Business Bank Accounts

• Criminals register shell companies to open these accounts with minimal beneficial ownership scrutiny.
• These accounts serve as conduits for illicit funds, allowing layering and the appearance of legitimate business transactions.

• Some shelf companies come bundled with pre-existing bank accounts, allowing immediate transfer and deposit of illicit funds.
• The existing transaction history misleads financial institutions into believing the entity has legitimate operations, facilitating layering of illegal proceeds.

• Ephemeral shell companies open business accounts for rapid deposits and withdrawals tied to fraudulent invoices or other illicit transactions.
• These accounts are closed or abandoned soon after, reducing the paper trail and hindering law enforcement’s attempts to investigate fund flows.

• Criminals deposit illicit cash into business accounts, presenting it as legitimate revenue to lessen scrutiny.
• They may split deposits below reporting thresholds across different accounts or branches, obscuring the total amounts introduced.

• Provide a legitimate façade for depositing illicit proceeds disguised as rental revenue or operational income.
• Division of incoming deposits across multiple business sub-accounts helps to obscure transactional patterns and conceal the origin of funds.

• Illicit funds disguised as rent are deposited into business accounts associated with real estate operations, mixing illegal proceeds with any legitimate rental inflows.
• Criminals may then perform structured withdrawals, transfers, or layering transactions to further conceal the unlawful source of funds.

• Criminals direct money mules to open business accounts with minimal documentation or using false details.
• Illicit funds pass through these “legitimate” business channels, masking the launderers’ identities.

• Shell or front companies open these business accounts to receive casino-issued checks from redeemed chips, concealing beneficial ownership behind corporate structures.
• Depositing funds through multiple shell-company accounts fragments the audit trail and complicates AML compliance.
• This layering tactic creates an appearance of legitimate business revenue, distancing the illicit funds from their true origins.

• Use of forged incorporation or identification documents to open accounts under fictitious or misrepresented entities, bypassing due diligence.
• Altered financial statements or references conceal illicit inflows and mask fraudulent activity.

• Allow criminals to deposit illicit proceeds under the guise of legitimate business transactions.
• Facilitate mixing of illegal funds with genuine revenue or invoice payments, reducing transparency over cash flows.
• Support routine operational activities—such as payroll and supplier payments—that can mask the origin of funds within normal banking activity.

• Permit deposit of fraudulent call-center proceeds, labeled as legitimate service fees or customer payments.
• Facilitate layering by mixing illicit funds with normal business transactions, making detection more challenging.

• Fraudulent consultancies open business accounts to receive purported advisory fees, blending illicit proceeds with legitimate transactions.
• The ability to conduct routine banking operations in the entity’s name aids in layering funds and disguises illegal revenue streams as consulting income.

• The fictitious entity opens a business account, depositing criminal proceeds as purported jewelry sales.
• Once mingled with legitimate revenue (if any), the illicit funds appear as normal commercial deposits.

• Serve as the primary repository for illicit funds injected as production budgets, concerts, or sponsorships.
• Allow perpetrators to claim these deposits as normal operating income from entertainment activities, effectively layering illicit proceeds.

• Criminals channel multiple small deposits through business accounts, masking the aggregation under legitimate business activity.
• By spreading transactions across various company accounts, they remain beneath detection trigger levels.

• Criminals open or register accounts in the name of sham vendors, receiving payments for false invoices.
• These accounts appear legitimate, enabling fraudsters to mingle illegal proceeds with everyday business transactions and complicating detection.

• Criminals may submit forged or stolen identity documents when establishing business entities, concealing the true owners.
• They exploit automated or insufficient verifications to pass as legitimate operators, hiding beneficial ownership and enabling illicit fund movement.

• Counterfeit or stolen identity documents are used to register businesses under fictitious beneficial owners.
• Once the business account is active, illicit funds can be funneled as purported commercial transactions without exposing the true controllers.

• Criminals can deposit illicit funds into the sports club’s business account disguised as legitimate revenue (e.g., ticket sales, merchandising, sponsorships).
• This mixing of illicit proceeds with normal inflows reduces scrutiny and seamlessly integrates criminal funds.

