Criminals move illicit funds through remittance services by falsely presenting them as personal gifts, familial support, or charitable donations. They often submit gift letters or similar documentation to reinforce the purported purpose and reduce scrutiny. These transfers can exceed typical amounts for the sender’s known financial profile or be directed to individuals or regions that lack any apparent family or organizational relationship. In many instances, offenders will also route funds outside typical migrant corridors, request a large transfer but settle for a smaller one, or fail to provide a convincing explanation for the remittance, all in order to obscure the true illicit source. This approach is considered a specialized subtechnique of misrepresenting the transaction’s purpose, enabling criminals to evade common AML triggers and appear compliant with routine remittance norms.
Disguised Remittance Transfers
Remittance Transfers
Disguised Remittances As Gifts
Tactics
By labeling remittances as gifts, familial support, or charitable donations, criminals circumvent standard AML triggers and inquiries, effectively securing entry or continued use of remittance channels with minimal scrutiny for illicit funds.
Risks
Criminals exploit minimal documentation or oversight in certain remittance channels by misrepresenting illicit funds as personal gifts, familial support, or charitable donations. They submit plausible gift-related documentation, split or reduce transfers to evade detection, and appear to comply with routine remittance purposes, thereby masking the illicit source of funds.
Offenders route disguised remittance transfers to or from jurisdictions with weak AML controls or outside typical migrant corridors to further obscure the funds' true origins, leveraging minimal oversight of charitable or familial transactions.
Indicators
Large or frequent remittance transfers labeled as family support or charitable donations that significantly surpass the customer's verified financial capacity or typical transaction patterns.
Repeated submission of identical or trivially altered gift letters or supporting documents across multiple transfers, all claiming the same transaction purpose.
Customers instruct remittance agents to minimize transaction details on official records, particularly regarding the actual reason for the transfers.
Remittances are directed to claimed charities or individuals for philanthropic or familial support, but no verifiable relationship or affiliation can be established.
Use of multiple remittance channels or providers for the same purported charitable or familial support purpose, with no clear economic rationale for dispersing funds in this manner.
Frequent or repeated remittances sent to or from regions known for lax oversight of charitable or nonprofit entities, with no correlation to the customer’s usual financial activities.
Customers frequently request large remittance amounts but reduce the transfer significantly after compliance or documentation inquiries, without providing a consistent explanation.
Data Sources
Aggregates official and publicly available data, including legal registrations, affiliations, and historical records, on individuals or organizations. This information verifies the legitimacy of claimed charitable recipients or family relationships, revealing inconsistencies that suggest a disguised transfer.
Collects data from online fundraising platforms, including donor identities, amounts, and stated purposes. This allows investigators to distinguish genuine contributions from remittances falsely labeled as charitable donations, a common tactic for disguising illicit funds.
Contains official licensing and operational details of MSBs, enabling the detection of customers who use multiple remittance providers to bypass monitoring thresholds or obscure the overall volume of disguised remittances.
Mitigations
Incorporate known risk factors for disguised remittances into jurisdictional assessments, focusing on regions with weak nonprofit oversight or corruption issues where false charitable claims are more common. Apply enhanced scrutiny or mandatory Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) for transfers to these regions labeled as familial gifts or donations, reducing the likelihood of illicit funds flow hidden behind charitable narratives.
Apply deeper scrutiny to remittances flagged due to unusual transaction size, frequency, or purpose claims (e.g., repeated high-value 'gift' transfers beyond the sender’s financial capacity). Require additional documentation that clearly proves the sender-recipient connection or the legitimacy of the charitable cause. Cross-check the authenticity of gift letters and any supporting evidence to uncover the use of boilerplate justifications or repeated patterns that may mask illicit funds transfers.
Collect and verify detailed information on both senders and recipients, confirming the stated familial or charitable relationship. For declared charity beneficiaries, validate registration status and legitimacy through official databases or public sources. Scrutinize gift letters for consistency with the customer’s known profile and ensure they align with credible documentation of personal ties or philanthropic involvement. By verifying these details upfront, institutions prevent criminals from misrepresenting the true purpose of remittances.
Deploy targeted rules and alerts for remittances flagged as personal gifts, family support, or donations that significantly exceed the customer’s usual transaction patterns. Monitor for repeated identical or minimally altered gift letters and attempts to strip transaction details from remittance records. Escalate cases where the purported remittance purpose is inconsistent with known risk profiles or the customer’s documented financial history.
Train frontline remittance staff to recognize red flags specific to disguised gifts and donations, such as recurring identical documentation, reluctance to clarify transaction purposes, or requests to omit details on records. Provide clear escalation procedures when customers repeatedly fail to demonstrate genuine family or philanthropic ties, ensuring timely internal reporting and deeper investigation.
Segment remittance customers based on the frequency of purported gift or donation transfers, receiving regions, and claimed affiliations. Flag higher-risk profiles—those frequently sending large sums under vague or repetitive personal stories—for immediate Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) and accelerated monitoring. By prioritizing these profiles, institutions can concentrate resources on capturing disguised remittance activities early.
