Multi-hop VPN

A subtechnique of Anonymous Networking that chains multiple VPN connections in tandem, further concealing the user’s original IP address and physical location. By distributing network traffic across multiple VPN servers, this approach makes tracing financial transactions associated with money laundering significantly more difficult. Criminals leverage multi-hop VPN as an additional layering tactic, often in parallel with other chain-based concealment methods, thereby hampering efforts to follow suspicious transactions. Through each VPN hop, adversaries introduce multiple routing points and encryption layers, degrading law enforcement’s ability to correlate digital footprints and identify beneficiaries behind illicit fund flows.

[
Code
T0015.004
]
[
Name
Multi-hop VPN
]
[
Version
1.0
]
[
Parent Technique
]
[
Risk
Channel Risk
]
[
Created
2025-02-06
]
[
Modified
2025-04-02
]

Chained VPNs

Tactics

By chaining multiple VPN connections (multi-hop), criminals deliberately obscure their digital footprints, complicating efforts to trace transactions back to their true origin and evading AML detection mechanisms. This ensures operational security by preventing straightforward attribution of illicit fund flows.

Risks

RS0003
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Channel Risk
|

Criminals exploit multi-hop VPNs to hinder IP-based or geolocation-based AML controls and obscure the true origin of transactions. By chaining multiple VPN servers, they degrade financial institutions’ ability to monitor customer location consistency, detect suspicious device/IP usage patterns, and correlate digital footprints across different sessions, thereby exploiting weaknesses in the delivery channel itself.

Indicators

IND00126
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Login sessions originate from IP addresses associated with multiple anonymizing services, including sequential VPN servers or Tor exit nodes, diverging from typical user location patterns.

IND00127
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Exclusive reliance on onion-over-VPN connections as the sole access channel to financial platforms, diverging from standard usage patterns.

IND01163
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Frequent session initiation via layered anonymity, with rapid switching between multiple anonymizing networks (VPN and Tor) across consecutive sessions, inconsistent with typical usage patterns.

IND01164
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High-value financial transactions initiated immediately after establishing an onion-over-VPN session, with no intervening account review or typical user navigation.

IND01165
|

Declared customer location differs from IP geolocation data, suggesting pervasive use of anonymizing networks to mask true geographic origin.

IND01166
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Automated detection of Tor-specific browser or device fingerprints indicating concurrent VPN routing.

IND01167
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Repeated or concurrent usage of multiple distinct VPN servers within a single session, consistent with multi-hop routing beyond typical single-VPN usage.

Mitigations

Require additional documentary proof of identity and location when customers exhibit repeated multi-hop VPN access. Verify declared physical addresses and contact details through independent sources or in-person interviews to confirm legitimacy. By intensifying scrutiny of accounts showing advanced anonymity, institutions can prevent criminals from concealing their true identity behind chained VPN connections.

Implement specialized analytics focusing on the repeated use of multiple anonymizing networks, including consecutive or simultaneous VPN hops. For example, set detection rules for abrupt shifts in IP addresses across different geolocations or sessions initiated via multi-hop VPN endpoints within short intervals. By promptly identifying these advanced anonymity layers, institutions can investigate and disrupt suspicious fund flows masked by chained VPN services.

Implement robust, continuous session monitoring to detect frequent IP switching or concurrent VPN usage. Require step-up authentication or manual review whenever the platform detects chained VPN endpoints or abrupt changes in geolocation. By enforcing real-time verification, institutions limit the effectiveness of multi-hop VPN tactics for concealing user identities.

Assign a higher risk rating to customers who consistently rely on multi-hop VPN connections to access accounts. Elevate these customers to enhanced monitoring tiers, apply stricter transaction thresholds, and require deeper due diligence measures. By factoring multi-hop VPN usage into risk segmentation, institutions can swiftly identify and address anonymity-driven vulnerabilities.

Limit or deny high-risk products and services, such as large wire transfers or cryptocurrency transactions, from sessions identified as routing through multiple VPN hops. Dynamically block or challenge logins originating from known multi-hop VPN IP ranges unless customers complete further verification. This reduces the likelihood of ongoing illicit layering through advanced anonymity routes.

Instruments

  • Multi-hop VPNs allow criminals to circumvent geoblocking or regional restrictions by appearing to access gambling platforms from various locations.
  • This strategy conceals consistent deposit-withdrawal patterns that could reveal the layering of illicit funds, hampering platform-based AML safeguards reliant on user location data.
  • Criminals use multi-hop VPNs to obscure their real IP addresses and geolocation during online account creation and ongoing transactions.
  • This bypasses location-based AML controls and makes it more difficult for banks to detect suspicious cross-border activity or inconsistent login patterns, complicating efforts to trace illicit fund flows.
  • By routing transaction broadcasts through multiple VPN servers, criminals prevent investigators from linking IP-based transaction data to real-world identities.
  • Multi-hop VPN usage compounds the inherent anonymity features of privacy coins (e.g., ring signatures, stealth addresses), further obscuring the origins and beneficiaries of illicit fund flows.
  • Criminals use multi-hop VPNs to register or top up accounts from multiple or conflicting IP locations, evading region-based KYC or AML checks.
  • The VPN layering hinders the detection of suspicious usage patterns or repeated device fingerprints, facilitating additional layering of illicit funds through stored-value balances.

Service & Products

  • Multi-hop VPN usage enables criminals to appear in multiple or conflicting locations, circumventing IP-based restrictions or blacklists.
  • This masking technique hinders detection of collusive trading patterns and complicates consistent identification of suspicious transactions.
  • Criminals chain multiple VPN connections to conceal IP addresses used for account registration, bypassing geoblocking or region-based compliance checks.
  • By layering VPN hops, they hamper suspicious transaction monitoring reliant on consistent device or location data, complicating due diligence measures.
  • Criminals use multi-hop VPN to hide IP addresses during digital banking logins, circumventing location-based security measures.
  • This technique allows them to maintain anonymity, complicating efforts to detect unusual login patterns or inconsistent user location data.
  • By routing traffic through multiple VPN servers, criminals obscure their real geographical origin, undermining geolocation-based risk assessments.
  • Rapid switching between VPN nodes creates transaction trails across unrelated jurisdictions, complicating AML monitoring and investigations.

Actors

Cybercriminals use multi-hop VPNs to:

  • Obfuscate their true geographic origin, complicating cross-border investigative cooperation.
  • Maintain operational security when coordinating hacking or fraud schemes tied to illicit fund flows.
  • Disrupt digital evidence correlation, hampering financial institutions' and law enforcement's ability to monitor and attribute suspicious online transactions.

Professional money launderers leverage multi-hop VPNs to:

  • Conceal IP addresses and hinder IP-based location checks by financial institutions.
  • Bypass region-based AML controls by presenting different or conflicting geolocations.
  • Fragment digital footprints across multiple routing layers, making it more difficult for investigators to trace suspicious transactions and identify beneficiaries.

References

  1. FATF (Financial Action Task Force) - Egmont Group. (2018, July). Concealment of beneficial ownership. FATF. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/Concealment-beneficial-ownership.html