Online Gambling

Criminals exploit online gambling sites to layer illicit proceeds by blending them with regular gaming transactions. Often, they first purchase high-value vouchers or utilize stolen payment credentials to fund multiple accounts, distributing deposits in small increments that appear ordinary. Once loaded, minimal or hedged bets camouflage large capital flows, enabling criminals to withdraw or transfer balances immediately as purported winnings. Many operations leverage unlicensed or lightly regulated sites whose inadequate KYC protocols make it harder to detect fraudulent player profiles and cross-border transactions. Some schemes involve buying other players’ legitimate winnings at a premium or setting up offshore platforms with limited oversight, thereby integrating illicit funds into the financial system as apparently lawful gambling profits. The cross-border nature of these platforms—combined with alternative payment methods, prepaid card usage, and inconsistent regulatory standards—further obscures the underlying criminal source and complicates AML enforcement efforts.

[
Code
T0017
]
[
Name
Online Gambling
]
[
Version
1.0
]
[
Parent Technique
]
[
Tactics
]
[
Risk
Product Risk, Channel Risk, Jurisdictional Risk
]
[
Created
2025-02-06
]
[
Modified
2025-04-02
]

Internet Gambling

Virtual Bettering

Online Wagering

Online Gambling Approach

Online Casino

Online Gambling With Prepaid Cards

Alternative Payment Methods

Stolen Gambling Account Usage

Tactics

ML.TA0007
|
|

Criminals repeatedly deposit illicit proceeds into online gambling accounts in small increments, commingling them with legitimate wagers. They subsequently move these funds across multiple accounts and jurisdictions, explicitly aiming to obscure the origin of the funds and complicate detection.

Risks

RS0002
|
Product Risk
|

Online gambling's inherent feature of easily converting deposited funds into 'winnings' creates a distinct vulnerability. Criminals exploit the ability to commingle illicit proceeds with legitimate wagers and rapidly withdraw them as apparently authentic gambling profits, obscuring the funds' illegal origin.

RS0003
|
Channel Risk
|

Criminals primarily exploit online delivery channels to launder funds through remote account creation and fund transfers with minimal or non-existent face-to-face verification. These digital platforms allow small structured deposits from prepaid cards or stolen credentials to appear as routine gambling activity, making layering and rapid cross-border transfers difficult to detect. This constitutes the central vulnerability, enabling anonymity and continuous layering across multiple accounts and jurisdictions.

RS0004
|
Jurisdictional Risk
|

The technique involves deliberately using unlicensed or lightly regulated offshore gambling platforms with weaker AML frameworks. Criminals exploit cross-border regulatory gaps to reduce oversight, taking advantage of inconsistent standards in different regions to facilitate anonymous deposits and withdrawals, thereby complicating AML enforcement.

Indicators

IND01299
|

Multiple online gambling accounts registered under overlapping or slightly varied personal details, indicating potential identity manipulation or synthetic identities.

IND01300
|

Structured deposits in small amounts from prepaid cards or loyalty programs across multiple gambling accounts, consistently remaining below reporting thresholds.

IND01301
|

Rapid cycles of deposits, brief betting activity, and nearly immediate withdrawals that do not align with typical gambling patterns.

IND01302
|

Use of cross-border fund transfers originating from jurisdictions with lax AML controls or inconsistent IP/geolocation data compared to the customer’s known profile.

IND01303
|

Anomalous betting patterns, such as placing wagers with irregular odds or amounts that deviate significantly from typical usage, suggesting artificially manipulated outcomes or layering.

IND01305
|

Exploitation of peer-to-peer betting or exchange networks to circulate funds among multiple accounts, obscuring the transaction trail and the true origin of the funds.

IND01306
|

Frequent account activity with large deposits far exceeding actual betting volume, indicative of minimal gambling use and potential layering.

IND01307
|

Login activities from devices or IP addresses that deviate significantly from a user’s typical profile, including frequent geolocation changes over short timeframes.

IND01308
|

Large or repeated purchases of other players’ legitimate winnings or cash-out balances at amounts above the official pay-out value, disguising illicit proceeds as lawful gambling earnings.

