Anonymous Networking

Anonymous Networking involves using technologies such as Tor, VPNs, and proxy servers to conceal a user’s real location, IP address, or identity online. By routing traffic through multiple servers and employing layered encryption, criminals obscure the origin and destination of financial transactions, hindering law enforcement and AML compliance teams in tracing fund flows. These methods are also exploited on darknet platforms to hide illicit dealings or mask fund origins. Legitimate use cases exist (e.g., privacy protection or circumvention of censorship), but adversaries leverage these anonymity tools to maintain operational secrecy while laundering illicit proceeds. In particular, onion routing employs multiple layers of encryption, with each node decrypting only a single layer to reveal the next routing destination, complicating attribution efforts. Criminals also combine anonymity networks with additional chain-based techniques, such as multi-hop VPN configurations, to further degrade investigators’ ability to link IP addresses to individuals or transactions.

[
Code
T0015
]
[
Name
Anonymous Networking
]
[
Version
1.0
]
[
Parent Technique
]
[
Risk
Channel Risk
]
[
Created
2025-02-06
]
[
Modified
2025-04-02
]

Obfuscated Connectivity

Masked Internet Use

Private Network Access

Concealed Online Access

Tactics

Criminals rely on anonymizing tools (e.g., Tor, VPNs) to hinder investigative tracing, conceal digital footprints, and maintain secrecy when laundering illicit proceeds. This reduces exposure to AML controls and complicates law enforcement attribution efforts.

Risks

RS0003
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Channel Risk
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Criminals exploit anonymizing networks (Tor, VPNs, proxy servers) to obscure IP addresses and geolocation data, thereby undermining channel-based monitoring and creating blind spots for financial institutions. This technique primarily targets the channel layer, bypassing or confusing IP-based and geolocation-based controls that AML systems rely on, making it significantly harder to trace transaction origins or attribute activity to specific users.

Indicators

IND00174
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Frequent login attempts from IP addresses known to be associated with VPNs, Tor exit nodes, or proxy servers.

IND00175
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Transactions initiated from IP addresses that do not correspond with the customer's registered location, particularly when linked to anonymizing networks.

IND01157
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Rapid and frequent changes in geolocation data during account access or transaction events, with connectivity switching between anonymized exit nodes in a short period.

IND01158
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Customer consistently uses anonymizing services without a documented business or personal need for such privacy measures.

IND01159
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Multiple small or structured transactions consistently initiated via networks flagged as anonymizing.

IND01160
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Network and connection logs showing encrypted, multi-hop routing paths that obscure the initial digital footprint associated with financial transactions.

IND01161
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Inconsistencies between customer-provided identification data and digital access details, where anonymizing networks are the predominant method of connectivity.

IND01162
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Open-source or investigative findings reference user involvement with dark web marketplaces or onion addresses, correlating with anonymized financial transactions.

Data Sources

  • Provides IP logs, device usage patterns, and connection details for each online banking session or transaction.
  • Enables monitoring and flagging of repeated access attempts from known anonymizing networks (e.g., Tor exit nodes, VPN endpoints).
  • Assists investigators in correlating suspicious IP usage or rapid geolocation changes to detect potential misuse of anonymity tools and mitigate laundering risks.
  • Collects publicly available information, including any dark web affiliations, onion addresses, or marketplace references.
  • Assists in correlating anonymized financial transactions with reported dark web activities, identifying potential links to illicit marketplaces or hidden user identities.
  • Records timestamps, amounts, currency types, and parties involved in each financial transaction.
  • Facilitates the identification of recurring or structured transactions initiated from anonymizing networks, enabling pattern analysis of unusual transaction frequencies or amounts masked by hidden IP addresses.
  • Captures network traces, IP addresses, authentication events, and multi-hop routing paths.
  • Helps investigators observe the use of layered encryption or repeated connections from Tor, VPNs, or proxy servers, pinpointing suspicious anonymity-driven access during financial transactions.
  • Provides vetted customer identity details, declared addresses, and documented justifications for using anonymity tools.
  • Enables detection of inconsistencies between customer-provided information and actual usage of anonymizing networks, supporting investigations into potentially concealed identities or illegitimate privacy claims.

