Criminals utilize cross-chain token wrapping to transfer illicit assets between blockchain networks by locking tokens on one chain and minting wrapped equivalents on another. By converting original proceeds into wrapped tokens such as WBTC or wETH, they effectively break address continuity and complicate standard blockchain analytics. In many cases, bridging services operate without a central provider, impairing KYC and oversight measures. While these mechanisms serve legitimate purposes in DeFi and blockchain-based gaming, their pseudonymous structures allow criminals to embed illicit gains with minimal detection. Once the wrapped tokens cross multiple networks, adversaries typically perform further swaps or bridging steps across diverse protocols, fragmenting the transaction history as part of a multi-hop layering strategy. This approach reduces transparency, conceals transactional origins, and significantly challenges investigators tracing funds back to their source.
Cross-Chain Token Wrapping
Cross-Blockchain Laundering
Tactics
Cross-chain token wrapping and bridging create multi-hop transaction pathways across diverse blockchain networks, explicitly increasing complexity to obscure the source of illicit funds and hinder investigative tracing. This process fulfills the purpose of layering by distancing criminal proceeds from their origin.
Risks
Criminals exploit cross-chain bridging services as an unregulated or minimally regulated channel to transfer illicit funds pseudonymously between blockchain networks. By locking tokens on one chain and minting wrapped equivalents on another, they circumvent standard KYC/AML controls and break on-chain address continuity, thereby frustrating investigations and enabling multi-hop layering.
Indicators
Rapid and repeated conversions between native cryptocurrencies and their wrapped equivalents across multiple blockchain networks with minimal holding periods, indicating layering attempts.
Large-volume transfers involving wrapped tokens that significantly deviate from a customer’s usual transaction pattern, indicating layering or integration attempts.
Frequent cross-chain transfer events in which assets are wrapped, moved, and unwrapped across multiple blockchains with no apparent economic rationale, indicating a structured layering scheme.
Sudden creation or usage of multiple new blockchain wallets dedicated to wrapped token transactions, inconsistent with the customer’s known profile, flagged for closer due diligence.
Discrepancies between a customer’s stated business or investment activities and their complex, multi-step wrapped token transactions, suggesting intentional opacity in asset origins.
Use of multiple custodial platforms or decentralized exchanges with lax AML controls when conducting wrapped token transactions, indicating exploitation of regulatory gaps.
Sudden surges in wrapped token transactions over a short timeframe without a legitimate economic rationale, indicating layering aimed at obscuring illicit funds.
Network analysis revealing clusters of interlinked blockchain addresses consistently engaging in cross-chain wrapping, indicating a systematic layering or obfuscation scheme.
Frequent bridging of funds to lesser-known or newly established blockchain networks with minimal subsequent activity, indicating an effort to fragment the transaction trail.
Data Sources
Data Provided:
- Detailed logs of digital asset transactions, including amounts, timestamps, and wallet addresses processed by VASPs.
- User account information, trading volumes, and history of interactions between custodial and decentralized platforms.
How It Supports Detection/Investigation:
- Identifies the use of multiple VASPs with lax AML measures to conduct large-scale wrapped token transfers.
- Detects suspicious bridging flows and cross-chain activities facilitated through VASP infrastructure.
- Supports uncovering patterns of rapid token wrapping and unwrapping designed to obscure the origin of funds.
Data Provided:
- Verified customer identities, beneficial ownership information, declared accounts and wallets, business activities, risk profiles.
How It Supports Detection/Investigation:
- Enables verification of whether newly created or active wallets for wrapped token transactions are disclosed by the customer.
- Allows comparison of customer-stated business or investment purposes against complex cross-chain wrapping patterns.
- Aids in investigating discrepancies between declared customer profiles and observed asset flows.
Data Provided:
- Transaction identifiers, timestamps, sender and receiver addresses, wrapped token creation and redemption records, cross-chain bridging events.
How It Supports Detection/Investigation:
- Enables tracing of rapid wrap-and-unwrap transactions and multi-chain movements.
- Helps identify suspicious address clusters, repeated bridging steps, and short holding periods indicative of layering.
- Facilitates detection of anomalous funding patterns inconsistent with declared customer activities.
Mitigations
Require deeper scrutiny for customers conducting frequent or high-value cross-chain wrap-and-bridge activities. Verify the source and legitimacy of digital assets used for bridging, confirm the economic rationale behind each hop, and assess counterparties across different blockchain networks to expose hidden layering schemes.
Configure scenario-based monitoring rules and alerts to highlight repeated cross-chain conversions of native tokens into wrapped equivalents with minimal holding times. Track large volumes of wrapped transactions originating from unverified wallets or lesser-known networks, pinpointing layered transfers designed to obscure illicit fund flows.
