Cross-Border Payment Service

• Criminals pair misrepresented trade invoices with international payment transfers, concealing the underlying economic reality of transactions.
• The layering of funds across jurisdictions complicates investigations, as cross-border payment operators rely on declared values in trade documents.

• Criminals present falsified settlement documents in cross-border payment channels, masking illicit funds as proceeds from legitimate trade.
• They exploit varying regulatory standards across jurisdictions, making it difficult to detect mismatched or inflated invoices in real time.

• Facilitate complex international transfers under the pretense of financing global entertainment projects or paying foreign talent.
• Aid in layering funds across multiple jurisdictions, exploiting gaps in AML controls between different countries.

• Criminals transfer funds internationally under the cover of charitable donations, exploiting weaker AML regulations in certain jurisdictions.
• By dispersing transactions across multiple regions, they add complexity that hinders investigators from tracing beneficiaries and origins.

• Enable nonprofits disguised as educational institutions to receive or send international donations, tuition fees, or grants—concealing cross-border movement of illicit funds.
• Gaps in AML regulations across different jurisdictions allow criminals to layer proceeds globally while maintaining a nonprofit front.

• Criminals employ multiple citizenship documents to lessen oversight on international fund transfers.
• Differences in KYC standards among jurisdictions allow them to obscure discrepancies in their documentation.
• Rapid cross-border movements of value complicate regulatory attempts to trace transactions back to a single individual.

Automation exploits low-cost, near-instant corridors (SEPA Instant, FPS, UPI, etc.), hopping value through 3+ countries in an hour to bury jurisdictional traceability.

• Facilitates the transfer of proceeds from smuggled goods across jurisdictions, enabling layering and disguising the illicit origin of funds.
• Criminals can route payments through multiple countries, complicating investigators’ efforts to trace the source of capital.

• Transfer profits internationally through channels with inconsistent AML regimes, concealing actual beneficiaries.
• Employ layered transactions to obscure funds’ origin, rapidly shifting illicit proceeds among multiple jurisdictions.

• Facilitates transnational transfers framed as foreign direct investment to distance funds from their criminal source.
• Multiple jurisdictional layers reduce transparency, complicating regulators' efforts to trace beneficial owners.

• Facilitate rapid international transfers to accounts in tax havens, assisting in layering and concealing beneficial ownership.
• Leverage weak AML measures and limited data-sharing across borders, rendering it more difficult to trace funds effectively.

• Allow frequent offshore remittances under various commercial pretexts, fragmenting transaction trails.
• Support rapid looping of funds among multiple jurisdictions, making it difficult for authorities to link transfers back to illicit sources.

• Enables the rapid movement of funds across countries under the guise of legitimate trade settlements.
• Criminals exploit uneven AML protocols in multiple jurisdictions, making it harder to detect the fictitious nature of transactions.

• Criminals route funds across different countries under the guise of legitimate trade, scattering partial and advanced payments to evade detection.
• Frequent cross-border transfers mask the origin of funds and complicate compliance checks by leveraging multiple jurisdictions with weaker oversight.

• Multiple over- or under-invoiced payments flow through cross-border transfers, exploiting inconsistent AML standards among jurisdictions.
• Rapid international routing fragments transaction trails, masking the original source of illicit funds.

• Enables rapid international fund transfers linked to carbon credit trades, moving illicit proceeds into multiple jurisdictions.
• The cross-border nature of these payments adds layers of complexity, reducing transparency and impeding law enforcement efforts.

• Criminals exploit the service’s global reach, routing funds through jurisdictions with weaker AML oversight to obscure the funds’ origin.
• They leverage partial or delayed adoption of standardized data identifiers (e.g., LEIs) to limit transparency on ultimate beneficiaries and originators.
• By selecting intermediary banks or corridors with weaker controls, they create complex transaction chains that hinder unified tracking by investigators.

• Criminals leverage these services to move funds internationally, exploiting differences in AML enforcement among jurisdictions.
• Layered transfers across multiple regional payment providers obscure the origin and beneficial owner, impeding investigative efforts.

• Perpetrators leverage official customs declarations to justify international transfers of funds, asserting these declared amounts represent legitimate capital.
• Such cross-border transfers complicate AML efforts due to inconsistent coordination among jurisdictions, allowing criminals to obscure the money’s true origin.
• Re-using or falsifying border declaration records multiple times helps inflate or legitimize additional illicit sums transferred back under the pretense of lawful possessions.

• Enables large international fund transfers under the guise of M&A payments, leveraging multiple jurisdictions for layering.
• The purported corporate acquisitions conceal significant capital outflows, diminishing transaction transparency and impeding AML scrutiny.

• Enables convenient international transfers, allowing criminal organizations to quickly shuttle proceeds across jurisdictions with limited transparency.
• Complex currency routes and intermediaries diminish the trail, helping launder earnings from large-scale narcotics operations.

• Enables international transfer of funds tied to the sale of falsified pharmaceuticals, often routed through jurisdictions with weak oversight.
• Criminals may structure or layer transactions across multiple accounts to mask beneficial ownership and distance funds from their illicit origin.

• Facilitates the international transfer of inflated export proceeds, allowing large sums to be routed as if they stem from normal commercial transactions.
• Complex cross-border paths obscure the true source of funds and the inflated values, impeding AML oversight.