Proxy Servers

Criminals route traffic through intermediary servers—often open or rotating proxies—to conceal their true IP address and location when conducting illicit financial activities. By frequently switching endpoints, they bypass geo-blocks or basic security filters, thwarting an institution’s ability to reliably attribute session activity to a single user. In practice, entire laundering networks have been observed operating behind VPN servers, making it difficult for investigators to pinpoint the actors’ actual infrastructure. Criminals also leverage anonymizing networks, such as Tor, to further obscure connection sources, complicating law enforcement’s IP-based detection efforts. While proxies have legitimate uses (for privacy, testing, or regional access), in a laundering context they degrade IP-based detection and audit trails, enabling stealthier fund movements and higher evasion of location-based controls.

[
Code
T0015.002
]
[
Name
Proxy Servers
]
[
Version
1.0
]
[
Parent Technique
]
[
Risk
Channel Risk
]
[
Created
2025-02-06
]
[
Modified
2025-04-02
]

Web Proxy

HTTP Proxy

SOCKS Proxy

Anonymous Proxy

Proxy

Tactics

By routing traffic through intermediary proxy servers, criminals deliberately conceal their true IP address and location, defeating IP-based detection and location-based controls. This stealth-driven approach hinders investigators' ability to attribute sessions to real actors, thereby reducing the risk of AML scrutiny and preserving operational security.

Risks

RS0003
|
Channel Risk
|

Criminals leverage proxies as a key vulnerability in remote, non-face-to-face transaction channels. By routing traffic through rotating proxy endpoints, they bypass IP-based geoblocking and location checks, eroding the effectiveness of channel-based monitoring. This obscures session attribution and impairs the institution’s ability to reliably confirm a user’s true whereabouts, thereby weakening the channel’s AML defenses.

Indicators

IND01101
|

Frequent account logins from IP addresses associated with known proxy services or suspicious short-term hosting providers, indicating possible obfuscation of the user’s true location.

IND01102
|

Transactions initiated from publicly listed proxy IP addresses, indicating an attempt to route financial flows through anonymizing intermediaries.

IND01103
|

Frequent changes in the originating IP addresses within a short time frame, consistent with rotating proxy usage.

IND01104
|

Account logins or transactions from residential proxy services that do not align with the customer’s declared or expected geographic location.

IND01105
|

Multiple login sessions or transaction requests using diverse proxy types (open, residential, rotating) within a short period.

IND01106
|

Connection logs show IP addresses associated with data centers or jurisdictions with lax regulatory oversight that are inconsistent with the customer's profile.

IND01107
|

A persistent mismatch between the IP geolocation derived from transaction data and the customer's reported location, especially when the IP is associated with a known proxy network.

IND01108
|

Frequent or contradictory device fingerprints (e.g., OS, time zone, language settings) across consecutive sessions, inconsistent with a single user's typical usage profile.

IND01109
|

Repeated logins or transaction requests from IP addresses recognized as Tor exit nodes, indicating usage of anonymizing networks to hide the user's true location.

Data Sources

  • Provides details on high-risk jurisdictions and data centers with weak AML oversight.
  • Aids in detecting network traffic from regions commonly used by criminals for proxy-based obfuscation.
  • Supports investigators in evaluating whether certain IP addresses or hosting providers are operating in risky or non-cooperative jurisdictions.
  • Tracks device attributes such as operating system, time zone, language settings, and user-agent details.
  • Helps identify suspicious session anomalies or rapid changes in device fingerprints consistent with rotating proxy usage.
  • Strengthens AML investigations by flagging inconsistent device characteristics originating from potentially anonymized connections.
  • Provides reference data on known Tor exit nodes, proxy IP addresses, and suspicious hosting services.
  • Enables cross-checking of session and transaction IPs against publicly documented anonymizing networks.
  • Helps investigators identify IP ranges frequently associated with criminal or high-risk proxy usage, thereby enhancing AML detection and investigation capabilities.

Captures transaction origin IP addresses, timestamps, amounts, and involved parties, enabling cross-referencing of IP data against known proxy or suspicious hosting providers. This helps investigators detect potential anonymizing service usage, such as Tor, VPNs, or rotating proxies, and identify high-risk connection behaviors that mask the user’s true location.

