Criminals incorporate governance tokens into their laundering chain, exploiting specialized functions (such as voting or protocol control) to add extra complexity to layering. By interspersing these governance token transactions among more liquid assets, they obscure the true source of funds and hinder straightforward tracing. This tactic draws on the decentralized and pseudonymous nature of DAO or protocol governance tokens, where beneficial ownership is even less transparent. Adversaries commonly exploit minimal-KYC platforms or decentralized exchanges to quickly swap governance tokens into higher-volume cryptocurrencies, especially after hacks or exploits, both to avoid price slumps and hamper detection. They also employ cross-chain bridges and multi-hop transactions to break address continuity, creating elaborate transactional webs that frustrate analytics and increase investigative challenges. In some jurisdictions, the limited regulatory classification of these tokens means criminals can further evade scrutiny, bypassing certain anti–money laundering requirements.
Governance Token Obfuscation
Governance Tokens in Layering
Tactics
Criminals engage in frequent governance token swaps across multiple decentralized platforms and chains to deliberately create dense transactional webs. This tactic obscures the original source of illicit funds, making it difficult for investigators to establish a clear audit trail.
Risks
Criminals exploit the unique features and incomplete regulatory classification of governance tokens (e.g., DAO voting or protocol control) to obscure beneficial ownership and complicate tracing. These inherent product characteristics allow for layering maneuvers and reduced transparency regarding the original source of funds, making product risk the central vulnerability.
In executing this technique, criminals exploit minimal or no-KYC decentralized exchanges, cross-chain bridging, and multi-hop transactions as channel vulnerabilities. These channels enable rapid swaps and complex routing that break transaction continuity, increasing opacity and hampering AML detection efforts.
Criminals deliberately exploit inconsistent or minimal regulatory classification of governance tokens in certain regions. By operating in jurisdictions lacking robust AML requirements for such tokens, they avoid stricter oversight and more easily evade detection.
Indicators
Frequent, repeated conversions of governance tokens into more liquid cryptocurrencies on decentralized exchanges, with no apparent business or investment rationale.
Intense trading activity involving governance tokens without observable participation in governance functions, diverging from typical usage patterns.
High-volume transactions converting low-liquidity governance tokens into mainstream cryptocurrencies or stablecoins, in amounts far exceeding typical liquidity norms.
Sudden, sizable acquisition of governance tokens by a customer lacking any prior engagement in decentralized protocols, misaligned with known risk or investment profiles.
Fragmented governance token transactions distributed across multiple wallets in small increments, lacking clear economic or operational justification.
Rapid transfers of governance tokens among multiple wallets, interspersed with other cryptocurrencies, without any discernible business purpose.
Complex routing of governance token swaps through decentralized platforms using non-standard or multiple trading pairs, absent any legitimate supply-and-demand rationale.
Frequent cross-chain bridging of governance tokens to newly created or atypical blockchains and wallets, with no credible business or investment explanation.
Significant governance token transactions tied to jurisdictions with minimal AML oversight or classification requirements, lacking an authentic nexus to those regions.
Data Sources
Consolidates country- and region-specific AML/CFT regulations, risk levels, and enforcement practices. Investigators can:
- Pinpoint governance token transactions linked to jurisdictions with minimal AML oversight.
- Identify potential regulatory arbitrage or non-compliant regions that criminals exploit to evade detection.
Includes detailed logs from centralized or semi-decentralized exchanges and bridging platforms, capturing user account data, transaction details, and flows of governance tokens. This data helps investigators trace conversions, link user identities, and detect suspicious patterns when governance tokens are moved or swapped, complementing on-chain analysis.
Contains verified customer identities, beneficial ownership information, and historical activity profiles. Investigators can:
- Detect sudden or unexplained governance token activity among users with minimal or no prior DeFi involvement.
- Identify mismatches between declared risk profiles and high-volume or complex token swaps.
Provides on-chain transaction records, addresses, token contract interactions, bridging transactions, multi-hop transfers, and cross-chain swaps. Investigators can:
- Identify repeated governance token conversions and bridging events.
- Detect unusual transaction volumes, layering patterns, or wallet linkages.
- Correlate wallet addresses to uncover illicit obfuscation of fund flows.
Mitigations
Incorporate decentralized governance tokens into jurisdictional risk scoring by assigning heightened risk levels to regions with limited AML regulations for digital assets. This approach guides enhanced scrutiny or outright restrictions on governance token movements originating from or flowing to these high-risk jurisdictions.
Require more thorough background checks and verification for customers involved in significant governance token activity, especially when it involves cross-chain movements from questionable platforms or newly created wallets. Scrutinize potential links to hacks or unregulated sources of funds to ensure that hidden beneficial ownership or proceeds from exploits are uncovered.
Implement targeted rules-based scenarios for governance token transactions, flagging repeated rapid conversions to mainstream cryptocurrencies, large bridging volumes from minimal-KYC platforms, or frequent multi-hop transfers inconsistent with typical usage. By generating immediate alerts for these high-risk patterns, institutions can investigate potential layering attempts unique to governance token obfuscation.
Deploy advanced on-chain analytics to trace the flow of governance tokens across multiple blockchain networks. Focus on detecting short holding periods, repeated bridging, and multi-hop wallet transfers that deviate from typical governance participation, as these patterns commonly reflect deliberate layering and obfuscation.