Data Sources

  • Captures e-wallet and digital payment transactions, including user identifiers, timestamps, amounts, and device details.
  • Reveals structured or frequent deposits funneled from digital payment accounts into multiple gambling accounts.
  • Supports detection of layering attempts leveraging alternative payment methods to obscure the origin of funds.
DS0033
|
|
  • Contains records of known or suspected fraudulent identities, including stolen or compromised payment credentials.
  • Enables detection of accounts opened using fraudulent details or stolen data.
  • Helps identify the use of compromised payment cards to fund online gambling accounts, linking suspicious identities to broader fraud patterns.
  • Contains details on cross-border wires, correspondent banking relationships, intermediary banks, and settlement processes.
  • Reveals the movement of funds to or from high-risk or lightly regulated jurisdictions.
  • Assists investigators in tracing complex cross-border layers of gambling-related transactions.

Mitigations

Perform thorough country risk assessments for cross-border gambling transactions from jurisdictions recognized for weak AML controls or minimal regulatory oversight. Assign higher risk ratings and implement earlier triggers for Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) or service restrictions. This ensures that suspicious cross-border flows are identified promptly and subjected to heightened scrutiny.

Require deeper background checks on high-value or frequent gamblers by verifying the legitimacy of their funding sources. Cross-check large or repeated deposits against known income and probe for unusual betting activity or suspicious use of prepaid cards. Apply Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) to players from jurisdictions with lenient gambling oversight to mitigate the risk of cross-border layering.

Enforce stringent ID verification for new gambling-related accounts by requiring official photo identification, verification of payment method ownership, and cross-checking personal details with external databases. Detect synthetic or repetitive account information that indicates layering or stolen identity usage.

Implement specialized monitoring rules to detect anomalies in deposit, betting, and withdrawal patterns that signal layering. Look for multiple small deposits from diverse funding sources with minimal wagering activity, followed by rapid withdrawals to different accounts or jurisdictions. Track cross-border flows, usage of prepaid cards, overlapping account details, frequent IP changes, and mismatched geolocation data that indicate stolen credential usage or cross-border layering.

Mandate multi-factor authentication and continuous login tracking for all gambling-related transactions. Flag abrupt changes in IP address, device fingerprint, or location to detect stolen credential usage or collusion across multiple accounts in different jurisdictions.

Leverage public records, adverse media checks, and social media analytics to scrutinize frequent or high-value gambling account holders. Verify the authenticity of stated addresses or identities and identify contradictory information, such as claims of local residence contradicted by foreign IP usage.

Block or limit transactions to unlicensed or lightly regulated gambling sites known for lax KYC practices. Impose usage thresholds or account restrictions when unusual patterns are detected, such as repeated minimal bets with large deposit or withdrawal volumes. Block suspicious accounts from continuing illicit funds layering.

Instruments

  • Criminals create multiple accounts on online gambling platforms using minimal or fabricated KYC details, making illicit deposits appear as standard player funds.
  • They place only small or hedged bets to create the illusion of legitimate gambling activity and quickly withdraw or transfer the balance as purported, legitimate 'winnings.'
  • This layering tactic obscures the true origin of the funds, especially on sites lacking robust monitoring or cross-border transaction oversight.
  • Criminals use stolen or compromised card credentials to fund online gambling accounts, disguising illicit proceeds as routine deposit transactions.
  • Due to insufficient identity checks on some gambling sites, these card-based deposits blend with legitimate gaming activity, evading clear detection.
  • Withdrawals from the gambling platform as ‘winnings’ further obscure the origin, completing a layer of the laundering process.
  • Criminals load illicit proceeds onto prepaid cards or vouchers and deposit them into gambling accounts in structured, low-value increments that resemble regular player transactions.
  • Because these cards can be registered with limited or false personal data, they mask the true beneficiary, facilitating repeated loading and subsequent cash-outs without drawing significant scrutiny.
  • The resultant ‘winnings’ withdrawals appear legitimate, making it difficult for authorities to trace the original illicit source.

