Identity Manipulation

Adversaries create, alter, or misuse personal and account details—such as forging or stealing identity documents or using synthetic identities—to bypass KYC checks, open new accounts, or take over existing ones, all while obscuring beneficial ownership. In many cases, criminals merge real stolen personal information with fabricated data to generate a new “synthetic” identity, enabling them to pass automated checks and build credit histories that appear legitimate. They also exploit remote onboarding procedures by digitally manipulating identity documentation (for example, altering images or metadata) to evade fraud detection and take over customer accounts. During account opening, validation and verification steps are susceptible to falsified data, especially when institutions rely heavily on automated controls. Once established, criminals may tamper with transaction histories or account data to conceal ties to illicit origins. Warning signs include sudden or repeated changes to personal information, consistent sets of overlapping identity details across seemingly unrelated profiles, and unverifiable or contradictory customer documentation and backgrounds. These methods feed into subtechniques such as Name Alteration—where manipulated spellings and aliases frustrate watchlist screening—and Fraudulent KYC Documentation—where forged or stolen materials (sometimes bundled as “KYC kits”) bypass due diligence thresholds, ensuring illicit proceeds flow without revealing ultimate beneficiaries. Typical indicators cover mismatches in submitted documents, questionable residency claims, and device or network anomalies that do not align with stated customer details.

[
Code
T0023
]
[
Name
Identity Manipulation
]
[
Version
1.0
]
[
Parent Technique
]
[
Risk
Customer Risk, Channel Risk
]
[
Created
2025-02-10
]
[
Modified
2025-04-02
]

Fabricated Identity

Counterfeit Identification Document

Identity Fraud

Account Concealment

Tactics

Through forged, stolen, or synthetic identities, criminals bypass KYC and negative screening controls to open or maintain accounts with minimal scrutiny, directly enabling entry into financial systems for laundering proceeds. This constitutes the primary objective of identity manipulation.

Risks

RS0001
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Customer Risk
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Criminals manipulate or fabricate customer identities—using forged, stolen, or synthetic documents—to bypass KYC checks and obscure beneficial ownership. This directly exploits vulnerabilities in verifying true customer identity, undermining standard risk profiling and monitoring processes.

RS0003
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Channel Risk
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Criminals exploit remote onboarding and digital account opening channels by altering or tampering with identity documentation (e.g., metadata manipulation, synthetic images) to evade automated controls and fraud detection, enabling illicit account access under false credentials.

Indicators

IND00310
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Frequent or repeated discrepancies between personally provided identity details (e.g., name, date of birth, address) and records from official or third-party data sources.

IND01282
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Use of synthetic or assumed identities across multiple accounts, where personal details (address, contact information, identification numbers) recur with minor variations.

IND01283
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Provision of unverifiable or non-existent residential addresses (e.g., PO boxes, virtual offices, mail forwarding services) as part of identity documentation.

IND01284
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Rapid initiation of high-value or high-frequency transactions from newly opened accounts established with questionable identity documents that conflict with the customer’s apparent background.

IND01285
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Repeated attempts by a customer to alter or update personal identity details after account opening, potentially indicating efforts to obfuscate their true identity.

IND01286
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Submission of identification documents that display signs of forgery or tampering (e.g., unusual fonts, missing watermarks, altered holograms, mismatched formatting) during the account opening or due diligence process.

IND01287
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Claimed residence is in one country, while all login IPs consistently originate from a different jurisdiction without legitimate explanation.

IND01288
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Multiple newly opened accounts from the same device or IP address under distinct, unrelated personal identities lacking any legitimate justification.

IND01289
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Inconsistent metadata within digital identity documents, such as a file creation date predating official issuance or suspicious software signatures indicating possible image manipulation.

Data Sources

Supplies risk assessments for countries and regions, highlighting high-risk or sanctioned jurisdictions. Discrepancies between a customer's claimed domicile and the associated geographic risk profile can indicate falsified residency or manipulated identity claims.

Logs and analyzes account access patterns, device fingerprints, and profile modification events. Excessive or repeated alterations to personal details after account opening can indicate identity manipulation efforts or account takeovers.

Publicly available data from social media, news sources, and other online platforms can confirm or contradict customers' submitted personal details. This information helps identify inconsistencies or evidence of stolen or fabricated identities involved in identity manipulation schemes.

Captures comprehensive records of financial transactions from newly opened or existing accounts. Sudden high-value or rapid transaction patterns linked to questionable identity documentation can be identified and flagged, helping to expose potentially manipulated or fraudulent account setups.

Aggregates external data on individuals and organizations, including official registries, public filings, and third-party records. Cross-referencing this information with customer-submitted details can highlight address mismatches, fraudulent identity claims, or overlapping attributes shared across multiple synthetic profiles.

Records device and network usage data, including login IP addresses, timestamps, and session activities. Conflicts between declared residence and consistent foreign IP origins can reveal misrepresented location details indicative of identity manipulation.

Examines official identification documents, through physical checks or digital forensics, for signs of forgery, incomplete security features, suspicious metadata, or image manipulation. This directly helps uncover tampered or falsified documents used in identity manipulation.

DS0033
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|

Aggregated information on known or suspected fraudulent activities includes identity theft reports, compromised personal data, and forged documentation patterns. By cross-referencing customer applications and account changes against these records, financial institutions can identify potential identity manipulation and investigate suspected synthetic or stolen identities more effectively.

Includes verified personal details, addresses, beneficial ownership information, and risk profiles. By comparing these records against newly provided identity data or sudden changes, financial institutions can detect inconsistencies, uncover synthetic or stolen identities, and flag suspicious identity updates for further investigation.