  • Collects session data, including IP addresses, user-agent strings, timestamps, and authentication events.
  • Enables correlation of these IPs with known proxy networks, Tor exit nodes, or suspicious short-term hosting services.
  • Facilitates detection of frequent or abrupt IP address changes that indicate possible rotating proxy usage.
  • Supports investigation by providing a clear audit trail of user sessions and highlighting anomalous network access patterns.
  • Contains official customer details, including declared addresses or regions of operation.
  • Enables direct comparison of reported locations against observed IP geolocation data from transaction and system logs.
  • Facilitates detection of location inconsistencies indicative of proxied or obscured network access.

Mitigations

Apply deeper background checks on customers exhibiting unexplained or high-frequency proxy usage. Require clear justification for anonymizing connections, verify the actual user location (e.g., cross-check declared address with geolocation data), and document all findings in the customer’s enhanced risk assessment. If proxy use remains unsubstantiated, escalate to a manual AML review or potential restrictive measures.

Implement real-time IP and device fingerprint analysis in the monitoring system to detect the use of anonymizing services, sudden IP geolocation changes, or patterns consistent with rotating proxies. Generate immediate alerts for high-risk proxy connections, allowing investigators to promptly assess and address suspicious activity tied to obfuscated locations.

Maintain and regularly update an internal watchlist of IP addresses known to be associated with open proxies, suspicious VPN endpoints, or anonymizing networks. Correlate login and transaction IP addresses against these updated lists in real-time to flag or block illicit activity and facilitate more timely investigative follow-up.

Restrict or block account access originating from identified anonymizing proxies or flagged VPNs unless the customer provides a legitimate business explanation for such connections. If unexplained proxy usage is detected, temporarily limit account functionality or suspend transactions until the risk is sufficiently mitigated or resolved.

Instruments

  • Criminals use proxies to log into gambling platforms, concealing their true location and bypassing regional access barriers.
  • Frequent proxy rotations disrupt any IP-based or geo-based pattern detection, allowing undetected fund transfers through wagering, deposit, and withdrawal activities.
  • Criminals connect to online banking portals through proxy servers to mask their actual IP addresses and circumvent geo-restrictions or suspicious login alerts.
  • By frequently switching proxy endpoints, they avoid consistent location tracking and disrupt risk-based monitoring, effectively concealing the real origin of deposits or transfers.
  • By routing exchange logins and transaction broadcasts through proxy servers, criminals mask their real geographic location.
  • Rapid proxy switching impedes investigators' attempts to correlate multiple crypto transactions with a single origin, defeating location-based monitoring or blacklists.
  • Proxies enhance the inherent anonymity of privacy coins by concealing IP addresses behind rotating endpoints.
  • Investigators find it challenging to link network origin data with on-chain anonymity features, significantly hindering their ability to identify the ultimate beneficial owner.
  • Offenders use proxies when registering or reloading prepaid cards and e-wallets, hiding the true location of account creation and top-up.
  • This obfuscation bypasses region-based restrictions and hinders IP-based analyses, enabling seamless movement of illicit proceeds across multiple jurisdictions.

Service & Products

  • Criminals use proxy servers to evade geographic or jurisdictional restrictions imposed by virtual asset exchanges, concealing their actual location.
  • Frequent proxy rotations disrupt IP-based analytics, making it difficult to detect repeated or suspicious usage patterns, thus facilitating layering of illicit funds.
  • Criminals leverage proxies to hide their true IP address when accessing digital banking portals, bypassing basic location-based restrictions and AML filters.
  • Rapid switching of proxy endpoints prevents consistent device or session fingerprinting, complicating efforts to detect unusual login patterns or attribute activity to a single user.

Actors

Professional money laundering networks leverage proxy servers to:

  • Conceal the true IP addresses of their members, making it more difficult for financial institutions to detect or address suspicious session activity based on location.
  • Rapidly switch proxy endpoints, hindering attempts to link multiple transactions or logins to a single origin.
  • Exploit anonymizing networks (like Tor) to mask the group’s infrastructure, undermining IP-based traceability and complicating law enforcement investigations.

References

  1. The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. (2024). Best Egmont cases: Financial Analysis Cases 2021-2023. Egmont Group Secretariat. http://www.egmontgroup.org

  2. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). (2019, May 9). Advisory on illicit activity involving convertible virtual currency (FIN-2019-A003). FinCEN. https://www.fincen.gov/resources