Real Estate-based Methods

Criminals exploit real estate transactions to introduce or disguise illicit funds in the legitimate economy by purchasing properties directly or through shell entities—often using straw buyers to mask beneficial ownership. A common laundering tactic is property flipping, repeatedly reselling real estate among colluding parties at artificially raised or lowered prices, creating seemingly legitimate equity or profit and obfuscating the original source of funds. Illicit actors may also overstate or understate property values in transaction documents to shift capital or disguise the true purchase price. Once properties are acquired, criminals can hold them for asset protection or monetize them by blending illicit proceeds with legitimate rental streams—sometimes depositing fictitious rent into accounts to further conceal dirty money. Criminals often leverage cross-border purchases and multi-layered ownership structures, adding complexity to beneficial ownership tracing and complicating investigative efforts across jurisdictions.

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Code
T0010
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Name
Real Estate-based Methods
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Version
1.0
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Parent Technique
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Risk
Customer Risk, Product Risk, Jurisdictional Risk
]
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Created
2025-01-23
]
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Modified
2025-04-02
]

Real Estate-Based Integration

Illicit Real Estate Acquisition

Tactics

ML.TA0009
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Acquiring and holding real property allows criminals to channel illicit funds into legitimate asset holdings.

Risks

RS0001
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Customer Risk
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Criminals employ shell entities, straw buyers, and hidden beneficial ownership structures to obscure the true controllers of real estate assets. These opaque customer relationships undermine KYC efforts and enable criminals to distance themselves from illicit funds.

RS0002
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Product Risk
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This technique primarily exploits real estate transactions (the product) by manipulating valuations, leveraging property flips, and disguising proceeds through fictitious rental income. The flexible pricing and variable oversight in real estate create a central vulnerability that criminals use to conceal and transform illicit funds.

RS0004
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Jurisdictional Risk
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Multiple jurisdictions with disparate AML regimes are exploited through cross-border real estate acquisitions. Criminals layer ownership structures across regions with weak disclosure requirements to impede beneficial ownership tracing and complicate investigations.

Indicators

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Real estate transactions facilitated by business entities that lack transparent beneficial ownership in official or publicly available registries.

IND52217
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Multiple layered, non-operational corporate vehicles established across different jurisdictions to obscure the ultimate beneficial owner in real estate acquisitions.

IND52218
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Property purchases at prices markedly exceeding or falling below comparable market values, suggesting manipulation of property valuations.

IND52219
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Frequent restructuring of corporate governance or beneficial ownership in non-operational entities immediately before or after real estate transactions.

IND52220
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Clients provide inconsistent or unverifiable explanations regarding the source of funds for high-value real estate purchases made through non-operational corporate entities.

IND52221
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Non-operational corporate vehicles with little to no documented business activity apart from real estate transactions, indicating a possible front for illicit capital flows.

IND52222
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Real estate transactions routed through multiple intermediary entities or accounts, obscuring the link between the original funding source and the final purchase.

IND52224
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Newly established corporate entities with limited operational history that immediately engage in high-value real estate acquisitions.

IND52225
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Discrepancies between information provided by corporate entities and official registry data, particularly in beneficial ownership details linked to real estate transactions.

IND52226
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Frequent property flips among closely connected parties with short holding periods and significant price variations.

IND52227
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Rental income deposits for properties that appear vacant or lack documented tenants, signaling potential fictitious rent streams.

Mitigations

Perform in-depth verification on all parties involved in real estate transactions, including beneficial owners of shell companies or straw buyers. Cross-check declared purchase prices against official property records or independent appraisals to detect anomalies in valuations. Investigate the source of funds for cross-border and high-value property deals, ensuring that complex ownership structures or rapid flipping patterns are subject to more rigorous scrutiny. By applying advanced checks, institutions can reveal concealed control, artificially manipulated property values, and undisclosed beneficial owners commonly used in real estate-based laundering.

Obtain and verify identity information and beneficial ownership for clients purchasing or selling real estate, ensuring that legal entities (e.g., LLCs or trusts) do not obscure ultimate ownership. Confirm the legitimacy of the property’s stated value by reviewing local sales data and independent valuations. Require documented proof of funds (e.g., tax returns, business financials) that match the nature of the transaction before proceeding. This clear verification process helps detect shell companies or front entities attempting to inject illicit money into real estate.