Mitigations

Implement advanced identity verification solutions, including specialized software to detect manipulated or forged ID images, verify embedded metadata, and cross-check official records to confirm validity. By focusing on document authenticity and verifying real-time issuance data, institutions can identify synthetic or stolen identities before account opening.

Implement multi-factor authentication and real-time session monitoring to detect login anomalies and device mismatches. By cross-referencing geolocation, user behavior analytics, and IP addresses against claimed customer information, institutions can quickly identify suspicious activity indicative of account takeover or identity manipulation.

Provide targeted training on identifying forged or tampered documents, spotting indicators of synthetic identities, and detecting suspicious inconsistencies in customer credentials. Emphasize rapid escalation procedures for potential identity manipulation attempts to ensure timely intervention and reduce risk.

Cross-check customer-provided identity data with public records, social media, and external databases to validate credentials and detect mismatches or fabricated details indicative of synthetic or stolen identities. By verifying claimed residency, employment, or identity document issuance status in real time, institutions can proactively identify and prevent identity manipulation.

Once a fake identity is suspected, freeze the account, gather evidence, and escalate the issue to relevant internal or external parties, such as the compliance team or law enforcement.

Instruments

  • Criminals register gambling accounts using forged or stolen personal data, often evading in-person or enhanced verification.
  • Illicit funds are deposited and subsequently withdrawn as ‘winnings,’ giving such funds a legitimate appearance.
  • Continuous alteration of identity details within these accounts diminishes the effectiveness of standard anti-fraud checks.
  • Criminals use stolen or forged identity documents to satisfy KYC requirements and open both personal and business bank accounts under false credentials.
  • Once operational, they deposit illicit funds and move them through multiple transfers or deposits to create layers, making the true beneficial owner difficult to identify.
  • By holding accounts in different fabricated identities, they further reduce the likelihood of being linked to the underlying criminal activity.
  • Adversaries submit altered or stolen identity details during exchange account registration, circumventing standard KYC procedures.
  • Once verified, they convert fiat currency into cryptocurrencies, obscuring the source of illicit funds.
  • By creating multiple exchange accounts under different synthetic profiles, they fragment the transaction trail and frustrate forensic tracing efforts.
  • Criminals apply for credit or debit cards using counterfeit or stolen identities, bypassing issuer screening.
  • They exploit these cards to receive illicit funds via cash advances, purchases, or online transactions, masking connections to the real cardholder.
  • Over time, they may cultivate synthetic credit profiles to access higher credit limits, broadening their capacity to circulate illicit proceeds undetected.
  • Criminals use fabricated or stolen ID documents to open or reload prepaid cards, e-wallets, or similar stored-value accounts.
  • Remote onboarding procedures, often reliant on digital scans or automated databases, are susceptible to manipulated documentation.
  • These instruments are then utilized to transfer or withdraw funds across various locations, further obscuring the illicit source.

Service & Products

  • Criminals apply for credit cards under synthetic or stolen identities, establishing credit histories that appear legitimate.
  • With access to credit lines under false credentials, they can layer or transfer illicit funds through everyday transactions or cash advances.
  • Criminals create multiple user profiles under synthetic identities, leveraging minimal oversight when trading directly with other participants.
  • They exploit escrow or dispute-resolution mechanisms by continually changing personal details, making it difficult to pinpoint the real accountholder.
  • Criminals exploit online KYC processes by submitting manipulated or stolen identity documents.
  • Once accounts are established, they can convert or transfer cryptocurrency, obscuring beneficial ownership and transactional traces.
  • Criminals may submit forged or stolen identity documents when establishing business entities, concealing the true owners.
  • They exploit automated or insufficient verifications to pass as legitimate operators, hiding beneficial ownership and enabling illicit fund movement.
  • Multiple accounts can be opened quickly with fabricated personal data, enabling rapid movement of illicit proceeds across borders.
  • Discrepancies between the provided identity details and third-party validations often signal identity tampering or fraud.
  • Criminals can open personal checking accounts under stolen or fabricated identities to deposit and withdraw illicit funds with minimal scrutiny.
  • They may frequently update personal information after account opening, further obscuring the true identity behind transactions.
  • Adversaries use remote or app-based onboarding processes, uploading altered identity documents to bypass in-person verification.
  • Challenging investigation efforts further, they may continually adjust personal details in the digital profile to evade detection.
  • Criminals leverage lax identity requirements or offshore secrecy laws to open accounts using fake or stolen personal data.
  • This hinders law enforcement by obscuring the real individuals behind these accounts, facilitating cross-border anonymity.

Actors

Cybercriminals collect stolen personal data or fabricate synthetic identities to pass automated KYC checks and take over existing accounts. They may also digitally manipulate submitted documents—altering metadata or images—to appear legitimate during remote onboarding. This allows them to bypass identity verification controls, facilitating undetected transfers or withdrawals that obscure the illicit origin of funds from financial institutions.

Document forgers create or alter official identification records, such as passports or driver's licenses, enabling criminals to open accounts or assume another person's identity. By producing convincing counterfeit documents or tampering with legitimate credentials, they circumvent financial institutions' KYC checks and obscure true beneficial ownership. This hinders due diligence processes and complicates subsequent investigations into suspicious account activities.

References

  1. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). (2020, July 30). Financial red flag indicators of cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime exploiting COVID-19. FinCEN. https://www.fincen.gov/coronavirus

  2. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). (2024). Identity-related suspicious activity: 2021 threats and trends. FinCEN. https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FTA_Identity_Final508.pdf

  3. Department of the Treasury. (2022, February). National Money Laundering Risk Assessment. Department of the Treasury.https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/2022-National-Terrorist-Financing-Risk-Assessment.pdf