A rug pull is a crypto-themed subtechnique of Investment Fraud recognized by enforcement agencies as a growing digital scam. Perpetrators often launch or heavily promote a new token or project, provide an enticing roadmap, and collect funds from unsuspecting investors (e.g., via an ICO). Once they have accumulated sufficient capital, they abruptly remove all liquidity, leaving victims with worthless tokens and no recourse. Proceeds are rapidly converted or transferred across various crypto addresses or fiat accounts—sometimes via decentralized exchanges—to complicate tracing and impede AML efforts. One notable example is the 2021 “Squid Game” cryptocurrency scam, where investors were left stranded as the perpetrators disappeared alongside the newly raised funds. This technique leverages the facade of a legitimate crypto launch to obscure beneficial ownership and employs layering through multiple wallets or services, ultimately hampering regulatory detection and investigation efforts.
Rug Pull
Exit Scam
ICO Rug Pull
Tactics
Criminals launch or promote a new crypto token or project under fraudulent pretenses (e.g., a promising ICO) to illicitly obtain investor capital. This is the primary objective of a rug pull, where perpetrators quickly accumulate funds from unsuspecting participants before absconding.
Risks
Rug pull schemes fundamentally exploit newly launched crypto or NFT offerings with minimal oversight or investor protections. Fraudsters leverage the ease of creating and marketing new tokens, quickly soliciting funds before removing all liquidity. This product-based vulnerability, characterized by a lack of regulatory scrutiny and unchecked token mechanics, is central to their success.
After withdrawing investor funds, perpetrators rapidly layer proceeds through decentralized exchanges, P2P trades, and cross-chain bridging. By exploiting lightly regulated or autonomous transaction platforms, they hinder tracing efforts and circumvent AML controls.
Indicators
Large, rapid transfers of collected cryptocurrency funds from ICO-associated wallets immediately after fundraising, indicating abrupt diversion of assets.
Immediate conversion of invested funds into other cryptocurrencies or fiat soon after the ICO to obscure money trails.
Noticeable absence or discontinuation of on-chain transaction activity for project wallets following fundraising, with funds swiftly moved to newly created or obscure wallets.
Sudden disappearance or deactivation of the project’s online presence (e.g., website, social media channels, customer support) immediately after raising investments, which is a hallmark of rug pull scams.
Project managers and key personnel presenting anonymous or unverifiable digital identities with minimal or no background references.
Lack of clear or transparent beneficial ownership and absence of verifiable registration or corporate documentation for the cryptocurrency project.
Patterns of funds moved rapidly across multiple jurisdictions or wallets that are not linked to any legitimate operational activities, indicating layering.
Inconsistencies between the project’s proclaimed business model and the actual financial or operational disclosures, commonly observed in exit scam scenarios.
Sudden removal or drastic reduction of liquidity in a token’s liquidity pool by project controllers on decentralized exchanges, preventing investors from selling or redeeming tokens.
Excessive social media or promotional hype from newly created or unverified accounts with minimal prior activity, running up to or concurrent with the token sale.
Data Sources
Covers an entity’s financial statements, tax filings, and business performance disclosures. Investigators can compare the project's claimed business model with actual filings to uncover discrepancies, which are frequent indicators of exit scams and rug pulls.
Includes publicly available data from websites, social media, forums, and news outlets. Investigators can detect abrupt project website shutdowns, unverified or anonymous online personas, and social media hype campaigns, which are warning signs of a rug pull. OSINT also helps verify project claims and track online footprints that may reveal fraudulent or rapidly abandoned crypto ventures.
Captures exchange-level logs from virtual asset platforms, including detailed transaction records, user account details, order books, and compliance checks. This data enables investigators to trace how rug pull proceeds are converted or moved within various trading environments, linking wallet addresses to identifiable user accounts and uncovering laundering patterns.
Contains verified identity details, addresses, beneficial ownership information, and risk assessments collected during onboarding. This information highlights undisclosed or unverifiable project team members, a common red flag in rug pulls. Investigators can uncover incomplete or nonexistent background references, prompting heightened scrutiny of high-risk profiles.