Implement specialized scenarios and alerts tailored to real estate transactions, flagging repeated flips between connected parties, significant divergences from local market valuations, and unusually short holding periods. Monitor cross-border payments for property purchases that originate from high-risk jurisdictions or involve complex layering through multiple accounts. By focusing on patterns unique to real estate laundering, institutions can quickly identify and escalate suspicious property-based activity.

Require funds for real estate transactions to be placed in escrow accounts pending thorough verification of property ownership, accurate valuations, and legitimate funding sources. Disburse funds only after all CDD checks and beneficial ownership confirmations are complete. This measure prevents hasty ownership transfers and deters attempts to inflate or deflate property prices for illicit gain, as pending funds remain withheld until compliance is satisfied.

Leverage public property registries, real estate listings, business directories, and media sources to validate claimed beneficial owners, track prior ownership changes, and verify market-consistent pricing. Cross-reference official documents with external platforms to identify potential under- or overpricing, repeated flipping among related parties, or newly formed corporate entities without transparent operations. This approach uncovers concealed ownership chains and artificial price manipulations often seen in real estate laundering.

Continually update and re-check customer records for real estate holdings, especially where rental income is claimed as part of repayment or account funding. Verify the existence of legitimate tenants and confirm that reported rent aligns with property characteristics and local market rates. Investigate any mid-relationship changes in ownership structures or frequent reselling, ensuring timely escalation of anomalies indicative of layering or disguised beneficial ownership.

Instruments

  • Fictitious rental income from laundered properties is deposited into bank accounts, giving the illusion of legitimate revenue streams.
  • Criminals use multiple accounts or frequent transfers to layer funds, distancing them from their original illicit source while maintaining an appearance of normal cash flow tied to real estate operations.
IN0013
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  • Criminals directly purchase properties using illicit funds or funnel proceeds through straw buyers and shell entities, embedding dirty money into tangible assets.
  • Property flipping at manipulated prices (over/under-valued sales) lets them generate seemingly legitimate profits or transfer value discreetly.
  • Fictitious rent deposits and multi-layered ownership structures obscure beneficial owners and muddy the paper trail, complicating investigations.
  • Criminals place real estate into trusts, naming straw beneficiaries and relocating beneficial ownership without direct property title transfers.
  • Reassigning beneficial interests rather than conducting open-market transactions thwarts straightforward inquiries into how, when, or to whom real estate assets are actually passed.
  • Real estate-holding corporations issued with bearer shares allow criminals to remain completely anonymous; whoever physically holds the share certificates is deemed the owner.
  • By transferring the certificates hand-to-hand, criminals can swiftly shift property control with no formal registry updates, concealing the ultimate beneficial owner in real estate deals.
  • Criminals form or acquire shell companies holding real estate assets, obscuring their involvement by positioning themselves behind layers of corporate ownership.
  • Repetitive sale or transfer of equity stakes in these entities creates complex layers, reducing transparency of who ultimately controls and benefits from property transactions.
  • Criminals buy into REITs with illicit funds, mixing dirty money with legitimate investor capital and returns.
  • The pooled nature of REIT investments provides a cloak for the original sources of money, making it harder for authorities to identify and isolate criminal proceeds tied to real estate transactions.