Mitigations

When repeated use of anonymizing networks is detected, or customers show masked IP addresses without legitimate rationale, apply Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) by requesting further proof of identity and geographic presence. Assess supporting documentation (e.g., employment or business records) and scrutinize high-risk transactions more closely to mitigate the risk of criminals exploiting anonymous networking to conceal illicit proceeds.

Require multi-factor authentication, biometric verification, or additional corroborating documentation for customers who frequently access services via anonymizing networks. These measures confirm the true identity and location of users, mitigating the risk that criminals hide behind Tor, VPNs, or proxies to obscure transaction trails.

Consolidate advanced solutions that detect anomalies in device configurations, including hidden or inconsistent time zones and mismatches between language settings and declared location. Integrate device fingerprint, IP, and geolocation data in real-time or post-event. By pinpointing suspicious changes in connectivity or flagged anonymizing IP addresses (such as Tor, VPNs, or proxies), institutions can quickly identify the obfuscation tactics criminals exploit to launder funds through anonymous networking.

Maintain an internal watchlist of known anonymizing IP ranges, including Tor exit nodes, and systematically flag or block connections and transactions originating from these IP addresses. By screening anonymizing endpoints, institutions reduce criminals’ ability to exploit anonymous networking undetected.

Geoblocking or Traffic Filtering: Some financial institutions block or flag Tor exit nodes and well-known VPN or proxy IP addresses. Strict geolocation policies can be enforced for account registration and subsequent online service usage. Real-time blocking or additional friction (e.g., captchas, additional identification steps) can be applied for connections from known anonymizing IP ranges.

Instruments

  • Criminals connect to online banking platforms through Tor or multi-hop VPNs, concealing their real IP addresses.
  • This bypasses institution-level geolocation or device-fingerprint checks used to detect suspicious login patterns.
  • Repeated high-value or cross-border transactions remain harder to tie to a specific physical location, complicating AML investigations.
  • By pairing privacy coins (e.g., Monero, Zcash) with onion routing, criminals shield both transactional data and network details.
  • Multiple encryption layers at the network and coin protocol level impede investigators seeking to correlate addresses with real-world entities.
  • Criminals access self-hosted or exchange-provided wallets behind anonymizing proxies, which block accurate IP attribution.
  • Automated risk engines that rely on location or device consistency are circumvented by frequent changes of Tor exit nodes or VPN servers.
  • This consistent obfuscation frustrates wallet activity monitoring and thwarts the correlation of addresses to specific individuals.
  • Criminals route access to exchanges or blockchain interfaces through privacy-focused networks, obscuring IP logs that could reveal user identities.
  • Investigators find it more challenging to map transaction flows when network-level cues are stripped away.
  • International fund transfers via public blockchains become even more difficult to trace when layered behind anonymizing connections.

Service & Products

  • Anonymous networking allows users to circumvent platform IP checks, enabling cross-border trades without revealing true identities or locations.
  • Minimal or easily circumvented KYC requirements, combined with hidden IP addresses, impede oversight and facilitate laundering through quick, direct user-to-user transfers.
  • Criminals use anonymizing networks (e.g., Tor/VPN) on mobile devices to mask IP addresses, impeding AML teams from accurately tracing user locations.
  • Rapid switching of anonymized connections circumvents typical fraud detection measures reliant on consistent device or geolocation data.
  • By leveraging anonymity networks, criminals obscure IP addresses when opening and operating exchange accounts, undermining KYC and AML controls.
  • Layered encryption and multiple hops further disguise transaction origins, complicating blockchain investigations and hindering law enforcement.

