruitment.
  • Include declared source-of-wealth data that can be cross-checked against actual account activity to identify discrepancies indicative of mule exploitation.

Provides detailed records of international transaction flows, including originating and beneficiary institutions, involved countries, currencies, and settlement processes. This data helps identify cross-border funds movement indicative of multi-jurisdictional money mule networks, revealing patterns where mules funnel illicit proceeds through multiple accounts across different regions.

Mitigations

Require additional documentation and justification for accounts displaying money mule indicators, such as unexplained third-party deposits or rapid external transfers. Validate the authenticity of identification records and scrutinize relationships between account holders and depositors to detect undisclosed controllers or criminal networks.

During onboarding and routine account reviews, confirm each customer's declared occupation, income sources, and purpose of the account. Cross-reference external data or OSINT to detect contradictions in background information that may arise when customers are recruited as money mules through fake job offers, romance scams, or other deceptive tactics.

  • Employ advanced analytics and monitoring systems to detect atypical volume, frequency, or velocity of transactions.
  • Enhance monitoring for patterns consistent with structuring by aggregating activity over time and across multiple accounts to spot cumulative suspicious behavior.
  • Lower internal thresholds for alerts to identify micro-structuring patterns.
  • Increase scrutiny on transactions just below regulatory thresholds.

Apply specialized on-chain analytics and wallet clustering to trace fund flows linked to suspected money mule accounts. Use IP and device fingerprinting to correlate multiple digital wallets controlled by the same individual, revealing coordinated funnels of criminal proceeds through crypto channels.

  • Train personnel to recognize suspicious transaction patterns indicative of mule activity, such as rapid in-and-out funds movement.
  • Instruct employees to escalate red flags, including repeated small deposits, multiple unrelated beneficiaries, or customers with inconsistent profiles.
  • Inform customers about the risks of becoming money mules through job scams, social media offers, or unsolicited "financial management" roles.
  • Encourage customers to report suspicious offers or unusual fund requests.

Immediately file suspicious activity reports when multiple third-party deposits or rapid pass-through transactions indicate money mule usage. Include details of account interconnections, deposit patterns, and beneficiary relationships to facilitate further investigation into the flow of illicit funds.

Temporarily restrict or freeze accounts suspected of money mule activity once red flags, such as repeated incoming transfers from unrelated sources, are identified. Limit or block high-risk services (e.g., international transfers, crypto transactions) until the account holder provides legitimate proof of transaction purpose, preventing continued misuse for illicit fund flows.

Instruments

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  • As part of 'Casino Mule Networks,' criminals instruct mules to purchase chips with illicit funds, engage in minimal wagering, and redeem the chips for seemingly legitimate winnings.
  • This process reintroduces illicit capital as casino payouts, complicating the paper trail and obscuring the true origin of the funds.
  • Criminals recruit money mules and instruct them to open or use existing personal or business bank accounts under the mule’s own credentials.
  • Illicit funds are deposited into these accounts and quickly transferred onward, layering the transactions and concealing the true controller.
  • The legitimate appearance of routine banking activity helps evade immediate suspicion from financial institutions.
  • In the 'Crypto ATM Mule' variant, mules convert physical cash into cryptocurrency (or vice versa), obscuring the transaction chain.
  • Pseudonymous wallet setups and rapid crypto-to-fiat swaps further distance original launderers from law enforcement scrutiny.
  • Mules obtain cards linked to funnel accounts, enabling swift ATM withdrawals or point-of-sale transfers of unlawfully obtained funds.
  • The everyday usage pattern of card transactions disguises the illicit nature of the underlying movement of proceeds.
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  • Mules receive illicit proceeds in physical form and perform structured cash deposits below reporting thresholds to evade detection.
  • Withdrawals in cash similarly mask the original fund source, adding layers of anonymity for the real launderers.
  • Criminals instruct mules to fund prepaid or stored-value accounts (e.g., reloadable gift cards, digital wallets) with illicit money.
  • The mule then transfers or withdraws these balances, fragmenting the transaction trail and reducing direct linkage to the originating criminal organization.

Service & Products

  • Enables money mules to open and manage accounts remotely, often bypassing in-person scrutiny.
  • Facilitates quick international or domestic transfers via mobile apps, adding layers of separation for illicit funds.
  • Mules use these platforms to receive illicit proceeds directly from criminals or other mules.
  • Multiple small transactions across different accounts create a complex network difficult to trace.
  • Mules exploit convenient mobile payment tools to receive and forward funds without standard banking scrutiny.
  • These non-traditional channels can camouflage transactional patterns and sources.
  • Criminals designate ‘Crypto ATM Mules’ to convert illicit cash to cryptocurrency or vice versa, obscuring fund origin.
  • Rapid deposits and withdrawals in fragmented amounts help evade standard currency transaction monitoring.
  • Criminals direct money mules to open business accounts with minimal documentation or using false details.
  • Illicit funds pass through these “legitimate” business channels, masking the launderers’ identities.
  • Mules set up or maintain digital wallets that rapidly receive and transfer illicit funds.
  • Pseudonymous or limited-KYC features can make transaction tracing more difficult.
  • Money mules can funnel illicit proceeds across borders under the guise of remittances.
  • Structured or frequent transfers cloak the true origin and intended recipient, obscuring money trails.
  • The most common avenue for money mules to deposit, withdraw, and disperse illegal proceeds.
  • Structured deposits and subsequent rapid transfers fragment the money trail.
  • Allows mules to send large sums domestically or internationally with few immediate questions.
  • Repeated rapid transfers through multiple corridors obscure the origin and final beneficiary.
  • Mules create or control accounts on these platforms, receiving funds under personal or fabricated identities.
  • Instant transfers and low threshold to set up accounts facilitate rapid layering of proceeds.

Actors

Money mule herders recruit, coordinate, and compensate multiple mules, enabling large-scale or cross-border funnel account networks. They:

  • Target individuals through fake job postings, social media offers, or direct inducements to open bank or digital payment accounts.
  • Instruct mules on timing and transaction amounts, orchestrating illicit fund movements across different institutions or jurisdictions.
  • Leverage each mule's account credentials, frustrating financial institutions’ attempts to identify ultimate beneficiaries.

One investigation uncovered a duo that enlisted seven individuals to launder scam proceeds, exemplifying how herders expand operations quickly.

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Money mules are unwitting or complicit individuals who funnel illicit proceeds through personal or business accounts. They:

  • Receive instructions to deposit, transfer, or withdraw funds under their own credentials, hiding the true beneficiaries.
  • May include family members or close associates who are co-opted—knowingly or not—into facilitating illegal transfers.
  • Conduct frequent, structured, or rapid transactions that fragment the financial trail, making it harder for financial institutions to detect suspicious patterns.

References

  1. Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. (2022, July). APG Yearly Typologies Report 2022. APG Secretariat. https://apgml.org/methods-and-trends/documents/

  2. Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG). (2014). APG Yearly Typologies Report 2014. APG Secretariat. http://www.apgml.org

  3. APG (Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering). (2019, August). APG Yearly Typologies Report 2019. Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. https://apgml.org/documents/default.aspx

  4. FATF (Financial Action Task Force). (2009, March). Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector. FATF. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/Vulnerabilitiesofcasinosandgamingsector.html

  5. Department of the Treasury. (2022, February). National Money Laundering Risk Assessment. Department of the Treasury.https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/2022-National-Terrorist-Financing-Risk-Assessment.pdf