Invoice Manipulation

A trade-focused laundering technique that falsifies the price, quantity, or quality of goods and services on invoices. Criminals may inflate, understate, or create fictitious invoices and phantom shipments to disguise illicit funds as ordinary trade proceeds, sometimes combining legitimate shipments with fabricated ones to provide plausible documentation. By exploiting cross-border commerce complexity (including digital invoicing and weak document checks), they insert illegal funds into seemingly routine transactions. Shell entities or opaque beneficial owners often facilitate this setup, colluding with import–export parties to reuse or falsify shipping documents and invoices, thereby obscuring true shipment details. The child method, Multiple Invoicing, compounds these risks by reusing the same trade documentation multiple times to secure multiple payments, letters of credit, or loans for the same underlying shipment.

[
Code
T0008
]
[
Name
Invoice Manipulation
]
[
Version
1.0
]
[
Parent Technique
]
[
Tactics
]
[
Risk
Customer Risk, Product Risk
]
[
Created
2025-01-23
]
[
Modified
2025-04-02
]

False Billing

Fictitious Invoicing

Counterfeit Invoicing

Over-Invoicing

Under-Invoicing

Tactics

ML.TA0007
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Falsifying invoices allows criminals to create complex cross-border transactions and conceal illicit funds within legitimate trade flows, thereby obscuring the illicit origin of the assets.

Risks

RS0001
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Customer Risk
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Shell or front companies with opaque beneficial owners facilitate the manipulation of invoices, concealing the true parties behind these transactions and complicating due diligence. By obscuring ownership structures, criminals add a secondary layer of vulnerability that frustrates customer identification and verification processes.

RS0002
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Product Risk
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Invoice manipulation directly exploits vulnerabilities in trade finance products, including letters of credit and invoice financing. Criminals fabricate or overstate invoices and shipping documents, leveraging the reliance on supporting paperwork to legitimize illicit proceeds as ordinary trade flows. This is the primary vulnerability, as falsified documentation bypasses standard AML scrutiny inherent to trade finance.

Indicators

IND01013
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Invoices that significantly exceed recognized market prices for the goods or services.

IND01014
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Invoices that significantly undervalue goods or services compared to recognized market prices.

IND01015
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Discrepancies between invoice amounts and shipping documentation (e.g., bills of lading, packing lists) for the same shipment.

IND01016
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Frequent revisions or multiple versions of invoices created shortly after the initial trade transaction.

IND01017
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Consistent patterns where invoiced amounts deviate from contractual or historical pricing without legitimate justification.

IND01018
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Sudden initiation of high-value trade transactions by an entity with limited or no prior trading history, where invoice values do not match the entity’s known business activity.

IND01019
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Frequent involvement of newly formed or non-operational legal entities with undisclosed beneficial ownership in trade transactions featuring questionable invoices.

IND01020
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Transactions involving counterparties in high-risk jurisdictions or with mismatched business addresses where invoiced values are inconsistent with the economic substance of the trade.

IND01021
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Repeated submission of the same invoice or shipping documents across multiple financing requests or trade transactions for a single shipment.