Actors

AT0008
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Criminals connect to online banking platforms through Tor or multi-hop VPNs to disguise their true IP addresses, which frustrates location-based detection and device fingerprinting controls. This makes it harder for banks to identify consistent usage patterns or flag unusual cross-border transactions based on realistic geographic profiles.

Cybercriminals rely on Tor, VPNs, and other anonymizing tools to conceal their digital footprints while conducting illicit activities or laundering stolen funds. By routing transactions through multiple encrypted nodes, they impede financial institutions' ability to flag unusual origins or correlate suspicious traffic, prolonging detection and complicating law enforcement investigations.

Criminals operating behind anonymized connections create and use exchange accounts with obscured IP addresses, circumventing location-based checks. This hinders KYC and transaction monitoring efforts, making it more difficult for exchanges and regulators to link suspicious activity to specific individuals or geographic regions.

Criminals use anonymity networks to access or operate darknet marketplaces that trade illicit goods or services, masking their real IP addresses from both financial institutions and law enforcement. This obfuscation hinders AML teams in tracing payment flows or identifying the individuals behind marketplace transactions, as layered routes and encryption complicate attribution efforts.

Individuals using anonymizing networks obscure their IP addresses when opening or managing virtual asset accounts, hampering AML controls designed to detect location inconsistencies. By employing layered routing or proxy connections, they thwart investigators' efforts to connect digital wallet activities to real-world identities, especially when combined with frequent IP or node changes.

Criminals exploit anonymity networks to engage with peer-to-peer cryptocurrency trading platforms, circumventing IP checks and limiting reliable geolocation data. These hidden connections undermine KYC processes, enabling cross-border trades under false or unverified identities. Financial institutions subsequently face greater challenges in detecting suspicious fund flows connected to these exchanges.

Criminals register for mobile money or e-wallet services using anonymized IP addresses, bypassing geographic and device-level checks. By rapidly rotating between various exit nodes or proxy servers, they confuse automated risk engines, enabling cross-border transfers that remain difficult for financial institutions to trace or link to specific users.

References

  1. Goldbarsht, D., de Koker, L. (2022). Financial Technology and the Law: Combating Financial Crime. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88036-1

  2. Lessambo, F. I. (2023). Anti-Money Laundering, Counter Financing Terrorism and Cybersecurity in the Banking Industry: A Comparative Study within the G-20.Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23484-2

  3. King, C., Walker, C., Gurulé, J. (2018). The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64498-1

  4. Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. (2022, July). APG Yearly Typologies Report 2022. APG Secretariat. https://apgml.org/methods-and-trends/documents/

  5. APG (Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering). (2016). APG Yearly Typologies Report 2016: Methods and Trends of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing. APG Secretariat. https://apgml.org/documents/default.aspx

  6. APG (Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering). (2016). APG yearly typologies report 2016: Methods and trends of money laundering and terrorism financing. APG Secretariat. https://apgml.org/methods-and-trends/documents/default.aspx?pcPage=1

  7. Durner, T., Yalbir, N., Laksmi, S. (2021). Financing and Facilitation of Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Returnees in Southeast Asia. Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. https://apgml.org/methods-and-trends/news/details.aspx?pcPage=1&n=3184

  8. Europol. (2023). The other side of the coin: An analysis of financial and economic crime. Publications Office of the European Union. https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/publications/other-side-of-coin-analysis-of-financial-and-economic-crime

  9. FATF (Financial Action Task Force). (2023, March). Countering ransomware financing. FATF. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/fatf-gafi/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/countering-ransomware-financing.html

  10. Financial Action Task Force (FATF). (2023, October). Crowdfunding for Terrorism Financing. FATF. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/crowdfunding-for-terrorism-financing.html

  11. van Wegberg, R., Oerlemans, J.J. and van Deventer, O. (2018). Bitcoin money laundering: mixed results? An explorative study on money laundering of cybercrime proceeds using bitcoin. Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 25 No. 2, pp. 419-435. https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-11-2016-0067

  12. CoinJoin. Bitcoinwiki. https://bitcoinwiki.org/wiki/coinjoin