Service & Products

  • Criminals load illicit proceeds onto prepaid cards and deposit them into online gambling accounts in structured, low-value increments.
  • These cards circumvent stricter banking controls while offering anonymity if KYC is minimal, making it harder to trace ultimate beneficiaries.
  • Subsequent withdrawals from gambling platforms appear as legitimate refunds or winnings, blurring the origin of the funds further.
  • Criminals set up online gambling accounts to deposit illicit proceeds in small increments, masking the true source under seemingly legitimate wagers.
  • Minimal or hedged bets camouflage large fund flows, allowing quick withdrawals as “winnings,” thereby integrating illegal funds into the financial system.
  • Unlicensed or lightly regulated platforms lacking robust KYC controls facilitate account creation with stolen or synthetic identities, increasing anonymity and obscuring cross-border transactions.
  • Enables quick deposit and withdrawal channels for gambling platforms, providing a ready avenue for funneling illicit proceeds.
  • Stolen or compromised payment credentials can fund gambling accounts, where transactions appear as legitimate betting activity until withdrawn as legitimate “winnings.”
  • Lax or inconsistent monitoring of funds transfers to/from gambling sites complicates AML efforts and helps disguise suspicious financial flows.

Actors

Prepaid card issuers are exploited when:

  • Criminals load illicit proceeds onto prepaid cards in manageable increments.
  • These cards are then used to deposit funds into online gambling accounts under the guise of normal gaming transactions.

Financial institutions struggle to trace inflows from prepaid cards, leading to difficulties linking withdrawals back to criminal origins.

AT0038
|
|

Legitimate gamblers can be co-opted or involved when:

  • Criminals purchase their genuine winnings at a premium, turning illicit proceeds into officially recognized gambling payouts.

Financial institutions often receive these funds as normal gambling gains, making it challenging to distinguish lawful transactions from those that mask criminal proceeds.

Professional money launderers exploit online gambling sites by:

  • Creating multiple player accounts with minimal or falsified KYC details.
  • Depositing illicit funds in small, structured increments to avoid detection.
  • Placing only minimal or hedged bets to simulate routine gambling activity, then withdrawing or transferring balances as purported winnings.

Such practices challenge financial institutions’ transaction monitoring because funds re-enter the formal banking system labeled as legitimate gaming returns.

Payment service providers handle deposit and withdrawal channels that criminals exploit by:

  • Accepting transactions sourced from stolen or compromised payment credentials, disguising them as legitimate wagers.
  • Overlooking rapid or irregular deposit and withdrawal patterns due to insufficient monitoring.

This weak oversight allows illicit proceeds to flow through gambling sites largely unchecked, complicating financial institutions’ efforts to detect suspicious activity.

Gambling operators, particularly those unlicensed or with lax oversight, facilitate money laundering by:

  • Allowing remote account registration with weak or nonexistent KYC controls.
  • Enabling cross-border deposits, withdrawals, and alternative payment methods that thwart conventional AML checks.
  • Sometimes operating offshore, exploiting minimal regulatory environments.

These conditions hamper financial institutions’ ability to identify or trace illicit flows, as gambling transactions blend with legitimate gaming activity.

References

  1. AUSTRAC (Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre). (2012). Typologies and case studies report 2012. AUSTRAC. https://www.austrac.gov.au/business/how-comply-guidance-and-resources/guidance-resources/typologies-and-case-studies-report-2012

  2. AUSTRAC (Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre). (2020, November). Worked examples for the online wagering industry. AUSTRAC. https://www.austrac.gov.au/business/how-comply-guidance-and-resources/guidance-resources/worked-examples-online-wagering-industry

  3. FINTRAC (Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada). (2024). Special Bulletin on laundering the proceeds of crime through online gambling sites (FINTRAC-2024-SB001). FINTRAC.https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/intel/bulletins/gambling-jeu-eng.pdf

  4. MONEYVAL. (2013, April). The use of online gambling for money laundering and the financing of terrorism purposes. https://rm.coe.int/research-report-the-use-of-online-gambling-for-money-laundering-and-th/168071509c

  5. Tropina, T. (2014). Fighting money laundering in the age of online banking, virtual currencies and internet gambling. Max-Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law. ERA Forum 15(1):69-84. DOI:10.1007/s12027-014-0335-2