Data Sources

  • Provides official records from customs and border authorities detailing declared values, quantities, and routes of shipped goods.
  • Cross-referencing these with invoice documentation helps uncover false or overstated shipments characteristic of invoice manipulation.
  • Aggregates information on high-risk jurisdictions, regulatory requirements, and known trade anomalies.
  • Flags invoiced transactions involving suspect regions or mismatched business addresses potentially linked to invoice manipulation.
  • Provides benchmark commodity prices and historical market trends.
  • Comparing declared invoice pricing against prevailing market rates uncovers over-invoicing or under-invoicing, which is indicative of invoice manipulation.
  • Contains key details of contracts and invoices, such as parties involved, invoice identifiers, amounts, and payment terms.
  • Cross-referencing these details against actual shipments or market data helps detect inflated, duplicated, or otherwise manipulated invoices, which are typical of invoice manipulation schemes.
  • Maintains version control and revision history for stored invoices and related documentation.
  • Identifies frequent or unexplained invoice changes indicative of manipulative practices, such as repeated or inflated billing.
  • Catalogs a company's day-to-day operations, revenue streams, and operational capacity.
  • Comparing these operational metrics with high-value or frequent invoices supports the detection of artificially inflated or fabricated trade transactions.
  • Contains records of loans, lines of credit, and the collateral used to finance trade transactions.
  • Identifies multiple invoicing schemes where the same invoice or shipping documentation is submitted for repeated financing requests.
  • Includes official shipping records (bills of lading, customs declarations, packing lists) detailing contents and quantities.
  • Cross-checking these documents against invoice data helps identify discrepancies between declared goods and invoiced amounts or values.
  • Contains verified customer identities, beneficial ownership details, and stated business activities.
  • Helps confirm whether the volume and nature of invoiced trade transactions align with the customer's known profile and legitimate operations.
  • Captures actual commodity purchase/sale records, including volumes, prices, and counterparties.
  • Enables direct comparison of real commodity trades with invoiced details to detect inflated or underpriced entries.
  • Provides official details on legal entities: registration data, shareholders, directors, and beneficial owners.
  • Reveals shell or newly formed companies with opaque ownership potentially used for issuing manipulated invoices.

Mitigations

Apply deeper scrutiny for high-risk or cross-border trade transactions by verifying beneficial owner backgrounds, examining historical shipping records, and matching invoice details to external shipping data to uncover any discrepancies that might indicate inflated or fictitious invoices.

Obtain and verify official business registrations, beneficial ownership details, and trade references for all entities seeking trade finance. Cross-check the provided information with external databases to confirm that company operations, owners, and stated shipping capabilities align with invoice claims. This helps to detect front or shell entities commonly used for invoice manipulation.

Provide specialized trade finance training to equip employees with knowledge of invoice manipulation tactics, including over/under-invoicing, phantom shipments, and multiple invoicing. Establish clear escalation procedures for staff to quickly flag and investigate dubious invoice patterns.

Hold trade finance disbursements in escrow or use documentary credits until independent confirmation of shipment and invoice details is obtained. Release funds only upon verifying that the goods shipped match the invoiced quantity, quality, and declared pricing.

Cross-check invoice and shipping details against publicly available import/export records, vessel tracking data, and commodity price databases. Verify that documented shipments match real-world events and pricing benchmarks to spot invoice tampering or fictitious consignments.

Share trade finance data (e.g., invoice references, shipping documentation) with other financial institutions and trade associations to identify repeated or suspiciously similar invoicing across multiple financing requests. This collaborative approach uncovers multiple invoicing schemes and prevents criminals from exploiting fragmented oversight.

Require systematic validation of invoice values, goods descriptions, and shipping documents to detect anomalies such as repeated use of the same invoice, artificially inflated or understated prices, or phantom shipments. Compare declared amounts and products against recognized market rates and transport routes to expose hidden misinvoicing patterns.

Instruments

  • Falsified invoices underpinning letters of credit enable criminals to draw inflated sums, disguising illicit proceeds as ‘legitimate’ trade payments.
  • Multiple invoicing exploits involve repeated or modified documentation for the same shipment, allowing repeated draws on letters of credit to launder funds.
  • Criminals attach overstated or fictitious invoice details to bills of exchange, obligating payment for goods or services that do not match the actual shipment.
  • Acceptance of these inflated bills by financial intermediaries facilitates layering, as laundered funds appear to be part of legitimate trade settlements.
  • Criminals inflate or fabricate invoices to justify receiving larger payments, falsely labeling illicit funds as legitimate receivables.
  • By overstating or under-reporting goods and services, they disguise the true source of money and commingle it with normal trade flows, making detection harder.