Implement specialized cross-chain analytics tools to identify token-locking, bridging events, and wrapped token transactions across multiple blockchains. This directly addresses the complexities introduced by cross-chain wrapping by detecting abnormal bridging flows, repeated wrapping/unwrapping, or short holding periods indicative of layering attempts.
Train compliance staff to recognize rapid wrap-and-bridge sequences, newly created or obscure bridging protocols, and high-volume wrapped token flows. Emphasize the detection of layering tactics, such as short holding times or repeated unwrapping events across multiple networks, which commonly signal illicit behavior.
Include cross-chain bridging behaviors as a key risk factor, elevating alerts for customers who frequently move funds across multiple blockchains without a clear economic rationale. Automatically reassess risk levels when bridging activity diverges sharply from a client’s expected transactional profile.
Restrict bridging transactions with platforms lacking robust AML controls, or impose enhanced vetting on them. Enforce additional approval or documentation requirements for cross-chain transfers that exceed defined risk thresholds. This will limit criminals' ability to exploit unregulated services for layering.
Instruments
Criminals deposit their illicit Bitcoin or Ethereum into bridging protocols that lock the tokens on the original chain while minting wrapped equivalents on the target chain. This severs direct address continuity in the public ledger, hindering standard blockchain analytics. Minimal or nonexistent KYC requirements on bridging services further obscure ownership, enabling multi-hop layering across multiple networks.
By converting locked assets on one blockchain into wrapped tokens (e.g., WBTC, wETH) on another, criminals effectively break on-chain links to the original funds. Repeated wrapping and unwrapping across multiple chains fragments transactional data, thwarting investigators' efforts to trace illicit proceeds and facilitating advanced layering.
Service & Products
- DeFi protocols often remove traditional intermediaries or centralized oversight, permitting users to transact pseudonymously.
- Criminals exploit DeFi smart contracts to perform multi-hop transactions involving wrapped tokens, reducing AML visibility and impairing effective KYC controls.
- The inherently decentralized nature of these services, coupled with automated liquidity pools, facilitates rapid cross-chain swaps that layer illicit proceeds and confound investigators.
- Once assets are wrapped and moved across different blockchains, criminals use near-instant cross-chain swap services to convert tokens into various cryptocurrencies, breaking transaction continuity.
- These services often require no extended account setup, enabling rapid, opaque conversion that frustrates typical monitoring and chain analytics.
- Swaps can be repeated multiple times to disperse funds across divergent chains and tokens, amplifying layering complexity.
- Criminals lock or deposit their illicit tokens on one blockchain, mint wrapped equivalents on another chain, and thereby sever the direct on-chain link to the original funds.
- By operating in a largely non-custodial or minimally regulated environment, these bridging services lack robust KYC measures, making it difficult for investigators to trace the origin of assets and identify beneficial owners.
- Repeated bridging across multiple networks further fragments the transaction trail, increasing complexity for AML monitoring tools and obscuring the ultimate fund destination.
Actors
They deposit or lock illicit tokens on one blockchain in bridging protocols, generating wrapped tokens on another chain that severs the direct on-chain link to the original funds.
By repeatedly bridging tokens across multiple networks, they fragment transaction histories and impede standard analytics, making it difficult for financial institutions to detect or trace illicit proceeds.
Financial institutions are challenged to identify the true source or beneficiary of these funds, as bridging protocols often omit robust KYC requirements, reducing transparency and impeding AML monitoring.
Cross-chain bridging services often function as or resemble decentralized VASPs, facilitating token transfers without strong KYC measures or oversight.
Criminals take advantage of these non-custodial bridging protocols to obscure the origin of funds, hinder chain analytics, and complicate financial institutions' due diligence.
Repeated bridging across multiple networks creates complex layering paths, making it more difficult for financial institutions to identify the original source of funds or the ultimate beneficiary.
References
Lam, K. Y., Chan, B.H., Hartel, P., van Staalduinen, M. (2020, June). Combatting cyber-enabled financial crimes in the era of virtual asset and darknet service providers. INTERPOL. http://www.interpol.int
Higgs, J., Flowerday, S. (2024). Towards definitive categories for online video game money laundering. Emerald Group Publishing. https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/jmlc-12-2023-0193/full/html
Akartuna, E. A., Madelin, T. (2022). The state of cross-chain crime: Countering the new age of crypto crime and money laundering in a cross-chain world. Elliptic. https://www.elliptic.co/resources/state-of-cross-chain-crime-report
Zubic, E. (2024). Chain Hopping in Crypto: How to Track Cross-Blockchain Fund Movement. OSINT Ambition. https://publication.osintambition.org/chain-hopping-in-crypto-how-to-track-cross-blockchain-fund-movement-138da36dd6e9