Provides on-chain transaction data, including transaction IDs, timestamps, sender/receiver addresses, amounts, and liquidity pool interactions. Investigators can use this data to track large, rapid outflows from ICO wallets, abrupt liquidity removal, and layering across multiple addresses, which are common indicators of rug pull schemes. By analyzing these movements, it becomes possible to link wallet addresses to suspicious activity and trace illicit proceeds.
Correlates transactions with their geographic origin or destination to reveal cross-border fund flows. In rug pull scenarios, sudden movements of capital to multiple or opaque jurisdictions may indicate layering efforts to obscure the funds' final recipients.
Provides official registration data, ownership structures, directorships, and beneficial owner details. This enables investigators to verify whether a cryptocurrency project has a legitimate corporate presence or to identify missing or fraudulent ownership disclosures that often signal rug pull scams.
Mitigations
Perform detailed verification of project founders, beneficial owners, and external audits for newly launched tokens or ICOs. This includes validating claimed backgrounds, assessing the project’s roadmap, and ensuring transparent code or security audits are in place. Such scrutiny helps uncover concealed ownership, unverified credentials, and vague business plans common in rug pull schemes.
Implement specialized transaction-monitoring rules and real-time analytics to detect abrupt large transfers from newly launched token projects post-ICO. By flagging significant outflows or rapid conversions to other cryptocurrencies or fiat, institutions can swiftly identify potential rug pull scenarios and escalate them for further investigation or preventive measures.
Deploy advanced blockchain analytics to continuously track on-chain token liquidity and wallet activity associated with newly released tokens. Rapid detection of significant, unexplained outflows from project wallets (e.g., post-ICO) triggers timely intervention or deeper investigation into a potential rug pull.
Provide targeted training for compliance and front-line teams to recognize unique red flags of rug pulls, such as short timelines between token launch and fund withdrawal, suspiciously high marketing hype with negligible project substance, or minimal background information on key promoters. Equip staff to escalate concerns swiftly during onboarding or early sale stages.
Educate prospective investors about typical rug pull warning signs, such as anonymous or unverifiable development teams, unrealistic return promises, sudden liquidity removals, and abrupt disappearance of official communication channels. Provide easily accessible guidance to help customers recognize and avoid fraudulent crypto schemes.
Use escrow accounts to safeguard investor funds until predefined development milestones or independently verified deliverables are met. By withholding direct access to collected capital, this measure prevents immediate liquidity removal, reducing the likelihood of rug pull exit scams.
Investigate the project's online presence, developer identities, domain registration details, and any media coverage to confirm that claims align with observable evidence. Discrepancies, such as unverifiable founders or newly created social media accounts, may indicate a high-risk project prone to rug pulling.
Restrict or deny listing and fundraising services for cryptocurrency projects that lack transparent ownership structures or fail to meet basic disclosure criteria. By requiring evidence of team credentials and legitimate organizational details, institutions reduce the likelihood of facilitating a rug pull scam.
Instruments
- After a rug pull, perpetrators often convert stolen cryptocurrency into fiat and deposit those funds into domestic or offshore bank accounts under false or third-party credentials.
- By rapidly moving deposits through multiple accounts, they break the transaction chain, frustrate AML controls, and conceal the origins of illicit proceeds.
- Scammers launch new NFT collections, marketing them as exclusive digital art or utility-driven projects.
- Once enough buyers have purchased and hyped the NFTs, the fraudsters abandon the project, leaving collectors with worthless assets while they abscond with the funds.
- The light oversight of NFT marketplaces enables quick liquidation or fund redirection, reducing traceability.
- Criminals immediately transfer rug-pulled tokens into multiple self-hosted wallets, generating distinct addresses to disperse the stolen funds.
- Controlling private keys for various wallets allows them to shuffle value among addresses, hindering blockchain analytics and complicating investigations.
- Rug pull schemes in DeFi often involve governance tokens that promise holders voting or revenue rights, attracting significant liquidity.