Service & Products

  • Falsified invoices and shipping documents prompt banks to release payment upon presentation, despite goods being misrepresented.
  • Criminals collude with counterparties to exploit minimal verification of underlying trade details.
  • Automated or outsourced invoice workflows can be exploited to generate inflated or duplicate invoices, launder illicit funds.
  • Limited oversight of digital invoice modifications enables criminals to resubmit or alter values without immediate detection.
  • Over- or under-invoicing goods allows criminals to manipulate the amount drawn under the letter of credit.
  • Submission of falsified invoices and shipping records to the issuing or advising bank conceals the true value of transactions.
  • Manipulated shipping papers can align with falsified invoices, creating the illusion of legitimate cross-border movements.
  • Overstating or fabricating cargo details helps mask the real value or existence of goods involved in trade-based laundering.
  • Criminals fabricate or inflate purchase orders and invoices to secure funds before goods are shipped, then divert proceeds.
  • The mismatch between financed invoices and actual or non-existent shipments obscures the true origin of funds.
  • Counterfeit or altered commercial invoices and bills of lading conceal actual values and quantities of shipped goods.
  • Reusing the same documents across multiple transactions supports schemes like multiple invoicing and hides true shipment details.
  • Criminals can falsify the declared price or quantity of goods in financed transactions, inflating invoices to legitimize illegal proceeds.
  • Colluding import–export parties can present inconsistent shipping and invoice documents to obscure true transaction values.
  • Service providers handling logistics and compliance may overlook red flags in invoices and shipping documents, enabling covert manipulation.
  • Coordinated submission of doctored invoices and repeated document usage goes undetected in complex global supply chains.
  • Fraudulent invoices overstating goods’ value allow criminals to receive excessive financing, effectively laundering proceeds.
  • Reusing or duplicating the same invoices with multiple financiers conceals the origin and movement of funds.
  • Presenting inflated or fictitious invoices to factoring or discounting companies secures funds well above legitimate receivables.
  • Multiple invoicing schemes re-submit the same invoice to different providers to multiply illicit gains.

Actors

  • These entities, including banks acting as issuing or advising institutions for letters of credit, are targeted with falsified invoices.
  • Criminals exploit reliance on supporting documents to secure financing or multiple payments for the same shipment.
  • The misrepresentation of goods and values undermines due diligence and credit decision processes, enabling illicit funds to pass as legitimate trade proceeds.
  • These firms, whether knowingly or unknowingly, submit or receive falsified invoices and shipping documents.
  • Mixing legitimate shipments with inflated or fictitious invoices creates the appearance of normal cross-border trade.
  • They plan and execute the submission of falsified or inflated invoices, sometimes mixing legitimate trade with phantom shipments.
  • By manipulating documents and values, they conceal illicit proceeds under the guise of ordinary trade.
  • Financial institutions face heightened risk when processing these transactions, as the true nature of the funds and goods is obscured.
  • Opaque beneficial owners stand behind shell or front companies to control invoice manipulation schemes.
  • Their concealed identities hamper financial institutions' efforts to identify ultimate ownership and assess transaction legitimacy.
  • By directing trade flows and invoice values behind the scenes, they mask the true origin and movement of illicit funds.
  • Criminals establish or use these entities to issue and receive fake or inflated invoices under the guise of legitimate business.
  • The lack of real operations and hidden ownership makes it harder for financial institutions to detect anomalies in trade documentation.
  • By routing illicit funds through such companies, criminals obscure beneficial ownership and complicate due diligence checks.
  • They may be unwittingly exploited when criminals align falsified invoices with manipulated shipping papers.
  • Overstating or fabricating cargo details helps criminals create an illusion of legitimate cross-border movement.
  • Financial institutions relying on these shipping documents face difficulty detecting inconsistencies or non-existent shipments.

References

  1. FATF (Financial Action Task Force), Egmont Group. (2020, December). Trade-Based Money Laundering: Trends and Developments. FATF. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/Trade-based-money-laundering-trends-and-developments.html

  2. Moiseienko, A., Reid, A., Chase, I. (2020). Improving governance and tackling crime in free-trade zones. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/improving-governance-and-tackling-crime-free-trade-zones

  3. Sivaguru, D. (2023). The phenomenon of trade-based money laundering (TBML) – a critical review in Sri Lankan context. Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 26 No. 6, pp. 1088-1099. https://doi.org/10.1108/JMLC-10-2022-0151