Assign higher risk ratings to customers exhibiting disproportionate governance token trades or complex bridging patterns through decentralized exchanges. Automatically escalate monitoring intensity and due diligence for these profiles, ensuring specialized focus on transactions indicative of governance token layering.
Leverage public blockchain explorers, decentralized governance forums, and external data sources to confirm legitimate governance participation if claimed. Investigate addresses linked to token hacks or flagged for suspicious behavior, exposing transactions inconsistent with normal governance token usage and revealing hidden laundering chains.
Limit or block governance token transfers to or from opaque decentralized platforms and unregulated jurisdictions, especially when transaction sizes or frequencies are misaligned with known customer profiles. By restricting high-risk cross-chain activities, institutions can interrupt the layering chains that exploit governance token obfuscation.
Continuously update customer profiles based on changes in governance token usage. Alert on spikes in token acquisition, repeated cross-chain swaps, or bridging to newly established wallets. Require fresh documentation on the source of funds whenever governance token activity exceeds normal thresholds, ensuring real-time risk re-evaluation.
Instruments
- Criminals convert governance tokens into stablecoins after a hack or exploit to lock in value and avoid market volatility.
- Cross-chain bridging with stablecoins increases transactional steps, further obscuring fund flows and making it difficult to follow the money trail.
- Limited regulatory scrutiny in certain jurisdictions allows adversaries to exploit stablecoins for layering, bypassing stringent AML checks.
- Criminals exploit voting or protocol control features to add extra complexity to layering, interspersing governance token transactions among other assets to obscure the original source of funds.
- Minimal regulatory classification in some jurisdictions enables evasion of certain AML checks, reducing KYC requirements and allowing beneficial owners to remain hidden.
- By bridging governance tokens across multiple blockchains, adversaries break address continuity and frustrate straightforward analytics, creating dense transactional webs.
- After receiving illicit proceeds in governance tokens, criminals convert them into mainstream public ledger cryptocurrencies (e.g., Bitcoin or Ethereum) on minimal-KYC exchanges.
- Repeated swaps and cross-chain transfers obscure the transactional path, hindering direct linkage to the original illicit funds.
- High liquidity and widespread acceptance of these major cryptocurrencies facilitate quick movement of value, complicating traceability for investigators.
Service & Products
- Criminals integrate governance tokens into DeFi platforms (e.g., decentralized exchanges, lending protocols), adding layered transactions that complicate end-to-end tracing.
- Pseudonymous governance and staking activities reduce transparency, creating barriers for AML investigators tracking beneficial ownership.
- Criminals leverage direct person-to-person trading of governance tokens without centralized intermediaries, reducing oversight.
- These platforms often have less stringent identification processes, allowing illicit actors to mask ownership and transact anonymously.
- Rapidly converts governance tokens into mainstream cryptocurrencies or stablecoins with minimal traceability.
- Near-instant swaps limit the detection window, enabling effective layering and heightening investigative difficulty.
- Criminals exploit minimal or no-KYC features to rapidly swap governance tokens for more liquid cryptocurrencies, obscuring traceable links to illicit proceeds.
- Interspersing governance token trades among broader altcoin transactions creates a complex transactional chain, making it more difficult for investigators to identify the original source of funds.
- Adversaries transfer governance tokens across multiple blockchains, breaking on-chain address continuity.
- Frequent bridging transactions obscure transactional pathways, multiplying compliance and monitoring challenges.
Actors
Illicit operators knowingly integrate governance tokens into their laundering operations by:
- Exploiting minimal or no-KYC platforms and decentralized exchanges to obscure their ownership of tokens and quickly swap them into mainstream cryptocurrencies.
- Using cross-chain bridges and multi-hop transactions that fragment the trail across multiple blockchains, frustrating investigators’ efforts to perform end-to-end tracing.
These tactics complicate financial institutions’ monitoring by creating intricate transactional chains and limiting visibility into the true origin of funds, especially after hacks or exploits.
Criminals leverage VASPs, often unwittingly, to facilitate governance token obfuscation by:
- Taking advantage of minimal or no-KYC onboarding and decentralized trading venues to transact governance tokens without easily traceable identities.
- Quickly converting governance tokens into other digital assets or mainstream cryptocurrencies, reducing transparency on the original source of funds.
These providers can inadvertently enable layered transactions, making it challenging for financial institutions to identify illicit patterns and enforce effective AML controls.
References
Benson, V., Turksen, U. Adamyk, B. (2024). Dark side of decentralised finance: a call for enhanced AML regulation based on use cases of illicit activities. Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 32 No. 1, pp. 80-97. https://doi.org/10.1108/JFRC-04-2023-0065
Akartuna, E. A., Johnson, S.D.,Thornton, A.E. (2022, September). The money laundering and terrorist financing risks of new and disruptive technologies: a futures-oriented scoping review. Springer Nature. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41284-022-00356-z
Akartuna, E. A., Madelin, T. (2022). The state of cross-chain crime: Countering the new age of crypto crime and money laundering in a cross-chain world. Elliptic. https://www.elliptic.co/resources/state-of-cross-chain-crime-report
CGMF (Interdepartmental coordinating group on combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism) Switzerland. (2024). National Risk Assessment (NRA): Risk of money laundering and the financing of terrorism through crypto assets. CGMF. Switzerland. https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/86329.pdf