Service & Products

  • Property management firms can falsify or inflate rental income streams, commingling illicit proceeds with legitimate rent.
  • Criminals maintain control over properties through third-party management, distancing themselves from direct ownership and scrutiny.
  • Criminals can abuse real estate transaction services to inject illicit proceeds by over- or under-valuing properties in official documentation.
  • Repeated property flips among connected parties create multiple transactional layers that obscure original fund sources.
  • Use of straw buyers and limited due diligence can further conceal true beneficial owners.
  • Real estate agencies or brokers may facilitate illicit property transactions with minimal scrutiny of funding sources.
  • Criminals can obscure beneficial ownership by using proxies or shell entities when purchasing or leasing properties.
  • Criminals invest illicit proceeds in real estate portfolios or REITs, blending them with legitimate investor funds.
  • Complex investment structures and cross-border deals complicate AML oversight, hiding the ultimate source of illicit proceeds.
  • Establishing offshore entities that purchase real estate domestically or internationally, shielding beneficial owners through secrecy jurisdictions.
  • Multi-layered offshore structures obscure the source of criminal proceeds used to acquire properties, complicating investigations.
  • Formation of shell companies or trusts to hold real estate assets, concealing the actual owners behind complex legal structures.
  • Layering real estate ownership across multiple entities or jurisdictions hinders transparency, enabling illicit fund flows via property acquisitions or flips.

Actors

Real estate professionals facilitate property transactions by:

  • Identifying and negotiating deals on behalf of buyers or sellers.
  • Overseeing property searches, inspections, and closings, sometimes with limited verification of ownership or funding sources.
  • Potentially overlooking suspicious price fluctuations or opaque beneficial ownership structures.

This can undermine financial institutions’ due diligence, as mortgage services or payment processing may fail to detect hidden illicit funds introduced through real estate transactions.

TCSPs facilitate real estate-based laundering by:

  • Forming and managing trusts or corporate vehicles that purchase properties on criminals’ behalf.
  • Designating nominee directors or shareholders to obscure the actual individuals controlling the assets.
  • Layering ownership across multiple jurisdictions, complicating law enforcement and bank inquiries into the origin of funds.

This structure significantly impedes financial institutions’ ability to identify ultimate beneficial owners and assess money laundering risks in real estate deals.

Illicit operators (the criminals themselves) conduct money laundering through real estate by:

  • Injecting criminal proceeds into property purchases or mortgage payments.
  • Executing property flips at artificially high or low prices to legitimize equity gains.
  • Depositing fabricated rental income, giving the appearance of ongoing legitimate revenue.

Such activities expose financial institutions to unrecognized money laundering risks, as these individuals obscure the true origin of funds behind real estate holdings.

Shell or front companies are used to:

  • Hold legal title to real estate while concealing the underlying criminal owners.
  • Enable property flips or transfers through a corporate veil, distancing illicit operators from direct ownership.
  • Funnel illicit capital through corporate accounts, complicating transaction monitoring.

This hampers financial institutions’ efforts to trace beneficial owners, especially when corporate registrations lack transparent ownership disclosures.

AT0068
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Criminals employ nominees (straw buyers) to:

  • Purchase and register real estate in someone else’s name, hiding the true beneficiary.
  • Complete documents and loan applications that reflect a different individual from the actual fund controller.
  • Bypass financial institution scrutiny by presenting nominally legitimate buyers.

This arrangement enables criminals to mask their involvement, making it harder for financial institutions to detect who truly controls the property or funding.

Criminals form or use offshore entities to:

  • Acquire real estate assets across multiple jurisdictions with higher confidentiality.
  • Hide ultimate beneficial owners behind lenient corporate disclosure rules.
  • Move illicit funds through cross-border layers before final property purchases.

Such opacity complicates financial institutions’ ability to trace the original source of funds or identify controlling parties in real estate transactions.

Legal professionals can be knowingly or unknowingly involved by:

  • Preparing or reviewing real estate contracts, deeds, and other documentation that mask true ownership.
  • Structuring complex trust or corporate arrangements used in property acquisitions.
  • Providing legal opinions that, if superficial, overlook suspicious price discrepancies or beneficial ownership red flags.

Financial institutions often rely on these documents and opinions, so incomplete legal scrutiny can enable ongoing laundering through real estate.

References

  1. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). (2011, March 30). Advisory on activities potentially related to commercial real estate fraud. FinCEN. https://www.fincen.gov/resources

  2. Tusikov, N. (2008). Mortgage fraud and organized crime in Canada: strategic intelligence brief. Trends in Organized Crime. DOI:10.1007/s12117-008-9040-2

  3. AUSTRAC (Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre). (2015). Strategic analysis brief: Money laundering through real estate 2015. AUSTRAC. https://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-07/sa-brief-real-estate_0.pdf