• Criminals channel proceeds from phony sales into dedicated business accounts, claiming it as commercial income.
• Routinely transacting through these accounts helps disguise illegal funds as legitimate operating revenue.

• Criminal organizations use front-company business accounts to deposit coerced payments, disguising them as legitimate revenue.
• Subsequent transfers or commingling with authentic sales proceeds obscure the extortion source and hinder detection.

• Criminal organizations deposit extorted protection fees into standard business accounts, blending illicit funds with normal commercial revenue. • Regular deposits and transfers within these accounts obscure the criminal origin by appearing as legitimate day-to-day business transactions.

• Criminals make substantial cash withdrawals from business accounts around payday without recording these disbursements in official payroll systems, thus paying undocumented workers off the books.
• This tactic integrates illicit funds with legitimate business revenue, disguising illegal wage outflows as normal operating expenses.

• Illicit funds are funneled through multiple business accounts in different geographic regions under the guise of legitimate commercial transactions.
• Repeated, low-value cash deposits blend in with normal revenue streams, reducing the likelihood of triggering AML alerts.

• Serve as the primary account for shell or front businesses to deposit proceeds from trafficking victims, blending illicit and legitimate income streams.
• Appear as routine commercial activity, reducing AML flags despite underlying forced labor or sexual exploitation revenues.

• Offenders channel forced labor profits through business accounts registered under legitimate business names, disguising the illegal source of the funds.
• Multiple business accounts may be used to layer transactions, dissipating red flags and making it harder to trace withheld wages back to forced labor operations.

• Perpetrators create shell or front businesses purporting to offer legitimate adult entertainment or hospitality services.
• Illicit proceeds from forced prostitution or child sexual exploitation are deposited into these accounts and commingled with legitimate revenues, masking the criminal source.

• Smugglers open accounts claiming legitimate commercial activity, depositing illicit fees as normal operating revenues.
• Structured cash deposits under reporting thresholds mask the illegal nature of funds, blending with everyday trade transactions.

• Disperse unauthorized wage payments or contractor fees from ostensibly legitimate corporate accounts, masking illicit transactions under routine payroll.
• Enable layering of illicit funds by mixing fake salaries with normal business operations, making them harder to detect.

• Receive proceeds paid under manipulated contract awards, appearing as legitimate corporate income.
• Enable concealed routing of kickbacks or bribes through routine commercial transactions, obfuscating the origin and beneficiary of illicit funds.

• Fraudulent or coerced business accounts enable rapid aggregation of small, structured deposits.
• Subsequent transfers or withdrawals from different branches or regions camouflage the true origin of the funds under perceived business activities.

• Senior officials or employees of state-owned entities leverage diplomatic privileges to open or operate business bank accounts with reduced scrutiny, bypassing normal AML checks.
• Large sums can be routed through these accounts under the guise of official diplomatic or enterprise transactions, masking the origin of corruption proceeds or bribes.

• Criminals can deposit counterfeit banknotes among genuine cash proceeds from a cash-intensive business.
• The false bills blend in with legitimate daily receipts, reducing detection risk and masking the origin of the illicit funds.

• Criminals with covert control of a bank can rapidly approve or overlook compliance checks for new business accounts.
• Compromised leadership enables high-risk customer onboarding and large illicit deposits, concealing beneficial ownership and source of funds under legitimate account services.

• Criminals can funnel illicit funds through ordinary business accounts by issuing checks or electronic payments to sham creditors, masking these as routine payables.
• Repeated outflows to ghost vendors appear as standard supplier expenses, reducing detection likelihood within normal expense monitoring processes.

• Criminals set up local shell entities or straw companies to open business accounts in multiple jurisdictions, passing off illicit proceeds as legitimate commercial transactions.
• Using local signatories obscures the true beneficial owner, exploiting weaker AML checks across different countries.

