Peer-to-Peer Payment Systems

• Mules use these platforms to receive illicit proceeds directly from criminals or other mules.
• Multiple small transactions across different accounts create a complex network difficult to trace.

• Enable direct user-to-user fund transfers with limited third-party oversight, allowing operators to replicate trust-based settlements via digital platforms.
• Multiple small transfers among accounts can mimic or substitute traditional IVTS offsets, making it harder for authorities to trace the ultimate source or beneficiary of funds.

• Public WiFi lets criminals create multiple accounts under different aliases with minimal overlap in device or IP data.
• Rapid transfers between shared-network users hamper the ability to trace ultimate beneficiaries of suspicious funds.

• Offenders make numerous micro-payments across multiple user accounts, each falling below required reporting limits.
• Limited identity verification in some P2P platforms further obscures the real source or beneficiary of the funds.

• Users can move small amounts directly between personal accounts without centralized oversight, reducing detection risk.
• A high frequency of micro transactions across peer networks masks aggregated laundering activity.

Bots send chains of small transfers between P2P handles (often across multiple apps), presenting as social payments while actually layering value.

• Criminals rely on consumer-to-consumer payment apps to fabricate private sales and shipping records, creating the appearance of legitimate e-commerce activity.
• Minimal KYC or identity checks on peer-to-peer networks help mask the source or destination of illicit funds, hindering AML efforts.

• Offenders leverage multiple micropayments between personal or mule accounts to identify the platform’s AML constraints.
• Through repeated small transactions, they gauge how easily they can evade suspicious activity flags.

• Criminals receive or move illicit payments directly between individuals, bypassing traditional banking oversight.
• Limited KYC on some P2P platforms facilitates anonymity, making it more difficult to identify the exploitation proceeds.

• Enable small-amount, direct transfers from exploitative content buyers to offenders with minimal oversight.
• Support rapid, repeated micro-payments, hindering the ability of financial institutions to pinpoint patterns of child exploitation funding.

• Offenders leverage direct person-to-person transfers to route illicit proceeds via unrelated or unwitting senders.
• Minimal identity verification requirements and rapid transaction capabilities enable fast layering and disguise the ultimate fund owner.

• These systems commonly rely on automated identity checks, allowing criminals to submit manipulated images or data.
• Fraudsters operate multiple user profiles under different aliases, yet often link back to the same device or IP address.
• Transfers under disguised identities facilitate layering of funds without in-person scrutiny.

• Layering occurs through multiple small-value P2P payments funneled into consolidated accounts.
• Quick onward transfers to new or third-party wallets obscure the money trail and hamper investigations.

• Criminals exploit minimal account-setup requirements to move illicit funds directly between users, bypassing more stringent banking controls.
• They create multiple accounts under various aliases, rapidly shuffling funds to layer proceeds and obscure the origin.

• Criminals exploit P2P features by rotating funds among multiple accounts or third-party wallets, making transaction patterns difficult to trace.
• Minimal KYC requirements or loopholes allow frequent micro-transactions that evade immediate detection.

• Recruits are encouraged to install or use P2P apps for rapid fund transfers.
• Small sums are funneled through these platforms under the pretense of legitimate side gigs, making it harder for AML systems to identify anomalies.
• This method exploits the convenience and speed of P2P transfers, reducing the likelihood of thorough verification.

• Scammers leverage popular P2P apps, telling victims to send payments instantly as ‘help’ or ‘emergency funds.’
• These direct, quick transfers minimize bank oversight and disguise the true nature of the transactions.

• Facilitate small, fragmented transfers of profited funds from illicit commodity sales, bypassing stringent AML controls of traditional banking.
• Multiple accounts or users can be utilized to distribute incoming proceeds, hindering traceability and oversight.

• Fraudsters exploit P2P platforms by guiding victims to transfer fees under superficial references (e.g., 'deposit' or 'administrative cost').
• Criminals take advantage of the quick, informal nature of these transfers to layer funds further, often sending them to accomplices or other accounts to avoid scrutiny.

• Fraudsters request direct P2P payments from victims, bypassing traditional banking scrutiny.
• These quick, low-barrier transfers allow scammers to receive multiple small payments labeled as 'lottery fees,' hampering detection.

• Offenders break down illicit proceeds into multiple small P2P transfers, slipping under typical transaction reporting thresholds.
• Rapid, direct exchanges with minimal customer identification requirements obscure the scale and source of accumulated funds.