- Once investors lock funds in the project, the perpetrators remove or drain the liquidity pool, rendering governance tokens worthless while escaping with the proceeds.
- Perpetrators create and heavily promote new utility tokens, enticing buyers with promises of platform access or rewards.
- After raising sufficient capital, they withdraw liquidity or dump their holdings, causing a near-instant token value collapse and leaving investors with worthless assets.
- Rug pull fraudsters require investor participation through common public cryptocurrencies like ETH, BNB, or similar coins.
- Once liquidity is removed, these public ledger assets are swiftly transferred across multiple addresses or blockchains, further obscuring the flow of illicit proceeds.
- Criminals convert stolen funds into wrapped tokens on other blockchains, effectively concealing the original source of the assets.
- By bridging to different chains, they split the on-chain transaction record, complicating investigators' attempts to track final destinations.
Service & Products
- Criminals introduce or market a token within DeFi platforms (e.g., decentralized exchanges) to attract investors.
- After gathering substantial liquidity, they remove or drain the liquidity pool, leaving investors unable to sell and holding worthless tokens.
- DeFi’s autonomous and lightly regulated protocols enable swift conversion or mixing of funds, impeding regulatory scrutiny.
- Perpetrators rapidly offload or distribute rug-pulled tokens through P2P trades.
- Using direct trades and decentralized dispute processes reduces transparent oversight, helping criminals remain partially anonymous.
- The fragmented nature of P2P transactions further complicates funds tracing and hinders AML investigations.
- Perpetrators leverage near-immediate swaps to convert rug-pulled tokens into more stable or anonymous cryptocurrencies.
- High-speed conversions hamper law enforcement’s ability to identify and freeze stolen assets.
- Repeated swaps across multiple tokens or blockchains further disguise the ultimate destination of illicit proceeds.
- Fraudsters may list or promote their newly issued tokens on a centralized exchange to reach a broader pool of investors.
- Once enough funds are raised, they quickly convert or withdraw the assets into other cryptocurrencies or fiat, making tracing difficult.
- The exchange environment facilitates layering by allowing multiple transactions and transfers through various user accounts or wallets.
- Offenders transfer stolen crypto assets across multiple blockchain networks, fragmenting the funds’ transaction history.
- By bridging between chains, they reduce the effectiveness of traditional tracing methods and AML analytics.
- This rapid, cross-chain layering obfuscates the origin of illicit rug-pull proceeds.
- Fraudsters use crowdfunding-like platforms to present an ICO or token sale under the pretense of a promising crypto project.
- They gather small contributions from many investors and abruptly disappear once they accumulate enough capital.
- Limited verification of project legitimacy on some platforms makes these scams easy to initiate and difficult to prevent.
Actors
Investors are exploited in rug pull schemes by:
- Contributing funds to what appears to be a legitimate token or project.
- Unwittingly providing illicit operators with capital that is swiftly siphoned off.
- Encountering delayed or ineffective AML safeguards, as transactions initially seem like standard investments.
- Ultimately holding worthless tokens once the perpetrators vanish with the liquidity.
Illicit operators orchestrate rug pull scams by:
- Launching or heavily promoting a new token under false pretenses.
- Soliciting investment from unsuspecting participants and abruptly removing all liquidity.
- Rapidly moving or converting criminal proceeds among multiple crypto addresses or fiat accounts to frustrate AML controls.
- Concealing true ownership and identities, hindering beneficial ownership checks.
References
INTERPOL. (2024, May). INTERPOL Global Financial Fraud Assessment. INTERPOL. https://www.interpol.int/en/Search-Page?search=Global+Financial+Fraud+Assessment
Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS). (2024). Virtual assets risk assessment report Singapore 2024. MAS. https://www.mas.gov.sg/publications/monographs-or-information-paper/2024/virtual-assets-risk-assessment
Lange, A. (2022). Financial crime in the metaverse is real – how can we fight back?. Wolf Theiss. https://www.wolftheiss.com/insights/financial-crime-in-the-metaverse-is-real/