• Criminals can establish multiple business bank accounts under interlinked corporate entities to co-mingle illicit proceeds with ostensibly legitimate transactions.
• Repeated transfers among these accounts obscure the origin and flow of funds, complicating efforts to trace beneficial ownership.

• Used to deposit undeclared earnings as normal business income, blending illicit and legitimate funds.
• Facilitates daily transactions that appear legitimate, reducing the likelihood of detection by financial institutions or authorities.

• Scammers encourage victims to open or repurpose existing business accounts, promising higher payment thresholds or perceived legitimacy for commercial transactions.
• Illicit funds are funneled through these accounts, disguised as legitimate business income, further obfuscating the true source and beneficiary.

• Shell or front companies can open business accounts to deposit revenues from illicit commodity trade, appearing as normal commercial transactions.
• Large or frequent deposits and transfers blend into genuine business activity, complicating detection by financial institutions.

• Deposit counterfeit product revenues as legitimate business income, commingling illicit proceeds with legitimate funds.
• Repeated withdrawals and re-deposits create layering, making illicit transaction patterns harder to detect, thereby complicating AML investigations.

• Criminals open or misuse business accounts under false identities or shell entities to deposit funds from fabricated sales or invoices.
• The accounts also facilitate structured deposits and rapid transfers, commingling legitimate and fraudulent proceeds to obscure the source.

• Allows fraudsters to pose as legitimate businesses to secure and receive government relief funds under falsified eligibility claims.
• Proceeds can be mixed with legitimate transactions, masking the illicit inflow and complicating AML monitoring.

• Fraudsters establish accounts under fabricated or shell businesses to receive fraudulent relief payments.
• Funds are then commingled with any legitimate deposits or diverted into additional accounts, complicating transaction tracing.

• Offer the essential mechanism for transferring and receiving funds among deceptive corporate entities, enabling the circulation of illicit proceeds claimed from bogus VAT refunds.
• Permit the layering of transactions with minimal scrutiny, especially when multiple accounts are opened within different institutions or jurisdictions.

• Illicit actors establish accounts under fabricated or stolen business credentials, depositing high-value checks that may be non-sufficient funds (NSF) or altered.
• The guise of business activities masks the rapid outflow of temporarily credited funds, hindering immediate detection.

• Criminals deposit fraudulently obtained agricultural subsidies as if they are normal business revenues.
• By commingling illicit funds with legitimate transactions, they obscure the origin of subsidy proceeds.

• Fraudsters register a fictitious or shell business and open a corresponding bank account to pose as a legitimate employer.
• Government benefit disbursements for fake employees are deposited into this account, lending an appearance of normal payroll activity.
• Criminals then funnel these funds to personal or third-party accounts, rapidly dispersing the illicit proceeds.

• Fraudsters may open or control ordinary business accounts to receive payments intended for legitimate vendors.
• They disguise the transfer as a routine settlement of invoices, causing unsuspecting payers to send funds into these fraudulent business accounts.

• Criminals establish front or shell companies in sectors such as logging or fishing, then open business bank accounts to deposit illicit proceeds from illegal resource extraction.
• Commingling these funds with legitimate commercial transactions disguises their origin, reducing transparency and detection.

• Criminals open or use these accounts under front or shell companies to deposit and layer proceeds generated from unauthorized timber sales.
• They commingle illicit funds with normal business income, making it more difficult for authorities to detect the true origin of the money.

• Criminals deposit small sums of cash proceeds from common offenses as part of daily legitimate revenue, making irregular spikes in deposits harder to detect.
• By intermingling illicit funds with normal business transactions, they avoid triggering typical AML thresholds for suspicious cash activity.

• Allow offenders to channel illicitly saved payroll proceeds through ostensibly legitimate corporate accounts.
• Enable layering of funds via multiple deposits and withdrawals, masking the true wage base from tax authorities.

• Fraudulently obtained tax refunds are deposited into corporate accounts to appear as legitimate business proceeds.
• Multiple layered transfers help disguise the origin of the funds, hindering investigators tracing the fraudulent refunds.