Privacy Wallets

Certain non-custodial cryptocurrency wallets incorporate additional anonymity features—coinjoin protocols, stealth addresses, or zero-knowledge proofs. While partly intended for legitimate privacy, these capabilities can be misused to further obscure beneficial ownership and transaction histories. Criminals employ these wallets to mask the origins of illicit funds, complicating investigative efforts and bypassing routine AML checks. Some wallets offer built-in anonymization (for example, coinjoin-based services) that commingle user funds, breaking the traceable link between sender and recipient. In many cases, criminals also chain-hop into these wallets from more transparent cryptocurrencies to layer proceeds and further fragment the transaction trail. Notably, investigations have shown a rise in illicit funds passing through privacy wallets instead of traditional mixers, with certain analyses indicating a measurable proportion of laundered assets moving through these tools. Although some financial institutions now screen inbound and outbound transfers for known privacy wallet addresses, advanced anonymity features still challenge regulatory oversight and complicate detection.

[
Code
T0034.001
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[
Name
Privacy Wallets
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Version
1.0
]
[
Risk
Product Risk, Channel Risk
]
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Created
2025-02-06
]
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Modified
2025-04-02
]

Privacy Wallet With Built-In Mixing

Privacy Wallet Use

Anonymous Cryptocurrency Wallets

Anonymous Virtual Asset Transactions

Cryptocurrency for Tax Evasion

Tactics

Privacy wallets use advanced anonymity features that hinder law enforcement by concealing transaction details and ownership data, explicitly enabling criminals to bypass AML checks and investigative scrutiny.

Risks

RS0002
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Product Risk
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This technique primarily exploits anonymity-enabled wallet products to hinder detection. Criminals leverage advanced privacy features such as coinjoin, stealth addresses, and zero-knowledge proofs inherent to these wallets. These features obscure beneficial ownership and transaction histories, making it significantly harder for regulated entities to trace or monitor funds.

RS0003
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Channel Risk
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Privacy wallets often operate in peer-to-peer or decentralized environments outside traditional regulated channels, weakening oversight and enabling criminals to bypass standard AML checks. This limits transparency on transaction flows and impedes routine monitoring by financial institutions.

Indicators

IND00023
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Rapid, consecutive transactions with minimal holding periods in and out of privacy wallets indicate that funds are being quickly mixed and redistributed.

IND00024
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Multiple incoming transfers from unrelated external sources converging into a privacy wallet followed by dispersal to a variety of destinations signal the merging and shuffling of funds.

IND00025
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High volumes of digital assets routed through addresses associated with coin mixers or tumblers that deviate from the customer’s typical transactional patterns.

IND00026
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Repeated layering of transactions through privacy wallets, where funds are merged and re-distributed in multiple stages, creating complex patterns that obscure original sources and end recipients.

IND01093
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Customers using privacy wallets without a demonstrable business or personal need, as evidenced by their documented profile and transaction history, deviating from normal usage patterns.

IND01094
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Frequent cross-chain transfers from transparent blockchains into privacy wallets or anonymity-focused cryptocurrencies, inconsistent with the user’s normal behavior or stated business purpose.

Data Sources

  • Includes detailed records of customers’ digital asset transactions, wallet addresses, deposit and withdrawal logs, and associated account details maintained by VASPs.
  • Helps investigators identify the use of privacy wallets, trace rapid or suspicious transfers, and correlate user activity with KYC information to detect layering and anonymity-enhancing behaviors.
  • Contains verified identities, risk profiles, stated business activities, and transaction histories.
  • Reveals when privacy wallet transactions deviate from a customer’s typical profile or stated purpose, indicating potentially unjustified anonymity-seeking behavior.
  • Provides on-chain transaction data, including addresses associated with privacy wallets, timestamps, and amounts.
  • Enables detection of rapid consecutive transactions, coinjoin usage, cross-chain transfers, and layering patterns that obscure original fund sources.
  • Captures cross-chain bridging and swaps, listing details of trades, parties involved, volumes, and timestamps.
  • Essential for identifying frequent chain-hopping into privacy wallets or anonymity-focused cryptocurrencies as part of complex layering schemes.

Mitigations

Implement tailored Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) protocols for customers transacting with privacy wallets. Require them to disclose the purpose of advanced anonymization features and provide verifiable documentation for both the source and destination of funds. Corroborate these claims by employing blockchain forensic tools and, if needed, external data sources to verify transaction legitimacy. Classify these relationships as higher risk and apply stricter ongoing monitoring to detect any further obfuscation attempts.

Continuously monitor on-chain transactions using specialized blockchain analysis software. Identify patterns indicative of layering, chain-hopping across multiple cryptocurrencies, and the use of coinjoin or zk-based protocols to obscure ownership. By tracking wallet histories and linking addresses, institutions can detect high-risk clusters and disrupt attempts to launder proceeds via privacy-focused wallets.