Leverage publicly accessible data (e.g., verifying registered charities, confirming recipient identities on social media or official websites) to validate the legitimacy of declared family connections or philanthropic causes. Investigate inconsistencies in gift letters or claims of charitable involvement by cross-referencing external sources. Discrepancies indicating fake relationships or unregistered charities prompt further investigation and potential service restrictions.
Restrict or suspend remittance services when customers cannot substantiate large "gift" or "charity" transactions with satisfactory documentation, or repeatedly alter transaction details to avoid scrutiny. Impose transaction limits, withhold approvals, or require pre-approval for higher-risk remittances to deter the continued exploitation of disguised transfer channels.
Re-evaluate remittance customers’ transaction activities on a scheduled basis, confirming the continued legitimacy of claimed relationships or charities. Track changes in the frequency, size, or destination of transfers against initial onboarding information. Promptly escalate any inconsistencies, such as multiple identical gift letters or sudden shifts to different, unrelated beneficiaries, that suggest a disguised laundering scheme.
Terminate the relationship if customers consistently submit misleading or contradictory documentation for "gift" or "charitable" remittances, ignore repeated compliance requests, or continue circumventing established controls. This step removes ongoing exposure when remedial measures fail to rectify the high risk posed by disguised transaction practices.
Instruments
- Criminals purchase money orders with illicit funds, claiming these funds are personal gifts or charitable support (e.g., presenting gift letters).
- By structuring transactions below reporting thresholds, they avoid triggering AML reviews typically applied to larger remittance payments.
- The false documentation (gift letters, familial support claims) matches typical remittance usage, reducing scrutiny and enabling illicit funds to pass as standard remittance activity.
- Criminals load prepaid cards or e-wallets with illicit proceeds, labeling the transfers as personal or philanthropic remittances.
- Supporting documents, such as gift letters, provide a veneer of authenticity, mirroring typical remittance behavior and reducing suspicion.
- Minimal KYC requirements and the ability to rapidly convert or withdraw funds in multiple jurisdictions make these instruments easy to exploit while concealing true sources.
Service & Products
- Criminals load prepaid cards or stored-value accounts with illicit proceeds, misrepresenting them as personal gifts or philanthropic remittances.
- They take advantage of minimal KYC requirements and cross-border usability to obscure the true source of funds.
- Gift letters or other plausible documentation mirror legitimate remittance scenarios, reducing AML scrutiny.
- Criminals funnel illicit funds into charitable accounts under the guise of philanthropic donations.
- They provide minimal or falsified evidence of legitimate charitable activities, benefiting from reduced scrutiny associated with charitable giving.
- By exploiting the presumption of good faith for such accounts, offenders conceal the true illicit source of funds in remittance transactions.
- Criminals falsely label remittance transfers as personal gifts, familial support, or charitable donations, providing documents (e.g., gift letters) to reduce scrutiny.
- They often send amounts exceeding the sender’s known financial profile or route funds through regions lacking any genuine familial or organizational link, concealing the true source.
- By misrepresenting the transaction purpose, offenders evade common AML checks and appear compliant with routine remittance norms.
- Criminals purchase money orders with illicit funds while labeling them as personal gifts or charitable contributions (e.g., using gift letters).
- They structure transactions below reporting thresholds, avoiding AML reviews typically triggered by higher-value remittance payments.
- False documentation aligning with common gift or familial support claims reduces scrutiny, allowing illicit proceeds to pass as legitimate remittances.
Actors
Criminals claim these individuals as recipients for remittances under the guise of family support or personal gifts by:
- Presenting plausible letters or relationship narratives to mask the illicit nature of the funds.
- Sending amounts inconsistent with the sender’s known financial profile, complicating the ability of financial institutions to confirm genuine familial ties or legitimate needs.
Criminals disguise remittances as charitable donations by:
- Claiming affiliation with a non-profit but offering little verifiable proof of any legitimate cause.
- Submitting fictitious or minimal supporting papers that appear genuine, complicating verification for remittance providers and financial institutions.
Money services businesses are exploited by:
- Processing remittance transactions that appear to be personal or philanthropic in nature but exceed typical amounts or lack a genuine family or organizational link.
- Relying on documentation (e.g., gift letters) that can be easily falsified, making it harder to identify suspicious transactions, especially in cross-border contexts.
Illicit operators use disguised remittance transfers by:
- Submitting gift letters or other false documentation to label illicit funds as personal gifts, familial support, or charitable donations.
- Exploiting remittance channels where the true source and purpose of funds appear routine, making it challenging for financial institutions to detect suspicious activity.
References
Financial Action Task Force (FATF). (2005). Money laundering & terrorist financing typologies 2004-2005. FATF. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/Moneylaunderingandterroristfinancingtypologies2004-2005.html
Financial Action Task Force (FATF). (2005). Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing Typologies 2004-2005. FATF. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications.html