Leverage specialized blockchain analytics to detect wallet addresses known for privacy features or mixer-first funding patterns, focusing on anomalous deposits or withdrawals that suggest an attempt to mask fund origins. When activity is flagged, compliance teams rapidly investigate and file SARs detailing the anonymization methods employed, ensuring regulatory bodies are informed of potential layering or advanced obfuscation tactics.

Restrict or block high-risk transactions to and from known privacy wallet addresses unless the customer provides a legitimate rationale for such usage. Temporarily suspend or hold funds originating from advanced anonymization methods until further due diligence is completed, preventing continued layering and protecting the institution from facilitating illicit flows.

Instruments

  • Criminals use privacy-oriented cryptocurrencies (e.g., Monero, Zcash) within these advanced wallets to capitalize on stealth addresses, ring signatures, or zero-knowledge proofs. Such features inherently conceal transaction details.
  • By holding, layering, or exchanging these privacy coins in a wallet designed to obscure flows, criminals mask the origins and ownership of illicit proceeds, hindering regulatory insight and law enforcement investigations.
  • Criminals funnel transparent cryptocurrencies (e.g., Bitcoin, Ethereum) into non-custodial privacy wallets that implement coinjoin or stealth addresses, commingling illicit funds with unrelated transactions. This process severs the on-chain link to the original source and frustrates AML monitoring.
  • By leveraging chain-hopping to shift value into and out of these wallets across multiple networks, launderers break transaction continuity and further complicate investigative tracing efforts.

Service & Products

  • Enables rapid conversion of cryptocurrencies between different chains or tokens, often without extensive KYC checks, allowing criminals to further mask transaction histories.
  • Successive swaps and layering degrade traceability, obfuscating the flow of illicit assets before or after entering a privacy wallet.
  • Facilitates ‘chain-hopping’ by moving funds from transparent blockchains into privacy-focused wallets or networks, layering illicit proceeds and fragmenting the transaction trail.
  • Repeated bridging creates multiple, complex transfers that hamper law enforcement efforts to link transactions back to their origin.
  • Criminals leverage privacy-enhanced, non-custodial digital wallets (e.g., coinjoin or stealth addresses) to obscure ownership, making it difficult for investigators to trace illicit funds.
  • Mixing or commingling features within these wallets break the link between sender and recipient, complicating AML checks and concealing the original source of assets.

Actors

Professional money launderers exploit privacy wallets to:

  • Layer and commingle client funds through coinjoin protocols or stealth addresses, deliberately breaking transaction chains and obscuring beneficial ownership.
  • Repeatedly move illicit assets between transparent and privacy-focused blockchains to degrade institutional oversight and hamper attempts to link funds to a single origin.

This orchestrated use of privacy features greatly complicates financial institutions’ due diligence efforts, as it conceals transactional trails and makes it difficult to identify patterns or detect connections to predicate crimes.

Illicit operators use privacy wallets to:

  • Mask the origins of proceeds derived from crimes (e.g., fraud, smuggling) by leveraging built-in mixing or coinjoin features.
  • Conduct rapid chain-hopping from transparent blockchains into privacy-focused wallets, fragmenting the transaction trail and evading straightforward tracing.

These tactics undermine financial institutions' ability to detect suspicious crypto movements and perform effective transaction monitoring, as the commingled or stealth transactions complicate identifying the true beneficiary or source of funds.

AT0072
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Tax evaders leverage privacy wallets to:

  • Conceal control over digital assets by using stealth addresses or mixing protocols, limiting the visibility of their holdings from tax authorities.
  • Shift funds between multiple networks or tokens (chain-hopping) to circumvent transparent reporting mechanisms.

These practices hinder financial institutions' capacity to detect irregular asset flows, as the anonymity features disrupt typical monitoring and hamper verification of account activity against reported income or known obligations.

References

  1. Financial Action Task Force (FATF). (2021). Updated guidance for a risk-based approach: Virtual assets and virtual asset service providers. FATF. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Guidance-rba-virtual-assets-2021.html

  2. Carlisle, D. (2024). Preventing financial crime in cryptoassets: Identifying evolving criminal behavior. Elliptic.https://www.elliptic.co/hubfs/Elliptic%20Typologies%20Report%202024.pdf

  3. Costa, A. (2023). Preventing financial crime in cryptoassets: Investigating illicit funds flows in a cross-chain world. Elliptic.https://www.elliptic.co/hubfs/Elliptic_LEA_Typologies_2023_Report.pdf

  4. Elliptic. (2020). Financial crime typologies in cryptoassets: The Concise Guide for Compliance Leaders. Elliptic. http://www.elliptic.co . https://www.elliptic.co/hubfs/Financial%20Crime%20Typologies%20in%20Cryptoassets%20Guides%20(All%20Assets)/Typologies_Concise%20Guide_12-20.pdf